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Abstract
The amount of data for processing and categorization grows at an ever increas-
ing rate. At the same time the demand for collaboration and transparency
in organizations, government and businesses, drives the release of data from
internal repositories to the public or 3rd party domain. This in turn increase
the potential of sharing sensitive information. The leak of sensitive informa-
tion can potentially be very costly, both financially for organizations, but also
for individuals. In this work we address the important problem of sensitive
information detection. Specially we focus on detection in unstructured text
documents.
We show that simplistic, brittle rule sets for detecting sensitive information
only find a small fraction of the actual sensitive information. Furthermore we
show that previous state-of-the-art approaches have been implicitly tailored
to such simplistic scenarios and thus fail to detect actual sensitive content.
We develop a novel family of sensitive information detection approaches
which only assumes access to labeled examples, rather than unrealistic as-
sumptions such as access to a set of generating rules or descriptive topical
seed words. Our approaches are inspired by the current state-of-the-art for
paraphrase detection and we adapt deep learning approaches over recursive
neural networks to the problem of sensitive information detection. We show
that our context-based approaches significantly outperforms the family of pre-
vious state-of-the-art approaches for sensitive information detection, so-called
keyword-based approaches, on real-world data and with human labeled exam-
ples of sensitive and non-sensitive documents.
A key challenge in the field of sensitive information detection is the lack
of publicly available real-world datasets on which to train and/or benchmark
on. This is due to the inherent sensitive nature of the data in question.
We address this issue in this work by releasing publicly labeled examples of
sensitive and non-sensitive content. We release a total of 8 different types
of sensitive information over 2 distinct sets of documents. We utilize efforts
by human domain experts in labeling both datasets for 4 complex types of
informational content for each set of documents. This release totals 750, 000
labeled sentences with their parse trees for the research community to make
use of.
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Resumé
Mængden af information tilgængeligt som skal kunne automatisk håndteres
og bearbejdes vokser eksplosivt. Dette sker samtidigt med øget fokus på del-
ing af data og krav om transparens. Dette øger risikoen for deling af po-
tentielt følsomme oplysninger som ikke skulle have været delt. Sådanne fejl-
agtige delinger og afsløringer af følsomme oplysninger er forbundet med høje
omkostninger. I denne afhandling adresseres det voksende og komplekse prob-
lemområde omkring at finde følsomme informationer ved hjælp af datalogiske
algoritmer. Specifikt fokuseres på at finde følsomme oplysninger i ustruktur-
erede tekst dokumenter.
Vi påviser at simple regelsæt kun finder en relativ lille del af de faktiske føl-
somme oplysninger i tekst dokumenter. Vi påviser også at tidligere udgivende
algoritmer til at finde følsom information har båret en indbygget svaghed
således at disse algoritmer kun kan finde simpel følsom information.
Vi udvikler og beskriver en hel ny familie af algoritmer til at finde følsom
informationer. Vi antager adgang til eksempler af følsomme og ikke-følsomme
dokumenter. Dette er i kontrast til tidligere algoritmer med potentielt ureal-
istiske antagelser, så som at al følsom information kan indfanges af små sæt
af emneord. Vores nye algoritmer er inspireret af algoritmer indenfor “para-
phrase detection”. Vi tilpasser og forandre disse algoritmer baseret på dybe
rekursive kunstige neurale netværk. Vi efterviser eksperimentelt at vores al-
goritmer er signifikant bedre til at finde følsom information end de tidligere
udviklede og anvendte, såkaldte emneord-baserede algoritmer.
En stor udfordring for den forsatte forskning, udvikling og kvalitetssikring
indenfor det samfundsmæssige vigtige felt; at finde og beskytte følsomme in-
formationer, er manglen på adgang til relevant data. Da følsomme informa-
tioner, i sagens natur, er følsomme, er der en absolut mangel på datasæt som
kan bruges til at forske og udvikle nye tilgange og algoritmer. Dette funda-
mentale problem adresseres i denne afhandling. Vi frigiver 8 forskellige typer
af følsomme oplysninger over 2 meget forskellige datasæt af dokumenter. Vi
anvender angivelser af følsomhed foretaget af domæne eksperter. For hvert
datasæt frigiver vi 4 dokument-niveau angivelser af forskellige slags følsomme
informationer. Sammenlagt frigiver vi mere end 750.000 sætninger med an-
givelse af følsomhed og med semantiske træer over sætningerne som forskere
og udviklere kan gøre brug af.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Collaboration requires sharing of information. This is particularly true for
large organizations such as companies or public institutions. Such organiza-
tions face the need to handle and share large sets of documents without sharing
or leaking any potentially sensitive information. The work in this dissertation
is about the important problem of detecting such sensitive information in text
documents.
Text documents which are to be shared, whether only with some 3rd par-
ties or released publicly, may contain information that is sensitive in nature.
There are many types of information which may be sensitive. For companies
examples of such sensitive information are intellectual property, or progress
on new products. For public institutions or other organizations this could
be information on ongoing dealings, information on strategy or similar. This
information can be personal information about a specific individual. For in-
stance information such as name, address, gender, specific sicknesses, etc. This
kind of sensitive information is referred to as private information.
Any documents which contain sensitive information need to be protected,
i.e., the sensitive information must not be publicized. A key challenge in
this setting is to distinguish the sensitive information from the non-sensitive
information. This is known as sensitive information detection, i.e. identifying
sensitive information in text documents [10, 16, 38, 42, 84].
Sensitive information detection is of great importance in a number of ap-
plications, where unintended leak of sensitive information may incur sever
negative consequences for businesses or authorities. The need is also driven
by a growing trend of transparency in both governmental institutions and
in private companies. For instance, the recent years has seen a number of
government laws and initiatives to promote the exchange and openness of in-
formation, e.g. the Freedom of Information Act in USA1 and EU2 and more
1https://www.foia.gov/
2http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/PDF/r1049_en.pdf
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recently the GDPR protection regulation3.
Due to this growth in data intended for release, the risk of accidentally
leaking sensitive information has increased tremendously. The consequences
of unintended leakage of sensitive information to the public (or to the com-
petition) may be very damaging for public authorities or businesses. To put
this into perspective, the fine for not processing sensitive data according to
regulation can be as large as 4% of yearly turnover for companies according to
the GDPR regulation4. However the cost in terms of lost business data and
customer trust may be even bigger: in 2017 the Poneman Institute conducted
an independent study, sponsored by IBM. The study calculates cost over the
complete life cycle of a data breach, i.e., detection, escalation, notification
(and mitigation), and after-the-fact (ex-post) response [81, 82]. In the study
it was found that the cost to an organization, on average, for a data breach
of sensitive information is $3.6 million.
The detection of sensitive information is important to organizations, both
businesses and public institutions. However, sensitive information detection
is also important on the individual personal level. There can be both social
and financial costs in connection with leak of individual private information.
As 80% of all information exchanged is unstructured [28] this also means
that a large fraction of leaked sensitive information comes from unstructured,
text documents. The Freedom of Information initiative requires millions of
text documents need to be screened yearly [84]. Thus, the number of docu-
ments becomes so large that manual, human inspection becomes very costly
or even intractable.
In this dissertation we investigate sensitive information detection in text
documents using ML algorithms. A Machine Learning (ML) algorithm is an
algorithm which learns from data. An often used definition is “A computer
program is said to learn from experience E with respect to some class of tasks
T and performance measure P, if its performance at tasks in T, as measured
by P, improves with experience E” [72].
In this work we refer to an ML algorithm as a “model”. We have some
data from the task T and we update the model to make the performance (for
example, accuracy of prediction) better when evaluated on the task.
For certain information types, sensitivity may be centered around certain
words. For instance, mentions of AIDS in connection to an individual and
whether an individual is sick, are considered sensitive. However other types of
sensitive information may be more complex (see Chapter 2 for details) in the
sense that they cannot be easily identified via the presence of certain words
alone. For example certain financial transactions may be considered sensitive
for a company but other financial transaction are perhaps not sensitive. The
3https://www.eugdpr.org
4http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-387_en.htm
5two types of financial transactions may be described, using similar words, as
in the example below. Thus, for a complex sensitive information type the
context in which a word appears may influence whether we deem the word to
be sensitive. In this work context denotes the sentence or document in which
the word appear, which may influence whether a text is considered sensitive.
Sensitivity in relation to context turns out to be a critical property of complex
sensitive information and indeed is a main theme in this dissertation.
Next we give an example of complex sensitive information from our re-
leased, labeled dataset [75] which is derived from the public available Enron
dataset. In one of the sensitive information tasks from our released datasets
we have labels for the sensitive information type covering the financial concept
of “prepay transactions”. An example of a possible sensitive leak is a short
email containing the following main text:
Attached are the credit worksheets for Royal Bank of
Canada and Bow River Trust. As we discussed we have
proposed letters of credit for the approved form of
collateral pending further discussion with Treasury
regarding funding impact. We may have to move to cash
margining if necessary.
This text does not contain the word prepay but still this short email is about
a prepay transaction. A co-occurrence word model assign probability to each
word that this word is indicative of the sensitive topic. As we show in our
experiments keyword-based models assign low probability to all words in the
example above and thus mis-classifies the text. However using models that
consider a full sentence at a time we develop approaches which detect semantic
sensitive information as in the above example.
To address the particular needs when detecting such complex sensitive
information types we create a new family of approaches which take context
into account and are thus suited for complex sensitive information detection.
We compare empirically with previous approaches and finds that our family
of approaches find previously undetected sensitive information.
A key challenge when working with sensitive information detection is that
actual labeled sensitive information is not commonly available. Due to the
nature of the type of data there is a natural barrier in obtaining sensitive data
from organizations as they do not wish their sensitive information to be made
public [5].
The lack of public datasets with labeled sensitive information also makes
it difficult to compare or benchmark different approaches against each other.
Previous works report accuracies which are typically based on different datasets
and different definitions of sensitive information and are thus difficult to com-
pare and evaluate.
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Furthermore as we discuss in Chapter 4.2 for realistic benchmark purposes
datasets for benchmarkings must have the critical property that the sensitive
and non-sensitive documents are similar in structure and thus harder to dis-
tinguish than sensitive datasets where artificial sensitive documents have been
inserted into an existing open dataset and where the sensitive documents are
completely different in form than the non-sensitive documents.
To address these shortcomings we create 8 benchmark tasks for sensitive
information detection based on 2 corpora of documents. In total we release
publicly over 750, 000 new, labeled, processed sentences for sensitive detection
training and benchmarking. Each of our definition of sensitive information
types is given as a textual definition and also through a training set. To
ensure that our sensitive information definitions are not overly simplistic we
based our labels on labels provided by human annotators.
Our first 4 benchmark tasks are based on the Enron dataset which consists
of internal and external communication from a number of Enron employees
released as part of an investigation of the practices in the now defunct com-
pany Enron around 2002 [58]. The Enron dataset has been released nearly
completely unaltered and as such is one of the few real-world examples of a
dataset containing several different kinds of sensitive information. Further-
more while the Enron dataset has been utilized by other authors [16, 42, 84]
as example of a real-world dataset, we recognize that to find non-simplistic
sensitive information we need true labels of sensitive information and to obtain
this we need human annotators. Here we propose to use labels generated in
the Legal track of Text Retrieval Conference (TREC) around 2010, we argue
that some of the different topics labeled by human annotators can be viewed
as types of sensitive information and as such together with Enron text docu-
ments an unique large scale real-world dataset with several types of sensitive
information labeled by human annotators.
In [76], also included in Chapter 10 and in detail discussed in Section 5.2,
we propose our second set of benchmark tasks. Similar to the labeled En-
ron dataset our second dataset is a real-world dataset with communication
and documents from a large corporation, Monsanto. These documents was
released to the public in 2017 as part of the ongoing trial of Monsanto (see
Section 5.2). The our processing, labeling and final publication of re-worked
Monsanto dataset is motivated by the need to have more than one dataset
with real-world sensitive information for evaluation and benchmarking of var-
ious sensitive information detection approaches. Furthermore we also need
to validate that biases and dataset specific structures in the Enron dataset
is not captured by sensitive information detection approaches, e.g. that our
approaches generalize to other types of sensitive information. We also note
that the Enron dataset is from around 2002 and thus more than 15 years
old and the need for an updated dataset with documents representative of
communication today is needed.
The Monsanto documents released in the trial are unlabeled. Therefore
7we propose to use labels generated by lawyers at Baum, Hedlund, Aristei &
Goldman[7] as labels for different types of sensitive information. There are 4
different types of sensitive information labeled. For each type we both study
lawyer document labels as sentence label in a silver dataset with weaker (more
noisy) labels and also a golden dataset with true sentence level labels from a
group of annotators. For each sensitive information type we release both the
silver and golden datasets, in total 8 preprocessed datasets with constituency
parse trees for each labeled sentence.
Previous work in detection of sensitive information in textual data rely
on Bayesian statistics based on co-occurrence counting of words in documents
from various domains [16] [38, 84, 91] similarly to the classical and seminal
techniques for classification by topic [14] or sentiment analysis [77]. We refer
to method based on co-occurrence counting as keyword-based approaches be-
cause they count occurrences of keywords. We formalize this for the sensitive
detection domain in Chapter 2 and discuss the keyword-based approaches in
Chapter 3. In general keyword-based models for text classification tend to be
brittle and very sensitive to small changes in training data [94].
In particular, intuitively if we have a sentence with sensitive information,
e.g. a sensitive sentence, and the sentence is rewritten, i.e. paraphrased, such
that the sentence still carries the same information, then, clearly, the sentence
is still sensitive. This intuition prompts us to look into current best approaches
for paraphrase detection and create new approaches which combine the ability
to detect sensitive information with the ability to detect paraphrased infor-
mation. This is the topic of Chapter 4.
So-called Recursive Neural Networks (RecNN) are among the current best
approaches for paraphrase detection [88]. Such models can learn from text
and structure at the same time and this appears to be beneficial for problems
where natural language structure is important such as for instance sentiment
analysis [90] or paraphrase detection [88].
We create RecNN models for sensitive information detection which take
text and structure representations and detect sensitive information. We em-
pirically demonstrate that such RecNN approaches consistently outperform
keyword based approaches.
Neural network models and recursive neural network models have high
costs in terms of training times. This is in contrast with keyword based
approaches which often can be implemented in one pass counting over the data.
To ensure that we can train full RecNN models on a smaller computational
budget we create a new efficient training strategy for neural networks and
empirically demonstrate that this strategy reduces training times drastically
without sacrificing performance of the model. This is discussed further in
Chapter 9.
Detection of sensitive information constitutes a part of so-called Data Leak
Prevention (DLP). In this work we present new approaches to sensitive infor-
mation detection for unstructured documents, which is also sometimes referred
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to as Data Leak Detection (DLD). The approaches presented in this work are
inspired by current deep learning NLP methods which automatic learn seman-
tic and syntactic features through recursive neural networks from the dataset.
1.1 Research Questions
In this dissertation we address the important problem of complex sensitive
information detection using machine learning for automatically detection. The
work done here and in the publications which form part of this dissertation
address the following research questions
RQ1 How can we create state-of-the-art ML models, such as recursive neural
networks, for complex sensitive information detection?
RQ2 How can we efficiently train our models?
RQ3 How do we benchmark different sensitive information detection approaches?
These questions form the boundaries for our investigations, developments and
experiments in the following chapters. In Section 6.2 we relate our contribu-
tions to the research questions posed above.
1.2 Thesis Structure
Part I is outlined as follows; Above we introduced and motivated the problem
domain. In Section 1.1 we outline the research question we aim to answer
with this work. In Chapter 2 we discuss the drawback of simplistic sensitive
information detection which do not properly address the context of potential
leaks. We define the critical property of sensitivity in context which turns out
to guide our work on advanced methods for detecting sensitive information.
In Chapter 3 we discuss previous work on sensitive information detection, we
characterize approaches which do not consider context as keyword-based ap-
proaches. We group previous work into 3 main groups of approaches; n-gram
based (Section 3.1), Inference rule based (Section 3.2) and Pointwise mutual
information based (Section 3.3). We are able to show that all 3 groups are in
fact keyword-based. Furthermore we show this implies that previous state-of-
the-art are blind to certain kinds of sensitive information. In Chapter 4 we
discuss similarities between paraphrase detection and sensitive information
detection. We make slight modifications to the problem formulation of para-
phrase detection such that we transform the paraphrase problem into a new
variant. We show how we can adapt approaches for paraphrase detection into
approaches for the new paraphrase detection variant, and, more importantly
for our purposes, how to adapt the approaches to sensitive information detec-
tion. This we do in Section 4.1 where we introduce recursive neural networks
for sensitive information detection.
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In Chapter 4.2 we address the need for public available benchmark dataset
and evaluations of sensitive information detection approaches. We present two
new datasets with human annotated documents and part of our contribution
is the release of more than 750, 000 labeled sentences and their constituency
parse trees as easy available training data for recursive models and as evalua-
tion of sensitive information detection approaches. In Section 5.1 we present
a dataset based of the Enron dataset and in Section 5.2 we present our second
dataset which is based on recently released documents from the Monsanto
trial.
We end Part I with an outlook in Chapter 6 where we discuss possible
future research directions in Section 6.1 and finally conclude with a discussion
of our contributions in Section 6.2.
An overview of notation used in this work can be found in Table 1.1.
In Part II we include published work, Chapter 7 - Chapter 10:
Chapter 7 Jan Neerbek, Ira Assent and Peter Dolog. Detecting Com-
plex Sensitive Information via Phrase Structure in Recursive Neu-
ral Networks. Advances in Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining,
PAKDD ’18. [74].
Chapter 8 Jan Neerbek, Ira Assent and Peter Dolog. TABOO: De-
tecting unstructured sensitive information using recursive neural
networks. In Proceedings of the 33rd International Conference on
Data Engineering, ICDE ’17. [73].
Chapter 9 Jan Neerbek, Peter Dolog and Ira Assent. Selective Train-
ing: A Strategy for Fast Backpropagation on Sentence Em-
beddings. Advances in Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining,
PAKDD ’19. [75].
Chapter 10 Jan Neerbek and Morten Eskildsen and Peter Dolog and
Ira Assent. A real-world data resource of complex sensitive sen-
tences based on documents from the Monsanto trial. Proceed-
ings of The 12th Language Resources and Evaluation Conference,
LREC ’20 [76].
In accordance with GSST regulations, parts of this thesis was also used
in the progress report for the qualifying examination. Furthermore I hereby
assert that I, the author, independently and in my own words have formulated
Part I of this dissertation. In all included material from previously published
work, Part II, (Chapter 7 - Chapter 10), I have done the main work both in
terms of development of ideas, research and experiments and also in terms
of actual writing of the articles. This is also certified by my co-authors in
co-author statements which have been obtained and which were submitted
together with this dissertation as required.
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Notation Meaning
D A distribution or finite dataset D of documents
VD The vocabulary of words encountered in D
v A vector with components v[i]
M A matrix with components M[i, j]
w A word, such that w ∈ VD
(w1, w2, . . . , wn) A sequence (vector) of words
d A document, i.e. d = (w1, w2, . . . , wnd), where nd is
the length of the document
{w1, w2, . . . , wn} A set of words, e.g. i ∈ [1; n] :wi ∈ VD
 [.] The indicator function which is 1 if the argument is
true and 0 otherwise
R The real numbers
L A labeling function L : D → {0, 1}. See also Defini-
tion 1
|.| Size of argument. I.e. length of sequence or number
of elements in set
‖v‖ Euclidean norm of vector v, i.e. ‖v‖ =
√
vT v
sen(w) A score for how sensitive word (or words) w is (are)
tp, fp, tn, fn True Positive, False Positive, True Negative, False
Negative. For classification into positive (here: sen-
sitive) or negative (here: non-sensitive). True if clas-
sification is correct, False otherwise
Acc Accuracy, Acc = tp+tn
tp+fp+tn+fn
recall recall = tp
tp+fn
precision precision = tp
tp+fp
F1 F1 = 2 precision·recallprecision+recall =
2tp
2tp+fn+fp [26]
Table 1.1: Notation used in Part I. Note in each of the previous published
articles, Chapter 7 - Chapter 9, notation is slightly adapted to a particular
publishing venue and thus not completely captured in this table.
Chapter 2
Sensitive Information
The definition of sensitive is highly domain specific. In healthcare and govern-
ment institutions there is a lot of focus on no leaking of Personally identifiable
information (PII) [60] whereas in organizations, both private and public, there
is (also) focus on not leaking informational content such as documents con-
taining information on, for instance, inventions or strategic plans. Whereas in
text classification classifying might happen according to one-word class defi-
nitions, e.g. a Sports class [14], in this work we focus on sensitive information
which often is a very complex construct and not easily captured by a series of
keywords. E.g. where the definition of what constitutes sensitivity is known
implicitly to domain experts, but a formal definition is not given or may even
be impossible to obtain. Thus we use a data-driven approach where we focus
on sensitive content identified by human annotators, making use of state-of-
the-art ML research. Given a dataset, data and actual labels define what is
sensitive, and we refer to it as the sensitive information type or as the type of
sensitive information.
When we consider sensitive information we always do this in context of
some domain. Examples of domains includes a domain of a single company, or
a domain of a governmental organization. A domain can also be a certain type
of information such as personal information, where an example is information
about a person’s health and sicknesses.
We focus on sensitive content in textual units. Following [16], we consider
a textual unit to be the relevant unit of context. Depending on the task and
domain this could be a document, paragraph, sentence, phrases or words. In
this work we consider sensitive content in the scope of sentences. Working on
the sentence level has value for potential redacting purposes as it allows us
to remove just the sensitive sentences and leave large parts of an otherwise
non-sensitive document untouched. This allows users to browse non-sensitive
parts of a document released based on, say, the Freedom of Information act
discussed in the previous section.
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2.1 Definitions
We assume explicit access to a distribution of sentences S. E.g. for a domain
we have a set of sentences, where each sentence belongs to some distribution.
s ∈ S
and consists of a sequence of words
s = (w1, w2, . . . , wns), ∀i :wi ∈ VS
where ns is the number of words in document s and VS is the vocabulary for
the distribution S.
The sentences are generated by some process in the domain which is gen-
erally not known to us. The size of the distribution S can be theoretically
unbounded if we can obtain new samples from the domain process and in
principle have access to as many samples as we wish, or the distribution can
in fact be a dataset of sentences of some finite size. The latter case is typical
when a released set of sentences with or without labels are available. Thus we
slightly abuse notation and let S denote both an infinite sized probabilistic
distribution of sentences and also a finite sized dataset of sentences.
Two examples of such finite sized datasets are the Enron and Monsanto
sets. with a definition of sensitive information given as a representative sample
of sentences exhibiting some sensitive content. For example, a domain could
be Monsanto and S is the released dataset as discussed in Section 5.2.
Given a domain and a distribution of sentences S, we further need a defi-
nition of what constitutes sensitive information. A number of different defini-
tions have been proposed, e.g. see Chapter 4.2 for concrete domain definitions
based on human annotators and also Chapter 3 for previous work.
For now we abstract from any particular sensitive information definition.
In general we assume access to a labeling function L, i.e. for a given dataset
or distribution S our labeling function is a function from sentences in S to the
binary alphabet {0, 1}
L :S → {0, 1}. (2.1)
This labeling function defines, for a particular domain, which sentences are
sensitive.
Definition 1 Sensitive Definition Given a dataset or distribution of sen-
tences S and a labeling function L. We say the labeling function provides a
definition of sensitive content over the sentences S such that
L(s) = 1 implies some parts of the sentence are sensitive
L(s) = 0 implies none parts of the sentence are sensitive
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For the sensitive information detection problem, one goal for approximat-
ing, machine learning models becomes having the model predict as well as
possible the labeling function as given by Definition 1.
Whereas other sensitive information detection approaches (see Chapter 3)
assume that the sensitive information is defined by a simple, known, generative
function, e.g. seed words, the labeling function defined above is not necessarily
generative. That is, we do not assume a known generative model for sensitive
information. Instead we rely on labeled samples of documents and proceed to
models for finding sensitive information based solely on this labeling function
over a given domain. This is a crucial property compared to approaches which
assume seed-words or another known generative process for labels, see also
Chapter 3 and the discussion of the assumptions made in such approaches.
Also note from Definition 1 that the problem is asymmetric in how the
labels are awarded. If L(s) = 0 then the sentence s is known to be completely
safe, with no sensitive information. The situation for a sensitive sentence
L(s) = 1 is different. In a sensitive sentence some sensitive information is
present. That is, large portions of the sentence might be, and in practice
often are, non-sensitive.
Next we define sensitivity as a function of the context. The context is the
textual unit in which a word appears. In this work we consider the (sensitivity)
context of a word to be the sentence in which it appears, but our approach
can be generalized to considering the document in which the word appears to
be context.
In the following we use the sentence as context. We introduce two core
notions: context-less and context-based sensitive information. Context-less
sensitive information types are then characterized by being invariant to the
context (here: sentence) in which they appear. In a context-less approach, a
word can be assigned a fixed sensitivity score independently of the sentence.
Please note that depending on the model, other information, such as groups
of neighboring words may be part of the sensitivity score definition. However,
if the sensitivity score definition is the same for multiple contexts then we
say that the sensitive score definition (and the sensitive information type) is
context-less. Otherwise it is context-based.
As we demonstrate in this work for complex sensitive information con-
sidering only context-less sensitivity is not always sufficient. Some sensitive
information is undetected by such approaches. With this intuition we define
context-based sensitive information as conditional sensitivity of words given a
context; Given a sentence s we denote the conditional sensitivity of a partic-
ular word (given s) as
sen(w|s)
I.e. the sensitivity score of w in context of s. If another sentence s′ consists of
the same sequence of words, i.e. s′ = s then we require sen(w|s) = sen(w|s′).
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We capture this property in the following definition.
We define context-less sensitive information as
Definition 2 context-less Given a set of conditional sensitivities
∆ = {sen(w0, w1, . . . , wn|s) | ∀i : wi ∈ VS and s ∈ S}
then, if for all n-grams w0, w1, . . . , wn and pair of sentences s, s
′ we have
∀(w0, w1, . . . , wn), s, s′ sen(w0, w1, . . . , wn|s) = sen(w0, w1, . . . , wn|s′)
we say that the sensitivity defined by ∆ defines context-less sensitive informa-
tion.
For context-based sensitive information we similarly define
Definition 3 context-based Given a set of conditional sensitivities
∆ = {sen(w0, w1, . . . , wn|s) | ∀i : wi ∈ VS and s ∈ S}
then if there exists a n-gram w0, w1, . . . , wn and a pair of sentences s, s
′ such
that
∃(w0, w1, . . . , wn), s, s′ sen(w0, w1, . . . , wn|s) = sen(w0, w1, . . . , wn|s′)
we say that the sensitivity defined by ∆ defines context-based sensitive infor-
mation.
In [74] (Chapter 7) we previously published a similar definition. I.e. Defini-
tion 4 in Section 7.2.
The definitions, Definition 2 and Definition 3 again reflect an asymmetry
similar to the asymmetry of what constitutes a sensitive sentence.
Intuitively the two definitions reflect the difference between having a fixed
context of consideration (“context-less”) and having a fluid context of consid-
eration (“context-based”). The widely used n-grams (see Section 3.1) often
provide strong results for natural language problems. In a sense n-gram based
approaches are in-between context-less and context-based. E.g. on one hand,
given a fixed n we may learn an n-gram which can be both sensitive and
non-sensitive, and would require a larger context to correctly detect sensitive
content. On the other hand, most sensitive content can be captured by an
n-gram approach if just n is set high enough.
In our published work, Part II, we contrast previous work, including n-
grams, with more complex methods. To be aligned with our published work,
n-grams are considered context-less approaches in the following.
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2.2 Examples of sensitive content
To make the types of sensitive sentences which we encounter in our datasets
more concrete we here add a few illustrative examples of sensitive vs non-
sensitive sentences.
Example from the GHOST type of sensitive information from the Monsanto
dataset, see Chapter 4.2. In the ghostwriting information type, Monsanto
had people write articles and columns and discussions of other people listed
as authors.
But I suspect that is wishful thinking Are you interested
in writing a column on this topic?
We note that while the human annotators have marked this sentence as being
sensitive (with regards to GHOST ) the sentence itself does not discuss ghost-
writing or who gets credit so the sensitivity is not attached to any one word
but rather to the intent of the communication.
Two more examples, both from the Monsanto REGUL dataset are the follow-
ing:
Regulatory Affairs has shared these recent publications
with IARC and is continuing to share directly with
panelists IARC has a history of questionable and
politically charged rulings on the carcinogenic
properties of products such as cell phones, coffee and
caffeine.
and, (also from REGUL dataset)
rats Study 6: MONSANTO Ill GLOBAL REGULATORY Monsanto
Company Confidential AND GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS BMD Modeling
of Pancreatic Islet Tumor Data in Male Rats Approach
The first REGUL example is actually sensitive according to the sensitive in-
formation type (Monsanto’s dealing with regulatory bodies) whereas the sec-
ond example, even though it contains the word “REGULATORY” is labeled
non-sensitive. From the data we see that the second example is actual experi-
ments reporting internally in Monsanto whereas the first example is discussion
on reporting to regulatory bodies (IARC) from internally in Monsanto that
both make use of related words, but have different labels with respect to the
sensitive information type.

Chapter 3
Keyword-based Approaches
A common approach to detecting sensitive information in texts is based on
word counting, i.e. using statistics on words for prediction. In this chapter
we look at the 3 common families of approaches; n-gram, inference rules and
pointwise mutual information based approaches. We focus here on their usage
in sensitive information detection literature. We show how they are based on
word counting and we show these types of approaches all share some common
properties. Specifically they all have a fixed context size and in sensitive infor-
mation detection the three approaches are used with a sensitive information
definition which is by nature fixed for the corpus on which the approaches
are applied on. Given the operator supplied fixed context size and the static
definition of sensitive we propose that n-gram, inference rules and pointwise
mutual information based approaches to finding sensitive information all only
can find context-less sensitive content, as defined in Definition 2. We show
that all three families of methods essentially consider the same conditional
probabilities to this end. This motivates finding new approaches which does
consider context when assigning sensitivity scores, which we do in Chapter 4.
In our published works we contrast these 3 approaches with more complex
approaches and to be aligned with publications in Part II we consider these
n-gram, inference rules and pointwise mutual information approaches to be
context-less in this chapter.
A defining common characteristic of these approaches, as we show in this
chapter, is that they use words as the necessary statistic for assigning sensi-
tivity score to texts. Approaches which are completely without context only
consider a word at a time. This implies that sensitivity scores are assigned to
individual words
sen(w)
I.e. context-less as defined in Definition 2.
For approaches which use a fixed sized context, this can be extended to
the case where we are working with sequences of words, n-grams
sen(w1, w2, . . . , wn) (3.1)
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which is the sensitivity of the sequence (ordered set) of words w1, w2, up to
wn. We refer to approaches which only considers statistics on the form Equa-
tion (3.1) as being keywords-based because of the fact that these approaches
only considers the probability of (key-)words. By definition keywords-based
approaches are context-less in the sense of Definition 2.
Assume we are given a set of documents D, with vocabulary VD and a
labeling function L(d) over all documents d ∈ D. We can obtain a large set
of describing probabilities by counting over words, e.g. we denote the count
of the sequence (n-gram) w1, w2, . . . , wn occurring in D as
C(w1 ∧ w2 ∧ . . . ∧ wn) =
∑
d∈D
 [(w1 ∧ w2 ∧ . . . ∧ wn) ∈ d]
where  [. . .] is the indicator function which has value 1 if the parameter is true
and value 0 otherwise. The use of the logical and (∧) operator represents the
fact that the words occur together.
Similarly we can count the number of occurrences of w1, w2, . . . , wn in
documents that contain sensitive content, i.e. where L(d) = 1
C(w1∧w2∧ . . .∧wn, L(d) = 1) =
∑
d∈D
 [(w1∧w2∧ . . .∧wn) ∈ d and L(d) = 1].
Given these counts we form estimators for the probabilities
Pr(w1 ∧ w2 ∧ . . . ∧ wn) = C(w1 ∧ w2 ∧ . . . ∧ wn)
|D|
Pr(w1 ∧ w2 ∧ . . . ∧ wn, L(d) = 1) = C(w1 ∧ w2 ∧ . . . ∧ wn, L(d) = 1)
|D|
.
We can apply Bayes Law and obtain an estimate of the conditional probabil-
ity of a document d containing sensitive content given the observation that
w1, w2, . . . , wn occurred in d
Pr(L(d) = 1|w1 ∧ w2 ∧ . . . ∧ wn) = C(w1 ∧ w2 ∧ . . . ∧ wn, L = 1)
C(w1 ∧ w2 ∧ . . . ∧ wn) . (3.2)
Thus if we only consider one n-gram at a time in order to make a prediction
of whether the text under consideration is sensitive or not, then we become
context-less beyond our chosen size n context. We show in this chapter that
the current approaches in sensitive information detection described here all
consider sensitivity one n-gram at a time and thus are context-less in the
sense of Definition 2. Note, however that considering one n-gram at a time
is a choice. Another choice could be to look at the distribution of n-grams
and their sensitivity scores in a text. Doing this could would make the new
approach being less context-less, e.g. it would potentially be possible to detect
sensitivity scores over longer sequences of words than the original n-gram.
In previous work in sensitive information detection no such extension has
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been investigated and as such the approaches considered here only consider
statistics with fixed size context similar to Equation (3.2).
Such probabilities are assigned regardless of the document and the con-
text in which the word sequence occurs. Thus the probability can be viewed
as a context-less sensitivity score for the word sequence and it follows that any
approach which estimates sensitivity using estimators on this form is keyword-
based and only captures context-less sensitive information in the sense of Def-
inition 2.
3.1 n-gram based
In the n-gram model we are concerned with n-grams that co-occur together,
e.g. n words that co-occur together in document. In some sense n-grams are
the prototypical example of a keyword-based approach. Often a n value of 2,
e.g. a bi-gram model, yields surprisingly strong results, e.g. [38]. Whereas
higher n tends to perform less well as our models do not generalize as well
and become brittle with respect to small changes in data [94].
In the n-gram language model we assume we can assign a probability Pr(.)
to word sequences, i.e., Pr(w1, w2, . . . , wn), where wi ∈ VD. The motivation
for looking at the n-gram probabilities for sensitive information detection is
expectation that the distribution of word sequences in sensitive documents
is different from that in non-sensitive documents. I.e. an application of the
Distributional Hypothesis by Harris [41], which can also be informally stated
as
words (meaning) are similar if they appear in similar
contexts [34].
Thus we consider the document as a series of probabilistic events (i.e.
words). The probability of document d occurring is then the joint probability
of the document
Pr(d) = Pr(w1, w2, . . . , wnd).
By applying the chain rule of probability [49] we can write this in the following
form
Pr(w1, w2, . . . , wnd) =
nd∏
i=1
Pr(wi|w1 . . . wi−1).
In the n-gram model we approximate the terms in the above expression by
making the assumption that every word only depends on the previous n − 1
words. This is referred to as the Markov n-gram independence assumption
[78]
Pr(w1, w2, . . . , wnd) =
nd∏
i=1
Pr(wi|wi−n+1 . . . wi−1) (Markov assumption).
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The estimation of the Markovian probabilities is usually done by counting
number of occurrences of (w1, w2, . . . , wn) in documents over the dataset and
then normalizing (i.e., dividing) by the size of the dataset, as we saw in the
introduction to this chapter. Consider a bi-gram example, we estimate the
probability of a sequence (wi, wj) by counting the number of occurrences of the
sequence and dividing by the number of occurrences of any (in this example,
bi-gram) sequence beginning with wi. Thus we obtain (first for the bi-gram
example)
Pr(wj |wi) =
C(wi ∧ wj)∑
wk
C(wi ∧ wk) .
Generally we obtain for word wj and any length n > 0 word sequence
w1, w2, . . . , wn
Pr(wj |w1, w2, . . . , wn) =
C(w1 ∧ w2 ∧ . . . ∧ wn ∧ wj)∑
wk
C(w1 ∧ w2 ∧ . . . ∧ wn ∧ wk) . (3.3)
Approaches based on n-grams with lower order of n, has been previously
applied for sensitive information detection. Hart et al. [42] uses a traditional
bag-of-words classification approach, i.e., 2-grams (word frequencies exceeding
a threshold frequency) to detect sensitive information. The evaluation finds
that SVMs outperform Naïve Bayesian and Rocchio score on pairwise docu-
ment set evaluation. In [47] private information is detected in Twitter feeds
using broad topical (e.g. Latent Dirichlet Allocation) and n-gram features.
Approaches for text sanitization where we not only detect sensitive content
but also apply strategies other than removing to retain utility of the resulting
text also can be based on n-grams such as the uni-gram approach t-pat [48],
but these approaches are similarly sensitive to more context. Indeed the au-
thors in [5] show that doubling the context of t-pat from uni-gram to bi-grams
result in better detection and sanitation, however they do not investigate for
higher values of n.
Using n-gram approaches assign a fixed context size to every probabil-
ity considered. For the approaches described above these probabilities are
considered independently of each other. As argued in the introduction to this
chapter we conclude that such simple use of n-gram approaches do not capture
the contextual sensitive information and can ultimately only assign a fixed,
context-less sensitivity value to each n-gram and thus more complex sensitive
information is not addressed.
3.2 Inference rule based
Inference rule models for sensitive information detection are inspired by as-
sociation rule mining where the goal is to find frequently occurring itemsets
[2]. In the sensitive information detection setting we consider frequently co-
occurring words as elements in frequently itemsets. I.e. similar to n-grams
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we, in inference rule based sensitive information detection, base our statistics
on co-occurrence counts. A inference rule may take the form
A → B
which is to be interpreted as the observation of condition A (left-hand-side)
implies the consequence B (right-hand-side). In association rule mining A is
a frequent itemset and B is also a frequent itemset. For our purposes A is
some expression over words occurring in our data and B ∈ {0, 1}, i.e. B is
a prediction of either “sensitive” (B = 1) or “non-sensitive” (B = 0) . For
each rule we associate a probability known as the confidence of the rule. First
we define the structure of the condition A and then we define the estimated
confidence of the rules using A as a condition.
In general the condition can be a function of the words occurring. From
[16] we extract 3 different ways to combine observed word occurrences
w1 ∧ w2 (3.4)
is true for document d if sequence (w1, w2) occurs in d. Similar a logic formula
w1 ∨ w2 (3.5)
is true for a document d if any of (w1) or (w2) occur in d. Finally we define
the logic formula
¬w1 (3.6)
as true if the word (w1) does not occur in the document in d.
Using the given three basic constructive logic formulas we can generate
more complex Boolean formulas. I.e. by substituting the words in the formulas
with previous derived formulas we may obtain complex formulas dependent
on several words; A = f(w1, w2, . . . , wk). Each formula A has an associated
weight, referred to as the support
Supp(A) =
C(A)
|D|
(3.7)
I.e. Supp(A) is the fraction of the number of occurrences of A in D. Fur-
thermore each rule A → B (where A now is the condition) has an associated
confidence,
Conf(A → B) = Supp(A ∧B)
Supp(A)
=
C(A ∧B)
C(A)
(3.8)
Intuitively confidence tells us given A how certain are we of B, whereas support
tell us how often A occurs in the dataset, e.g. how important is the set of
rules that have A as a condition. In association rule mining we are typically
interested in rules, A → B where the condition A occurs often (e.g. has high
support) and where the rule has high confidence (e.g. if we encounter A then
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there is high probability for also encountering B). However as argued in [16]
in sensitive information detection we are interested also in rules with where
the condition has low support, because we wish to detect all leaks, not just
the most frequent ones.
However note that we are not interested in rules with low confidence since
low confidence implies a weak connection to the sensitive information.
The earliest work in the domain, [16], defines sensitive information as
words frequently occurring together with sensitive seed words. Such sensitive
information is learned using word-to-word inference rules. In the first part of
the empirical evaluation, a particular topic (“HIV” in this case) is assumed
to be sensitive, and Wikipedia documents are screened. In the second part,
the topic is set to the “University of Wharton” on the Enron dataset. These
datasets are thus well suited to study the identification of clear-cut sensitive
topics as a classification task where co-occurrence of words with seed words
can be reasonably assumed. In our work, however, we target complex sensitive
topics that are not necessarily captured by co-occurrence with seed words.
Grechanik et al. [38] extends the inference rule approach to sensitive in-
formation in software artifacts, such as comments or function and variable
names in the software source code. The goal is to avoid actual past incidents
where software code was inadvertently shared without removing comments
about (opinions of) business partners or other business secrets. Such leaks
can obviously be damaging to company business. In their work, word-to-word
inference rules are applied to keyword based sensitive topics that are to be
redacted from source code files. For evaluation, a set of keywords are chosen
by the authors as being sensitive. As before, this means that complex sensitive
topics are not captured. The sensitive information extracted is redacted using
synonyms obtained from publicly available word ontologies. The performance
of the approach is measured in terms of increasing entropy (based on word
count ratios) when comparing the original data and the redacted versions.
Cumby and Ghani [23, 24] uses inference control to detect and sanitize
sensitive information. They develop the notion of k-confusability where they
consider an adversarial classifier H which generates a total ordering of possible
sensitive classes that a document can be in and the document is k-confusable
if it’s rank in the ordering is at least k. The authors uses uni-gram as features
and thus assign context-less sensitivity scores to all uni-grams. Several exper-
iments are conducted to remove sensitive information under the assumption
of context-less sensitive information and while keeping various measures of
utility high.
Geng et al. [33] detect quasi-identifiers (entities) (QIE) and sensitive en-
tities (SE). Where examples of QIE might include a persons age, address or
name and examples SE might include private information such as diseases,
sexual orientations and so on. The authors apply inference rules to discover
the sets of SE. The entities, QIE, are obtained as Named Entities from the text
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and probabilities are obtained though counting of search results with the QIE
subsets. The extraction of both SE and QIE sets are based on an assumption
of context-less sensitivity scores on uni-grams. High accuracy experimental
results are obtained for PII and PHI from user interaction on a online health
discussion forum.
While it is in principle possible to use any possible logic formulas, in the
literature only single word to sensitive prediction inference rules has been
reported [16, 23, 24, 33, 38]. Such approaches limit the context to a fixed size
and therefore such approaches does not as such classify a document as being
sensitive, but rather generates a set of context-less sensitivity scored words or
n-grams.
3.3 Pointwise mutual information
Pointwise mutual information (PMI) is a statistical measure which can be used
for inferring relations between events. We follow [65]and define PMI between
two words w1, w2 as
PMI(w1 ∧ w2) = log Pr(w1 ∧ w2)
Pr(w1)Pr(w1)
where log is base-2 log. This definition can be extended to two word sequences
(n-grams) by replacing w1 and w2 with the n-grams in question. In [84] the
authors introduce pointwise mutual information as a measure for when words
are to be considered sensitive. The authors consider PMI with respect to the
sensitive documents, i.e.
PMI(w1 ∧ w2 ∧ . . . ∧ wn, L = 1) = log Pr(w1 ∧ w2 ∧ . . . ∧ wn, L = 1)
Pr(w1 ∧ w2 ∧ . . . ∧ wn)Pr(L = 1)
where (w1∧w2∧ . . .∧wn) is a sequence of words which we wish to determine if
is sensitive or not. Note that the authors in [84] work with seed sets of sensitive
words and thus their count of sensitive occurrences really counts documents
with sensitive words. I.e., the event L = 1 is the same as the event that we
see particular seed words.
Using Bayes’ theorem we may rewrite PMI as (See [65], Section 5.4)
PMI(w1 ∧ w2 ∧ . . . ∧ wn, L = 1) = log Pr(L = 1|w1 ∧ w2 ∧ . . . ∧ wn)
Pr(L = 1)
(3.9)
Note that since Pr(L = 1) is constant for a particular dataset D and labeling
function L and because the log function is monotonically increasing, we find
that the ordering given by PMI score is the same as the ordering given by n-
grams or inference rules for same (w1, w2, . . . , wn) as given by Equation (3.2).
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When working with PMI we wish to set a threshold for PMI which pro-
vides us we good predictors of potential sensitive content [84]. Using this
threshold we mark all single words w with high PMI(w, L = 1) to be sen-
sitive. One particular interesting measure to be utilized as threshold is the
Information Content IC(L = 1).
IC(L = 1) = − log Pr(L = 1) = − log C(L = 1)
|D|
I.e. the probability Pr(L = 1) is estimated as the fraction of sensitive docu-
ments over the size of the dataset. Thus for any word(s) w if we have
PMI(w, L = 1) = log
Pr(L = 1|w)
Pr(L = 1)
≥ IC(L = 1)
then we consider w to be sensitive also. Furthermore working in domains
where the cost of leaks of sensitive information is particular high we can intro-
duce a weighting scheme and thus increase the recall of sensitive information
and the possible expense of precision
PMI(w, L = 1) = log
Pr(L = 1|w)
Pr(L = 1)
≥ 1
α
IC(L = 1)
For some weight α > 1. The weight can be adjusted dynamically based on
observed performance on a development dataset.
Sánchez and Batet [84] develop and based their approach C-sanitized on
pointwise mutual information (PMI). This measure is used to define the rela-
tionship between sensitive words and other words in the document collection.
PMI results in the same ordering as words as in the n-gram approach. In [84]
the authors also propose using Information Content (IC), as threshold be-
tween sensitive and non-sensitive words. Authors introduce both information
content IC and the additional parameter α to allow for a stricter definition
of sensitivity than using IC alone. In [85] the authors extend the approach
to encode the α parameter semantically and obtain a derived approach (C,
g(C))-sanitized, where g(C) provides a generalization for each sensitive key-
word c, such that g(c) is a semantic generalization of c, e.g. c=”AIDS” and
g(c)=”chronic disorder”. Instead of limiting PMI to IC(c) they propose to
use IC(g(c)) which will detect more sensitive terms related to c. The authors
argue that for domain users choosing a good generalization g(c) is easier than
choosing the α parameter for the optimization of the detection process. As the
PMI approaches only consider word counts we conclude that these approaches
only detect context-less sensitive information.
3.4 Other related work
[18] studies the problem of hiding sensitive information when generating vector
representations. For example if a user is using a service on a mobile device
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a vector representation of input is sent to the cloud for further processing.
The approach studies the trade off between having high performance on the
original task vs. low performance for a potential attacker trying to recover
the sensitive information from an intermediate vector representation. In their
evaluations, LSTMs and feedforward neural networks are used. However, only
simple privacy types of sensitive information are considered such as age or
gender. Also, the problem is given a state representation from a particular
model how to prevent detection of private information. By contrast, we are
interested in detecting complex sensitive information with high accuracy.
[97] considers the problem of hiding privacy related information, such as
age, gender or race, by rewriting the texts. In this setup, a list of words and a
privacy attribute are given. The hiding of privacy information is successful if
an adversarial classifier has low probability of predicting the attribution. The
authors consider several different cost functions to achieve a good performance
that balances hiding the privacy attribute in question (making it difficult to
predict the attribute from the rewritten text) and being able to recover most
of the original text from the rewritten text. The authors consider the ability
to recover (most of) the original text as a indicator that their rewritten text
has not been too distorted to be useful in downstream tasks. The authors
give as an example a job application where we wish to hide the gender of
the applicant but where the application should still contain all other relevant
information. Performance is evaluated using both automated quantitative
metrics and human evaluations.
The approach of using automated language translation to hide privacy at-
tributes is only a limited subset of sensitive information in general. Further-
more, their methodology is focused on hiding/redaction and not detection. It
uses language translation approaches and can be seen as a form of paraphrase
generation. In this work we focus on detection approaches.
[4] presents a stacked autoencoder approach which can take a context
representation vector as additional input. The output is used on three different
tasks where similarity of words and sentences are calculated. Note, sensitive
here is used in the meaning of the autoencoder being sensitive to context, not
as in the sense of sensitive information as discussed elsewhere in our work.
The approach developed in [4] uses an average of a small window of words
in the original input as input to their stacked autoencoder. They do not
consider recurrent or recursive structures which could be useful for carrying
context information. As context input they use an average word embedding
over a larger window of input. They then use dimensionality reduction to
reduce the average embedding to a dense, low dimensionality context vector.
Detection of sensitive or private information is not considered.
[1] introduces models for paraphrase detection in short and noisy texts. A
deep component based model is created including a CNN-LSTM component,
denoted SentMod, to build a sentence vector representation. Interestingly, the
combination of CNN and LSTM can be seen as the CNN providing structure
26 CHAPTER 3. KEYWORD-BASED APPROACHES
to the LSTM in a local window (n-gram). Where we in our work provide
structure in the form of constituency parse trees which are traversed recur-
sively.
This approach performs well on paraphrase detection and is robust to
noise in form and spelling of the sentence input. Unfortunately, it is not clear
how to extend, in particular, the proposed Pair-wise Features to a sensitive
information detection setting where we do not have matching pairs of sensitive
and non-sensitive sentences.
[90] introduces a variant of recursive neural networks known as a Recursive
Neural Tensor Network. It demonstrate stronger performance than AvgVec,
which uses the average of input word embeddings as input. These findings
motivate the investigation of recursive neural networks which we consider in
this work (Chapter 4).
[68] evaluates the use of word embeddings for generating document rep-
resentations for detecting sensitive information as defined by UK Freedom of
Information laws1. They achieve strong results on a dataset of 3801 labeled
documents. An interesting addition in their approach is the use of several dif-
ferent trained word embeddings as inputs, but where positional information
(word order) is lost similar to AvgVec (see above). [68] includes a subset of
frequent n-grams and POS n-grams, which adds a fixed context size. Thus
their approach does not consider the full sentence context as in the RecNN
based approaches we develop here.
[3] employ bag-of-words representation with TF-IDF weighting per word as
paragraph representations. They develop a new dataset from U.S. diplomatic
cables released by WikiLeaks. Interestingly, sensitivity annotation is found in
the original documents on WikiLeaks. The authors build a dataset with three
levels of sensitivity from the documents. The approach generates clusters of
similar paragraphs and for each cluster a separate classifier is trained. Ex-
periments are conducted with Naive Bayes and linear SVM classifiers. Their
approach does not consider word order or semantic structure like parse trees as
in our work. They use clusters to group similar paragraphs together, to help
the context-less classifier make better predictions, rather than using clusters
of similar sentences to select subsets for training as in our selective training
Chapter 9
In his master thesis [39], Varun Gupta considers the problem of para-
phrase generation, in particular with the goal of increasing training set size
by generating paraphrases of existing training instance. This is a form of data
augmentation and can help improve performance of downstream tasks, but
does not consider paraphrase detection. In this work, we focus on detecting
sensitive information and do not consider data augmentation.
[40] is a shorter article version of his master thesis [39]. Again only para-
phrase generation as data augmentation is considered.
1http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/36/contents
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Other previous work on sensitive information redaction in the unstructured
setting exists. These works focus on the redaction step, e.g. after a list
of sensitive words have been found. As such these previous works do not
approach the detection problem that we consider in this dissertation, however
they still consider only context-less sensitive information as they redact all
occurrences of a word regardless of content. We brief mention these works in
this section.
Chakaravarthy et al. [15] develops the idea of K-safety, where they require
that all subsets of words which might be sensitive occurs at least K times in
non-sensitive contexts. This provides a bound on how much an attacker could
derive from a redacted document. The authors motivate K-safety with the
example of removing “AIDS” and other private types of information from
patient-doctor communications. Promising experiential results are provided
for synthetic generated datasets however the authors assume that each type of
sensitive information is given as a keyword and a list of words which may occur
together with the keyword in sensitive documents. They do not consider the
semantic relationship between words and would assign same sensitivity score
to the occurrence of “HIV” or “not HIV” and thus complex types of sensitive
information cannot be captured.
Chakaravarthy et al. is inspired from earlier work [86] where the concept
of k-anonymity for authorship is defined. Here the list of sensitive words
are provided as quasi-identifiers and this might include n-grams or global
document statistics such as total number of words without it being further
discussed how to obtain such a list.
3.5 Our Contributions
We define the keyword-based approach. Such keyword-based approaches can
only detect context-less sensitive information. We conclude that all previous
work for sensitive information detection considered here, based on n-grams,
inference rules and Point-wise Mutual, considers fixed contexts of words and
assign for each context (tuple of words) assign a single sensitivity score. These
approaches such as they are used within sensitive information detection consid-
ers each of these sensitivity scores independently and thus these approaches
rely on hard-coded sensitivity scores for context and are consider keyword-
based and can only detect context-less information. Our main contribution in
this chapter are
• The keyword-based definition over algorithms for sensitive information
detection
• n-grams approaches are keyword-based
• Inference rules approaches are keyword-based
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• PMI approaches are keyword-based
While these contributions are interesting in themselves, they are also impor-
tant because they lay the groundwork for the next generation of approaches,
context-based approaches. We discuss our work on such approaches in next
chapter.
Chapter 4
Beyond Keywords: The
Paraphrase Analogy
As discussed in previous chapter, existing methods for sensitive information
detection rely on context-less, fixed assignment of sensitivity scores on key-
words. Such keyword-based approaches are limited in which types of sensitive
information can be detected. In particular keyword-based approaches have
two main requirements/challenges:
• It must be possible to assign high, fixed sensitivity scores to all keywords
which are deemed sensitive.
• Sensitive sentences must contain words that frequently co-occur with
the fixed, sensitive keywords.
As a consequence, more complex sensitive information types which requires
context-based sensitivity scores cannot necessarily be captured.
In this chapter we address these two challenges and build an family of ap-
proaches for detecting sensitive information. Our approaches do not require
keywords and consider context when detecting sensitive information. I.e. our
proposed family of detection algorithms do not assign context-less sensitivity
scores to keywords. We move away from the restrictive assumption that we
assume access to descriptive sensitive keywords, instead we consider the more
general sensitive information detection problem where all that we have ac-
cess to are labeled examples of sensitive and non-sensitive information. Thus
detecting sensitive information becomes the problem of detecting whether a
sentence contains the same informational content as some of the sensitive ex-
amples, perhaps in a re-written form. We here focus on the ability to detect
sensitive meaning rather than just known sensitive keywords. The process of
taking one sentence and re-writing this sentence using perhaps different words
or a different grammatical structure is known as paraphrasing (more on this
below). Our work is motivated by this view of detecting (sensitive) meaning as
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a paraphrase detection problem. For the latter problem, recent machine learn-
ing techniques show promising results. Thus we consider an approach, which
obtains high accuracy in detecting sentences which are paraphrases of each
other, as promising for learning to correctly identify sensitive/non-sensitive
sentences. In this chapter we detail how we can adapt selected paraphrase
detection approaches to sensitive information detection.
Recall that in paraphrase detection we are given two texts and tasked
with determining if these two texts are paraphrases of each other, i.e. if they
contain the same informational content [88]. We propose to adapt paraphrase
detection approaches to model semantics for sensitive information detection.
That is, we observe that while it may be difficult to characterize a particular
sensitive information type with a few seed words it is generally much easier
to come up with examples of sensitive content. E.g. if we assume access to
previous examples of sensitive content then we can detect new instances by
looking for paraphrases of the known sensitive content.
Inspired by this intuition we develop a novel approach for finding sensitive
information [74] (Chapter 7) and show experimentally across a number of
datasets that this family of approaches can not only find sensitive content
characterize by seed words but also find previously undetected content [74]
(Chapter 7), [76] (Chapter 10). See also the discussion in Section 5.3.
In this work we extend current context-less approaches (Chapter 3) for
sensitive information detection to include larger context. In this section we
argue that certain paraphrase detection approaches are promising candidates
for study, in particular those approaches which can be adapted to consider the
problem of sensitive vs. non-sensitive context, rather than whether two given
sentences are paraphrases of each other. In our result overview Section 5.3 we
observe that we can successfully adapt recursive neural networks and LSTM
(Long Short-Term Memory) recurrent neural networks (see next section, Sec-
tion 4.1) for sensitive information detection. We observe further in Section 5.3
that at least for one dataset we see a fraction, of over 20%, of sentences which
are only correctly identified by our RecNN (Table 5.7), meaning that at least
20% of the sentences correctly identified by the RecNN approach are not cap-
tured by LSTM on that dataset, which indicates as we discuss that RecNN can
be a strong approach for detecting sensitive information. Including recursive
structure, here in the form of compositionality parse trees, can be important
in sensitive information detection Section 4.1.
First we introduce the problem of paraphrase detection and review cur-
rent state-of-the-art approaches to detecting paraphrasing. In next section,
Section 4.1, we introduce neural network approaches inspired from paraphrase
detection approaches and show how we can adapt such neural approaches to
the problem of detecting sensitive information.
In paraphrase detection we are given two sentences and asked to judge if
these two sentences express the same meaning, i.e., if they are paraphrases of
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Sentence1 Sentence2
?
Figure 4.1: Illustration of paraphrase detection. We are given 2 sentences
at the bottom. These are processed (bottom of model) and compared (top
of model) and a prediction is made (the question mark).
each other. See also Figure 4.1.
Recall that for sensitive information detection we defined a labeling func-
tion, Equation (2.1) (Chapter 2). Similarly in paraphrase detection we may
define a labeling function from pairs of sentences to 0 (not paraphrases) or 1
(paraphrases)
Lparaphrase :D × D → {0, 1}.
Adapting paraphrase approaches to the field of sensitive information de-
tection we observe that a sentence which contains sensitive information can
express this information in various ways. This means, a paraphrase of a sen-
sitive sentence is still a sensitive sentence. This holds even if we replace some
words in the sentence with synonyms, i.e. the sentence would still be both
sensitive and a paraphrase. In contrast for keyword-based approaches once the
word sensitivity scores are fixed, the approach cannot infer if a sentence, which
does not contain any sensitive keywords, is in fact sensitive, which means that
paraphrase inspired detection approaches should be able to detect sensitive
information where keyword-based approaches fail.
Paraphrase detection is a hard problem and thus many of the approaches
for this problem rely on semantic understanding of the sentences [88]. An
example of two paraphrases is (taken from [88]):
• The judge also refused to postpone the trial date of Sept. 29
• Obus also denied a defense motion to postpone the September trial date
The reader may wish to compare with the sensitive example discussed in
Chapter 1. Many of the characteristics of paraphrase sentences also occur in
sensitive information detection. For instance in the paraphrase example above
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Sentence
?
”paraphrase cloud”
of
sensitive sentences
Figure 4.2: Illustration of sensitive information detection. We are given a
sentence at the bottom. The sentence is processed (bottom of model) and
compared (top of model) with the known sensitive examples. Finally a
prediction is made (the question mark). The main difference compared to
Figure 4.1 is that we here have to detect sentences which are paraphrases
of any sentence in the labeled dataset seen at training.
we see that several of the words have been replaced by synonyms. For instance
the month September is referred to as both “September” and as “Sept” and one
sentence refers to the judge by his name “Obus” where the other refers simply
to “The judge”. These characteristics we also find in sensitive information.
In Chapter 1 we discussed some of the more challenging aspects of sensitive
information detection which have a similar structure. E.g. while not con-
taining any sensitive keywords, the sentences are still sensitive because their
informational content is a re-write of sensitive content. We observe that cur-
rent state-of-the-art approaches for sensitive information detection are solely
based on counting of co-occurrences and some of the sentences, while being
sensitive, do not contain any of the sensitive co-occurrences. We therefore ex-
pect paraphrase detection techniques to be beneficial for sensitive information
detection.
To adapt paraphrase detection approaches to sensitive information detec-
tion we conceptually move from a setting as the one found in Figure 4.1 to
the one in Figure 4.2. In paraphrase detection we match in pairs, i.e. we only
have to determine if a sentence is a paraphrase of the single other sentence
given. In Figure 4.1 this is the illustrated as the box with label “Sentence2”. In
contrast in Figure 4.2 we must detect sensitive information from paraphrases
of a given set of examples. This is referred to as the “paraphrase cloud” in the
figure. We train the sensitive information detection approach by optimizing
on the model’s ability to predict the labeling function (see also next section,
Section 4.1). This training objective will drive the model parameters towards
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a set of parameters where the model becomes better at predicting the label-
ing function. By adopting paraphrase detection model architectures we give
our models strong preference for generalizing on paraphrases of the training
examples. In Figure 4.2 we illustrate this as the “paraphrase cloud”.
The field of paraphrase detection has seen a lot of interest the recent years
with new strong models with high performance being published. Here we
briefly review previous work, with a particular focus on representation based
approaches. Socher et al. [88] applies recursive neural network for paraphrase
detection and obtain state-of-the-art results on the Microsoft Research Para-
phrase dataset (MSRP)1. The authors unfold the node representations into a
similarity matrix which is scored using dynamic pooling, e.g. a hierarchical
structure of pooling layers. In [13] authors compares different distributional
representations with different compositional models and show performance on
paraphrase detection. They compare additive, multiplicative and recursive
neural network based compositional models. For the recursive neural network
based models they use the approach from [88] together with constituency parse
trees but argues that they greedily could learn tree structures for the detec-
tion. Kiros et al. [53] experiment on data from several domains, among these
paraphrase detection. They develop so-called Skip-Thought Vectors which are
representations over phrases similar to word vectors. A key contribution is the
ability to extend representations from known phrases to smaller variations of
these phrases (i.e. with some words replaced) by using compositionality of rep-
resentations. The authors only consider recurrent models for representations
and uses logistic regression for prediction but are still able to show promising
result on the MSRP dataset.
In [80] the authors investigate the effect of word order information and dif-
ferent compositional models on paraphrase detection. They experiment with
additional, multiplicative and a compositional model where adjective-noun
phrases are modeled as functional application using matrix multiplication over
grammar based parse trees. We note that this functional application can be
cast as a linear recursive neural network model. The authors show that models
without word order information fail at detecting more complex examples of
paraphrases. They also experiment with ability of different compositionality
models to distinguish between semantic variations of sentences where we go
from a paraphrase to not a paraphrase. For instance “A man plays guitar”
vs. “A guitar plays a man” or “The man plays no guitar”. They show that
the recursive neural network inspired models perform significantly (on aver-
age almost an order of magnitude) better for distinguishing paraphrases from
these kinds of non-paraphrases.
Compositionality such as represented by parse trees is important for para-
phrase detection, as found in Socher et al. [88], For complex sensitive infor-
1https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=52398
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mation detection, compositionality is expected to play a similar role. This
is motivated by our observation that particular phrases are indicative of a
sensitive information type that goes beyond simple word (co-)occurrences.
Compositional context representations in the form of parse trees are thus ex-
pected to benefit sensitive information detection. Building complex detection
models (such as RecNN) we boost the amount and types of sensitive informa-
tion which can be detected.
We build adapted the representation based approaches above and use back-
propagation to train a recursive neural network particular trained to be good
at finding sensitive sentences and which assign similar representations to sim-
ilar sub-trees in the parse tree. This is discussed in detail in the next section.
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Figure 4.3: Visualization of classic
neural network with layers. Input
layer has size 2, hidden layer has
size 4 and output layer has size 3.
Figure 4.4: Visualization of recur-
rent neural network (with layers).
The main difference to the classi-
cal neural network is that the pre-
vious hidden state is part of the
update to the new hidden state as
per Equation (4.3).
4.1 Recursive Neural Networks
In this section we lay the technical groundwork for adapting state-of-the-
art paraphrase approaches to sensitive information detection. As discussed
in previous section these approaches are based on so-called recursive neural
networks.
In a regular neural network we transform some input vector x of fixed
length into some output vector y also of fixed length. Thus for a neural
network NN we can denote the operation of the neural network as
y = NN(x). (4.1)
Let |x| be the input size and |y| be the output size of the neural network. We
consider layered neural networks where the operation in Equation (4.1) can be
expressed as a series of operations. We use superscript ℓ such that yℓ denotes
the output of layer ℓ, thus we may write
yℓ = NNℓ(yℓ−1). (4.2)
Let L be the number of layers in the neural network. The input does not
count as a layer, but we may still refer to it as the 0th layer, y0 = x. We have
y = NN(x) = yL = NNL(yL−1). We follow the literature [34, 37] and refer
to all layers 0 < ℓ < L as hidden layers. Layer L is the output layer, neither
input nor output layers are considered hidden.
In Figure 4.3 a small example of a layered neural network is shown. The
colored horizontal boxes are the vectors given by Equation (4.2). We have the
input layer (in blue) with |y0| = |x| = 2. We have a hidden layer (in yellow)
with size |y1| = 4 and the output layer (in green) with |y| = |y2| = 3. Note
the vertical black arrows represent the operation of a particular layer of the
neural network, for instance the lower black arrow represent the operation of
the 1st neural network layer, NN1, which transform the input x to the hidden
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layer vector y1 as given by Equation (4.2), y1 = NN1(x). We refer to yℓ as
(the value of) layer ℓ in the neural network and to NNℓ as the operation of
ℓth layer.
Given this definition of a neural network it is clear that if the functions
in all layers are linear in input then the overall function for the entire neural
network is also linear. Similarly if the layered functions are polynomial then
the complete network is also polynomial.
If each layer consists of a linear combination of the inputs together with
a bias term (i.e. an affine transformation) followed by a suitable non-linear
function then we can apply the universal approximation theorem [25, 45] which
states that with this kind of layer transformation and if L ≥ 2 then our neural
network can approximate any suitably discrete or continuous function with
bounded input and output to any fixed error ǫ > 0 [34].
Thus it is common to consider neural networks with layers on the following
form
yℓ = σ(Wℓyℓ−1 + b)
where σ(z) is the suitable non-linear function, also called the activation func-
tion. For each layer ℓ we denote the length of the input as Nℓ−1 = |y
ℓ−1|, and
of the output as Nℓ = |y
ℓ|. The parameter Wℓ is a matrix of size Nℓ × Nℓ−1,
referred to as the weight matrix. The vectors yℓ−1, b are a column vectors.
By design length of yℓ−1 is Nℓ−1 and length of both y
ℓ and b are Nℓ.
A wide set of functions can be used as suitable non-linear or activation
functions. Common choices include [34, 37]
σ(z) =
1
1 + e−z
Sigmoid
σ(z) =
e2x − 1
e2x + 1
Hyperbolic tangent (tanh)
σ(z) = max(0, z) Rectifier (ReLU)
Using backpropagation we adjust the components in the weight matrices in
all layers to minimize the error measure. For an in-depth discussion of back-
propagation we refer the interested reader to [31, 34].
Neural networks on text A text can be considered as a sequence of data
(words) from which we wish to approximate some labeling function (e.g. sen-
sitive vs. non-sensitive). Below we discuss how and when it is beneficial to
develop a richer structures for text than that of a sequence, and how this may
help in learning more complex models over text. Here we consider sequences.
When we work with sequences of data (of variable length) it is apparent that
a limitation of the neural network is the need for fixed length input. The
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immediate solution which presents itself is to repeatedly re-apply the neural
network at each location in the sequence. This is known as a recurrent neural
network (RNN) [27, 34]. We briefly introduce notation and concepts for re-
current neural networks before introducing their generalization, the recursive
neural network.
Let our input be a text document d (i.e. a sequence) with words d =
(w1, w2, . . . , wnd). To encode the words in a way that allow for consumption
of neural networks we apply an encoding to the words, i.e. map each word
to a real valued vector. Common choices include bag-of-words [41] or word
embeddings [71]. Traditional bag-of-words encode a collection of one-hot word
vectors and thus do not encode word ordering and do not carry an inherent
similarity for similar words [34]. Both bag-of-words and word embeddings can
be seen as encoding some form of the Distributional Hypothesis [41], (see also
the previous discussion in Section 3.1). Word embeddings have the notable
properties that they directly encode a prediction of often occurring contexts
and similar words have similar embeddings [34, 71]. Furthermore word embed-
dings are typically densely encoded vectors and such dense vectors are well
suited as input to neural networks. Because of this, and because structure
and word order are important in paraphrase detection and by extension in
detecting sensitive information, we focus mainly on word embeddings in this
work.
Assume we are given a neural network NN which takes as input a word w
(we assume the word already is encoded with a word embedding) and a state
h. The state is often denoted with symbol h because the state acts as a kind of
hidden layer which connects the evaluations over the sequence (w1, . . . , wnd).
The input space for words is real valued vectors RNe for some embedding size
Ne and similarly for the hidden state R
Nh . The dimensionality of the spaces
Ne, Nh are hyperparameters which can be fitted to optimize the performance
on the given dataset D. Assume the initial state is the zero vector h = h0 = 0
then the first application of the neural network is
h1 = NN(w1, h0)
Thus we can define a recursive rule for applying the recurrent neural network
given the result of the t− 1 application
ht = NN(wt, ht−1). (4.3)
A visualization of a recurrent neural network following applications of this
update rule can be seen in Figure 4.4. In the figure the input layer (the blue
layer) is the words encoded via word embeddings. In this figure we have 4
input words and therefore 4 hidden states h1, h2, h3, h4, the initial hidden
state h0 is not shown. In the figure there is a output layer (the green layer
at the final step), this is simply another neural network layer which can be
applied to the final hidden state (as shown in the figure) or, another option
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is to apply the output layer at all steps and thereby obtain a prediction for
each step. We note that many other options for choosing when to generate
output and on which hidden states exists [31, 34] but in this work we will
focus on the former option described above, i.e. one prediction on the final
state in the sequence. All evaluations in this work done on recurrent neural
networks (mainly LSTM networks) are done only using the last final state
for prediction. This is similar to how we predict based on the final state for
recursive neural networks, see below.
The output neural network layer is denoted as NNO,
yt = NNO(ht).
I.e. if predicting sensitive (1) vs. non-sensitive (0) then yt could be the
predicted probability of the document containing sensitive information (in
which case yt would be a vector of dimension 1). We observe that for such
recurrent approaches, the final hidden state hNd used for predicting if this
document contains sensitive information can be viewed as encoding the most
information about the document that our approach can obtain. I.e. recurrent
neural networks are not keywords-based, instead they encode context as hNd .
We say that recurrent neural networks are context-based approaches and can
detect sensitive information beyond context-less sensitive information.
Recursive neural networks on text Recurrent neural networks as pre-
sented above can only process input which have sequential form. While in the
text data domain we can view a document as a sequential data structure, there
is much structure in text such as compositional and constituency dependency
parse trees which have been shown to accelerate and improve machine learning
models for problems such as paraphrase detection [88]. In principle we could
add such additional structure information by infusing the structure knowledge
into our sequential data, simply by encoding these structures sequentially and
then apply sequential machine learning models on this enhanced sequential
structure. For instance, if our input is structured as a binary tree we can flat-
ten this tree into an sequence with sub-trees enclosed by parentheses. However
such an encoding have two main challenges
• The length of paths between nodes in the sequential encoded data may
be much longer than in the original structure. For instance comparing a
balanced binary tree with the corresponding sequential encoding; most
nodes will be exponential further away from most other nodes when
sequential encoded (if the tree is bi-directional then the longest path
is 2 log n). Thus learning challenges such as vanishing gradient or ex-
ploding gradients [8, 44] becomes a (exponential) worse problem as we
consider longer documents.
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(a) Parse tree (b) Recursive neural network
Figure 4.5: The parse tree and the corresponding recursive neural net-
work. Each node in the parse tree becomes an application of the neural
network. The neural network thus generates a (hidden) representation
for each node in the structure. Note arrows show forward evaluation di-
rection, which corresponds to ancestor direction, e.g. the arrows point in
direction of parents.
• Making the structure sequential will invariably break regularities and
potential interesting relations in the original structure [31]. Close neigh-
boring nodes in the structure may end up far from each other in the se-
quential encoding. This incur not only the vanishing gradient problem
discussed above, but also harder learning since the structure becomes
broken. In a nutshell; in sequential form we can only encode certain
aspects of a rich structure in a localized way, the general aspects of the
structure tend to be distributed across large distances when in sequential
form, thus breaking structure.
These challenges make learning on sequential encoded structures harder or
even in-tractable [31]. For paraphrase (and by extension sensitive informa-
tion detection) where context and structure are important aspects to consider
we need to ensure that our model can easily learn from structure, thus we
propose to use recursive neural network which are capable of learning from
advanced structures such as parse trees. To keep the distinction between
recursive neural networks and recurrent neural networks clear we adopt the
abbreviations RecNN for the former and RNN for the latter. Below we define
the recursive neural network with particular emphasis on document datasets.
A recursive neural network can be applied to a sequence of data with some
additional structure. E.g. a sentence and the parse tree for that sentence.
In this work we are mainly interested in input structures which are binary
trees. For a full introduction to general recursive structures see [31]. Given
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a document d = (w1, w2, . . . , wnd), and a tree Td defined recursively over the
input. I.e. we consider the tree Td as a function which returns a node from
some set of nodes U = {n1, . . . , nnd−1} and as input the tree function takes
either the words from input d or a node from the node set. We denote the
input set as
V = U ∪ {wi :wi ∈ d}
We have that the tree is a function from nodes and words to a node, which is
considered the parent node in the tree structure. I.e. we have
Td :V → U ∪ {ǫ}
Where ǫ is a special node value which is not considered part of the tree. E.g.
ǫ is the empty or null node. Thus the tree function Td(v) returns the parent
node (in the tree) of input v, where v can be either a node or a word. We
focus on trees where each node is parent to two children from set V , i.e. the
tree is binary (but not necessarily balanced). Note words are not in U and
has no children. Only one node may have no parent. We refer to that node
as the root node of the tree.
Consider the tree in Figure 4.5a. This is a constituency parse tree gen-
erated over the sentence from the example in Chapter 1 (here shorten for
clarity). The parse tree was generated from a probabilistic context-free gram-
mar (pcfg) [56] and the node labels are from Stanford Penn Treebank [95].
The pcfg was trained on the Stanford Penn Treebank, i.e., the texts and node
labels in the treebank. We followed Klein and Manning and used a CKY
parser [56] to obtain rule probabilities. See Section 10.3 for further details on
how we obtain the parse trees. All our parse trees, used in experiments and
released as resources are obtained via the same parser.
We see the parse tree is a structure which fulfill the requirements just
discussed. For instance, in the parse tree we have a node with the label
“SBAR”. This is the parent of two nodes, to the left it is parent to the input
node of the word “if” and to the right it is parent of the input node of word
“necessary”. Furthermore all nodes (except the word leaf nodes) have two
children and there is only one root node which has no parent.
To define a recursive neural network over documents d and corresponding
trees Td we associate with each member of the input set V a representation,
i.e. some vector value from Rn for some n. For the words wi ∈ d this could
be a word embedding vector and for nodes ni ∈ U this would be a hidden
state value similar to the one calculated by a recurrent neural network in
Equation (4.3). Let RecNN be some neural network which as input takes
representations of two elements from V and outputs a representation for the
current node. I.e. let t ∈ U be any node from U and let l(t) and r(t) be (left
and right) children of node t, i.e. t = Td(l(t)) and t = Td(r(t)), we have
ht = RecNN(hl(t), hr(t))
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where hl(t), hr(t), ht are the representations of l(t), r(t), t respectively. A
recursive neural network which follows the step rule given above is shown in
Figure 4.4 the structure used to define the recursive neural network is the one
shown in Figure 4.5a.
Using generalized versions of the equation above it is possible to define
recursive neural networks for trees that are not binary and also for directed
acyclic graphs (DAG) or even for general recursive structures, see also [31].
Similarly to how we defined the output of a recurrent neural network we
define the output of a recursive neural network as dependent on the hidden
state at that node
yt = RecNNO(ht), t ∈ U
Initially the child node representations will be for the words in the sentence,
but as we move up in the tree structure T one or both child representations
will be for internal nodes where the representation has been generated by our
network.
Please note that it follows from the above definition of recursive neural
networks that we may view a sequential recurrent neural network as a spe-
cial type of a recursive neural network where the structure is constructed such
that the execution order for the recursive neural network is the same as for the
recurrent neural network. Thus recursive neural networks are a generalization
of recurrent neural networks, where we in the recursive neural network also
consider structure. It follows that recursive neural networks are context-based
approaches to sensitive information detection, as recurrent neural networks
are.
Backpropagation over standard neural networks was formulated in the
seminal work [83]. Applying recurrent neural networks over series is from
[27], we follow here the presentation given in [34]. Discussion of problems
with learning over many steps and the introduction of the Long Short-Term
Memory (LSTM) cell is from [44]. Bengio et al. [8] also show that the gradient
may grow or shrink exponentially over number of steps and thus demonstrate
the learning problem of vanishing or exploding gradients. Backpropagation
over structures was done as backpropagation-through-structure, which was
introduced in [35] and further formalized as backpropagation over recursive
execution graphs in [31].
In [88] authors do pre-training with an autoencoding neural network, i.e.
where we train the network to predict the input using restricted access to
information. These so-called autoencoders was trained to learn the represen-
tations in recursive structures. In [46] authors show that it is possible to obtain
high accuracy and good recursive state representations without the need for
the time consuming pre-training. In [46] there is access to handcrafted target
values for each sentence and node in the parse tree.
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y
(a) The standard shortcut.
y
y
(b) Inverse shortcut.
Figure 4.6: The difference between standard shortcuts and our inverse
shortcuts. The standard shortcut is given by Equation (4.4). The inverse
shortcut, with update gradient given by Equation (4.5).
Inverse shortcuts
A main drawback of the recursive neural networks is the need for finely la-
beled training examples. Training from a single root node label over a large
structure incurs the challenges of training over many steps such as vanishing
and exploding gradients [8, 44]. Authors [46, 90] use finely labeled datasets
with labels for each node in structure to obtain strong results with structured
models without encountering vanishing and exploding gradients.
For deep convolutional networks the concept of shortcuts has been intro-
duced to counter the challenge of vanishing gradients [43, 92]. Recall Equa-
tion (4.2) the output of standard layer in a neural network is given as
yℓ.
In the simplest form a shortcut alters the output of the layer to (see also
Figure 4.6a)
yℓshortcut = y
ℓ + yℓ−1, (4.4)
where yℓ−1 is the input to the unmodified ℓth layer. Thus the new output is
weighted between the unaltered output and the original input, e.g. there is a
“shortcut” from the input to output.
To see that this helps counter vanishing gradients observe that at back-
propagation time the error signal will propagate both through the ℓth layer
but also through the shortcut unaltered. Thus the error signal may travel a
higher number of layers before vanishing.
Inspired by such shortcuts we propose inverse shortcuts, i.e. shortcuts
from prediction to early layers. We referred to this in [74] as propagating
labels. For each representation in our structure T we add a prediction node
and try to predict the label for the complete tree from the partial information
available at the current node. This is shown in Figure 4.6b.
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Note the authors in [46, 90] used hand labeled sentences at each node
in the parse tree. These were obtained using a resource heavy process on
Amazon Turk [90]. The benefit of our proposed inverse shortcuts are two-
fold. 1) We introduce shortcuts into the training which improves performance
for deep learning [43, 92] and we avoid the costly fine labeling process by
“shortcutting” the sentence label. Thus the concept of inverse shortcuts is an
addition to deep neural networks in general and in particular to the approach
for sentiment analysis proposed in [90].
Let the set of ancestors for node v be
Pv = {T (v), T (T (v)), T (T (T (v))), . . .}.
Let the backpropagation update gradient (e.g. the update signal for the model
parameters as derived using backpropagation) from a parent node u ∈ Pv
be denote gv(u). In a regular network with only root node prediction and
without inverse shortcuts we have that the update gradient is determined by
error signal at the root node and the path between the root node and node v
gv(root).
If we encounter the vanishing gradient problem then this update gradient will
decay as a function of the distance between the root node and node v. When
we apply inverse gradient the update gradient becomes∑
p∈Pv
gv(p). (4.5)
I.e. a sum over update gradients from all ancestors in the tree. Thus we
circumvent the vanishing gradient problem by introducing update gradients
from close ancestors in the tree. Our strong results in [74–76] (see Part II)
were obtained using inverse shortcuts.
4.2 Our Contributions
We introduce a new family of approaches for context-based sensitive infor-
mation detection. We connect the field of paraphrase detection to that of
sensitive information detection and show that sensitive information detection
can be cast as a adapted form of paraphrase detection. The key concept for
driving this connection is the observation that
A paraphrase of sensitive information is itself sensitive. Thus we
want to be able to detect paraphrases of known sensitive information.
Using this insight, our main contributions include
• Casting sensitive information detection as a special kind of paraphrase
detection.
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• Focusing on informational content rather than specific topic or keywords.
• A new family of context-based approaches for sensitive information de-
tection.
• A encoding process of context through recursive neural networks.
• In our publications, Part II, we evaluate our approaches against state-of-
the-art approaches for sensitive information detection. We demonstrate
that we significantly outperform previous approaches.
• We propose inverse shortcuts to counter vanishing gradient. As a plus
adopting inverse shortcuts reduces the need for finely labeled data sam-
ples. This reduces the requirements for annotators to label on phrase
level which previous RecNN approaches require [90].
• The results of our evaluations demonstrate the strength and applicability
of inverse shortcuts to sensitive information detection.
• In [75] we address the important problem of effective training of models
over complex structures. We show that by clustering document represen-
tations we can do selective training with fewer updates to the model but
where the final model performs at least as well as a traditional trained
model.
• For Selective training we show that Most Frequently Occurring class label
measure, ∆MFO, allows us to train models using hard optimization
conditions with a large speedup factor, see also Chapter 9.
Chapter 5
Evaluation, Data and Result
Analysis
Evaluation of sensitive information detection is challenging in that no
benchmarking dataset is available. Due to the nature of the problem most or-
ganizations are hesitant to release actual sensitive data for research and often
any accidental released sensitive information will be followed by an redaction
effort. As a consequence there are no publicly available datasets where sen-
sitive information is retained, or even labeled as such. Therefore, researchers
have proposed different methods to prepare document datasets such that the
dataset can be used for evaluation purposes. We briefly review them in the
following, and characterize their strengths and weaknesses.
Chow et al. in [16] develops the idea that a particular sensitive information
type, characterized by a single seed keyword is sensitive. They develop two
datasets; one extracted and developed from Wikipedia and the other from the
Enron dataset. The authors define the task of finding sensitive information
corresponding to that of a classification task and they evaluate the inference
rules (see also Section 3.2) approach for this task definition. The first evalua-
tion is using the seed word “HIV” and finding inference rules which predicts
the seed word. Here Wikipedia is used as a dataset and inference rules are
found where the seed word can be predicted high confidence. Evaluation is
done on top 70 predicted rules by a human evaluator. A large fraction of the
found inference rules are deemed correct by the evaluations.
For their 2nd dataset Chow et al. argues that the Enron dataset is more
relevant to the task of detecting sensitive information than Wikipedia as it is
a “private” dataset in the sense that it contains emails and other documents
that are typically only available inside a company, but not shared with the
outside world. Similarly to the first evaluation they choose a single seed word,
“University of Wharton” to define the sensitive information to detect. As the
Enron documents are not labeled, the authors apply the assumption is that all
documents containing the keyword are sensitive. Precision is calculated as the
45
46 CHAPTER 5. EVALUATION, DATA AND RESULT ANALYSIS
fraction of documents predicted to be sensitive which also mentions the seed
word. To calculate recall special care has to be made. I.e. the pathological
rule with 100% recall is
“University of Wharton” → L = 1.
Thus to make a more fair comparison the authors compute recall of their ap-
proach by simply ignoring rules which uses the term “University of Wharton”
as a condition to predict, i.e. where “University of Wharton” occurs on the
left-hand-side of the rule.
We propose using the Enron dataset as well, as it is indeed a rare case of
private data out in the public domain. However, as we will discuss in Sec-
tion 5.1, we make use of labels that were generated based on human defined
complex types of sensitive information and thus our evaluation reflect human
judgment on types of information rather than seed word and rule based evalu-
ation which we have shown only can detect context-less sensitive information
types.
The authors Grechanik et al. [38] develops further the inference rules
approach and obtain good results using change in entropy as a measure of
privacy loss. The datasets they work on are software repositories, such as
PCAnywhere by Symantec1, Mozilla2,and from Opentaps3. Where they search
for sensitive information in function names and in code comments. Different
types of sensitive information are defined by the authors using seed keywords
sets containing up to 16 distinct words.
In this work we move beyond context-less sensitive information. Our public
evaluation and benchmarking datasets have human labeled documents rather
than seed word based definition such as the ones discussed above. Further-
more we consider sensitive information in a general NLP setting, i.e. where
the sensitive content can be embedded in informational content rather than
narrowing the dataset and labels to function names and named entities as
above. A narrow dataset such as the one above may be less applicable for
evaluating context-based approaches.
In [42] Hart et al. uses WikiLeaks4, Enron and Google developer forums
as sensitive information sources. From this the authors develop several pairs
of datasets to evaluate sensitive information detection. In each pair, one
document collection is assumed to be sensitive, while the other is considered
non-sensitive:
• WikiLeaks (23 documents, military field manuals) vs. corporate web-site
(174 documents) for DynCorp5
1Proprietary source code leaked by hackers http://www.computerworld.com/article/
2472272/endpoint-security/antisec-leaks-symantec-pcanywhere-source-code-
after--50k-extortion-not-paid.html
2https://www.mozilla.org
3http://www.opentab.org
4https://wikileaks.org
5http://www.dyn-intl.com/
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• WikiLeaks (102 documents) vs. corporate web-site (120 documents) for
Transcendental Mediation6 (a religious organization)
• WikiLeaks (3, where one long document was split into several) vs. web-
pages (277 documents) for Mormon7 (religion)
• Enron dataset (0.6 million documents) vs. corporate web-site (581 doc-
uments)
• Developer blogs (open source projects at google, 1119 documents) vs.
PR related blogs (1481 documents)
In addition, they also provide background non-sensitive documents which they
refer to as Non Enterprise (NE). I.e. in this setting we detect sensitive infor-
mation in enterprise documents but we are also interested in performance on
sets of non-sensitive examples such as NE documents. Let the set of sensitive
documents be denoted S, the set of enterprise documents be denoted E and
the set of non enterprise documents be NE, we have
S ⊆ E and E ∩NE = ∅.
The NE documents are sampled into the datasets to provide further types of
non-sensitive documents for training and testing. The authors use Wikipedia
news article, Reuters news articles and the Brown dataset as NE sources.
While this approach makes it possible to define more general sensitive
information types without having to rely on single keywords, it has its limi-
tations in the dissimilarities of the document collection pairs. For example,
sensitive military/religious manuals and the type of documents found on cor-
porate web-sites, Wikipedia news and other news sites differ not only with
respect to sensitive content but also with respect to other properties and style
of language used.
The authors obtain high detection results however do not address if per-
formance results might reflect the difference in documents origin more than
the ability to isolate and detect sensitive information. Another potential issue
lies in the large cardinality imbalance of document collections ranging from
few hundreds to more than half a million documents.
In the domain of general sensitive information detection we expect our ap-
proaches also might encounter the more challenging situation where sensitive
and non-sensitive documents have been generated by similar processes. To
obtain strong results our approaches may have to rely on distinguishing prop-
erties such as the informational and semantic content rather then document
structural properties such as length, language and domain.
6https://www.tm.org/
7https://www.lds.org
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Sánchez and Batet [84] base their approach on pointwise mutual informa-
tion (PMI, see Section 3.3) to define the relationship between sensitive words
and other words in the document collection.
The authors evaluate on Wikipedia pages of individuals (like movie stars).
The goal is to remove personal sensitive information on subjects such as dis-
eases, city of birth and religion. These topical personal sensitive information
can typically be defined using single seed keywords such as “AIDS”. The au-
thors use human manual generated labels for sentences from Wikipedia pages.
Unfortunately, the dataset is not publicly available. On their focused dataset
the authors obtain strong results, however more complex types of sensitive
information are not studied.
In the following we present 8 different types of sensitive information. Our
contribution is based on two corpora, the Enron corpus and the Monsanto
corpus. For each corpus we obtain 4 publicly available different definitions
of sensitive information on the document level. Furthermore we have human
annotators provide labels on the sentence level for parts of the Monsanto
corpus. We present each sensitive information type as its own dataset with
text, parse trees and labels. In total we release more than 750, 000 labeled
sentences in 12 datasets.
5.1 Enron Dataset
In this section we discuss how we may utilize the Enron corpus for sensitive
information detection evaluation and what the challenges are and how these
can be addressed.
We propose a public dataset and a labeling which contains different kinds
of semantic relationships in the form of different sensitive information types.
Similar to other authors in the sensitive information detection domain we make
use of the Enron dataset as a way to access a dataset of real-life complex
interactions. As noted by other authors in this field (see the discussion of
previous work above), we find that the Enron dataset is a particularly useful
one in that it was not originally intended to be published, but is still out in
the public domain today, and can be used for studying sensitive information
detection.
The Enron dataset was published in 2003 by FERC (Federal Energy Regu-
latory Commission) [58]. The dataset contains more than 600, 000 documents
and emails from the communication of several employees of the Enron corpo-
ration. Some documents are internal coordination between employees, some
are spreadsheets or contracts send around for feedback or to customers and
some documents are emails containing advertisement from 3rd party vendors.
Only minor redaction of private information has occurred and no redaction of
the type of complex information that we are interested in has occurred.
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A realistic evaluation and benchmarking dataset also needs access to sev-
eral types of sensitive information, i.e. definitions which are different in nature
and cover a wide variety of areas. To capture sensitive content which move be-
yond context-less sensitive information the types must also cover areas which
are not necessarily clear cut, but which can be understood and searched by
human users. Thus we must move beyond labels that are obtained through
seed words or simple rules. We therefore propose to use human expert labels
given to the Enron dataset as part of a competition of the TREC conference.
In the Legal track of the TREC conference [96] an effort has been un-
dertaken labeling the Enron dataset according to a number of conceptually
very different requests. Each request is defined as a request for production
of documents. This is a legal construct where a person/lawyer is responsible
for finding all relevant documents according to the particular request. The
definitions of the requests can be seen in Table 5.1, taken from [22, 96]. Many
of these requests are for information on a very specific type of information,
e.g. request 201, Prepay Transactions, while some are more classical topical
types, such as computer games, e.g. request 207, fantasy football. A subset of
2720 documents for each request of the Enron dataset has been labeled by law
students and professionals [96]. For each request, the TREC annotators have
annotated the 2720 documents with true-false labels. Each request is thus a
binary decision problem with both positive and negative samples.
We processed and release datasets 201 (PPAY), 202 (FAS), 203 (FCAST)
and 204 (EDENCE). See Chapter 9. PPAY deals with prepay transactions and
FAS with transaction which may be “FAS” compliant. FCAST is discussion
of financial forcasts and finally EDENCE is about tampering with evidence.
All 4 types of information are examples of information that may be considered
sensitive, and where both everyday wording and specialized notions (from fi-
nances, law, etc) are common. This is why we select these as representative
of sensitive information types and we empirically evaluate that they contain
more than context-less sensitive information in the sense of Definition 2. I.e.,
these datasets contain context-based sensitive information. See also Chapter 7
and Chapter 10. By contrast, for instance label 207 about sports is relatively
easy for traditional classification [14] and therefore chosen as a definition of a
complex sensitive information type.
If we wanted to do only standard text classification we could use some of
the standard news wire classification datasets [14] however these categories
are very broad in the sense that you do not actually need to understand for
instance politics or baseball to be able to classify texts about these topics.
I.e. we expect keyword-based approaches to perform well on such topical
datasets. On the other hand classifying sub-parts of text which is about prepay
transaction requires a much better model for detection as demonstrated by
our experiments in [74, 76], see Chapter 7 and Chapter 10.
In Chapter 7 we work with request 201 (PPAY) and show that we obtain
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Topic Call text
number
200 All documents or communications that describe, discuss, refer to,
report on, or relate to the Company’s engagement in transactions
concerning Real Estate.
201 All documents or communications that describe, discuss, refer to,
report on, or relate to the Company’s engagement in structured
commodity transactions known as “prepay transactions.”
202 All documents or communications that describe, discuss, refer to,
report on, or relate to the Company’s engagement in transactions
that the Company characterized as compliant with FAS 140 (or
its predecessor FAS 125).
203 All documents or communications that describe, discuss, refer to,
report on, or relate to whether the Company had met, or could,
would, or might meet its financial forecasts, models, projections,
or plans at any time after January 1, 1999.
204 All documents or communications that describe, discuss, refer to,
report on, or relate to any intentions, plans, efforts, or activities
involving the alteration, destruction, retention, lack of retention,
deletion, or shredding of documents or other evidence, whether
in hard - copy or electronic form.
205 All documents or communications that describe, discuss, refer
to, report on, or relate to energy schedules and bids, including
but not limited to, estimates, forecasts, descriptions, characteri-
zations, analyses, evaluations, projections, plans, and reports on
the volume(s) or geographic location(s) of energy loads.
206 All documents or communications that describe, discuss, refer
to, report on, or relate to any discussion(s),communication(s),
or contact(s) with financial analyst(s), or with the firm(s) that
employ them, regarding (i) the Company’s financial condition,
(ii) analysts’ coverage of the Company and/or its financial con-
dition, (iii) analysts’ rating of the Company’s stock, or (iv) the
impact of an analyst’s coverage of the Company on the business
relationship between the Company and the firm that employs
the analyst.
207 All documents or communications that describe, discuss, refer to,
report on, or relate to fantasy football, gambling on football, and
related activities, including but not limited to, football teams,
football players, football games, football statistics, and football
performance.
Table 5.1: The list of Enron labeled requests for documentation [22, 96].
The requests have been slightly shorten from original form in order to fit
here. Note that request 200 was only defined through an example set of
documents, for that request we have created the textual definition given
here. In our published datasets we have used labels 201, 202, 203 and 204.
See discussion in text.
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Dataset Descriptive text
GHOST The documents concerning article writing and peer-reviewing
by Monsanto paid people. Hiding the Monsanto connection,
as well as concerning efforts in pressuring journals to retract
damning studies in a way such that Monsanto is not seen as
providing the critique.
TOXIC The documents concerning discussions and testing of the chem-
ical glyphosate which is part of Roundup. This includes in
particular the toxicity of glyphosate and decisions not to fund
further studies, decisions not to do requested studies or pro-
vide data to regulators. Discussions in which ways Roundup
can and cannot be considered toxic.
CHEMI Monsanto articles on Roundup chemistry when Roundup is
used in nature. Internal email discussions on Monsanto stud-
ies as well as external studies and measurements together with
findings, discussions on which questions are answered or need
to be answered by Monsanto paid studies. Discussions on
which paid studies are too “risky”, discussions on not pub-
lishing (hiding) bad (unexpected) results.
REGUL The documents concerning discussions of rewarding people for
science that protect Roundup business. Documents on active
efforts to monitor and influence regulative bodies for possi-
ble problematic rulings related to Roundup. Documents on
planning and discussions where specific people from regulatory
bodies are being convinced to lower the rating or concerns for
Roundup/glyphosate.
Table 5.2: The list of Monsanto labeled information types. Reproduced
from our paper [76]. See also Chapter 10 (page 118).
consistent results when approaching prepay as a form of sensitive informa-
tion detection. In Chapter 9 we work with requests 201 (PPAY), 202 (FAS),
203 (FCAST) and 204 (EDENCE) and release a labeled dataset consisting of
747, 801 constituency parse trees over sentences.
This is the first large-scale, human labeled sensitive information dataset
available publicly. We provide 4 different types of sensitive information defi-
nitions in a large dataset and in an easy to access format. Links to data and
code can be found on page 70 in Section 5.4.
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5.2 Monsanto Dataset
As discussed in previous section the Enron dataset is an unique dataset, so
far, with regards to real-world communication containing potential sensitive
content. However just one dataset for benchmarking and developing true,
general methods for sensitive information detection is not enough. In fact
having only one dataset may introduce a bias in the models developed, such
that these models may become tuned to particular structure only found in the
Enron dataset and not in datasets with sensitive information in general. Also
the Enron dataset is from 2002 and thus more than 15 years old and while the
dataset provides unique access to data show-casing sensitive vs. non-sensitive
information, the Enron dataset may no longer be as representative of internal
present day human communication as it was 15 years ago.
To remedy these challenges we publish a new dataset providing expert la-
bels and providing a up-to-date modern dataset with several different types of
sensitive information. See Chapter 10. We propose using the recent publicized
documents which are part of the Monsanto trial [7].
Early in the Monsanto trials the American legal system decided to lump
different smaller trials into fewer larger trials. This is known as centralization
and the legal document enforcing the centralization is known as a transfer
order. The transfer order for the Monsanto trials succinctly summaries the
overall topic of the trials8
“Roundup, a widely used glyphosate-based herbicide
manufactured by Monsanto Company, can cause non-Hodgkin’s
lymphoma and that Monsanto failed to warn consumers and
regulators about the alleged risks of Roundup.”
In the trial several individuals are suing Monsanto and the so-called secret
Monsanto papers have been released to the public as part of the pre-trial dis-
covery process where each party in the trial has access to relevant documents
in order to build the evidence for the trial [7].
Redaction of these documents have been done to protect personal infor-
mation for instance about people not related to the trial. Similar to the Enron
documents this redaction is very light and as such the Monsanto documents
contain several different types of information which could be consider sensi-
tive. The documents do not come with predefined labels, again similar to the
Enron documents. To remedy this we propose to use a labeling carried out
by the law firm Baum, Hedlund, Aristei & Goldman where an effort has been
made to labeled initial released documents into 4 different types of informa-
tion relevant to the trial. The types of information are listed in Table 5.2.
The information types can be viewed as sensitive in 2 ways;
8https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/filelibrary/2886/JPML-transfer-order.pdf
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• We can choose to view this as information that is sensitive to the Mon-
santo company and potential information they wish to detect and pro-
tect, or
• We can view this as sensitive information for the suing partners and as
important information which we need to be able to detect and bring
attention to.
In both cases automated tools for detecting these types of sensitive information
becomes important and motivates the use of the secret Monsanto papers with
labels as a new dataset for sensitive information detection.
All 4 topic descriptions in Table 5.2 are considered potential complex sen-
sitive information types. The dataset GHOST is communication about for
instance ghostwriting where complex communication patterns in the e-mail
correspondence is ongoing and which in the two perspectives in the bullet-list
above can be consider as sensitive information. Similarly for REGUL there
are discussions of how to influence discussions and choices in government reg-
ulatory bodies which are also sensitive in both perspectives. T OXIC deals
with whether or not Monsanto (and the public as seen from internally within
Monsanto) deems Roundup and similar products to be toxic, e.g. cancer
producing. On the other hand CHEMI deals with experiments, chemical
components and other fact based communication about how environment and
usage affects the safety of Monsanto’s products. All information types are
clearly complex in composition and thus good candidates for complex sen-
sitive information datasets. We empirically evaluate the types of sensitive
information in these datasets in Chapter 10.
In the following we detail the extraction and labeling process of the Mon-
santo dataset.
Extraction and labeling of Monsanto datasets
Note: moved from chap 10. Only minor changes, except for the annotation
guidelines.
Downloading. We downloaded the raw documents from the website of law-
firm Baum, Hedlund, Aristei & Goldman9. There are 274 documents of var-
ious types. The lawfirm has made a human readable description of 120 links
to documents10. We cleaned up the human readable list of documents and
used the 4 aforementioned types of sensitive information, Table 5.2 to label
the documents, based on the document labels provided by the lawfirm. The
9https://www.baumhedlundlaw.com/toxic-tort-law/monsanto-roundup-lawsuit/
monsanto-secret-documents/
10https://www.baumhedlundlaw.com/pdf/monsanto-documents/monsanto-papers-
chart-1009.pdf
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dataset #d #url # ids
GHOST 29 29 53
TOXIC 40 39 95
CHEMI 17 17 23
REGUL 33 33 58
Total 119 118 229
Table 5.3: Some statistics over the Monsanto dataset. Number of doc-
uments are handcounted from the description document. The urls are
matched to extracted/harvested metadata. For one document we were
not able to match the link and the document. The ids are the number of
unique ids (MONGLY...) used to refer by the law firm to the documents.
See the discussion in the text for further information.
lawfirm has provided the documents ids in the form MONGLY xxxxxxxx
or ACQUAV ELLAPRODxxxxxxxx where the xs are replaced with actual
numbers.
We removed the documents which are not directly related to the case
(e.g. links pointing to forbes.com). We found 3 documents without pre-
viously assigned id and assigned these documents unique ids in the form
ASSIGNEDIDxxx, where xs are a unique number. Several documents have
several given ids, probably because the document can be or has been used in
several different arguments in the court. We found one instance where two
document links with different link text pointed to the same document. This
document has only been included once in our dataset.
Content. Each document is annotated by a number, an id, a link, a link
text and a description. An example is shown in Table 10.1 (Chapter 10).
All documents are pdf documents. Some are exported from emails, word
documents, and so on. Some of the documents are or contain scanned images
of their text without any optical character recognition. We extracted all text
encoded in the documents but have not attempted to extract optical data (i.e.
we have not applied any OCR) from the documents.
From the 118 documents we obtain 1.8 mega-bytes of raw unformatted
text. There are 37, 720 punctuation (character ’.’) occurrences in the files in
total, i.e. we expect in the order of, say, 20, 000 labeled sentences from the
dataset. Note that we use the document labels to label the sentences. See
table 5.3 for a summary of the number of documents across the 4 types of
sensitive information.
Tokenization. We applied the NLTK toolkit [12] and tokenized sentences
using the Punkt sentence boundary detection approach [55]. Given a sentence
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we generated probabilistic context-free grammars (pcfg) based constituent
trees [56], where the pcfg was trained over the Penn Treebank [95].
Before tokenizing sentences, we removed email headers, except subject,
and we removed ids (e.g. MONGLY...) and non-ascii characters. Our sen-
tence tokenizer yields 10, 774 sentences. The length distribution is shown in
table 10.2 (Chapter 10).
Sentence selection. We cleaned the data further by removing very short
sentences and very long sentences. We set the cutoff for minimum 5 words
and maximum 200 words in a sentence. By doing so, we removed 3160 short
sentences and 35 long sentences. We further cleaned ambiguous sentences
(i.e. sentences which are exact matches and which have been labeled with 2
different classes). There are 82 such sentences, yielding a total of 7537 high
quality informative sentences. The distribution over word length of the final,
cleaned sentence set is shown in table 10.3 (Chapter 10).
Labeling. We employ two label approaches. One where we use human an-
notators. Datasets with this label approach we refer to as the golden datasets.
Datasets from the second approach we refer to as silver datasets. We evalu-
ate the silver datasets in Subsection Silver Labels (page 126) and the golden
datasets in Subsection Golden Labels (page 127) using the same models and
demonstrate that performance results and learning from the silver datasets
carry over to the golden datasets.
Labeling - Silver labels. For the silver datasets we label each sentence
with the information type assigned to the overall document by the lawyers
at Baum, Hedlund, Aristei & Goldman. These datasets rely on very little
human annotation effort and thus with same cost provide much more labeled
data. We extract each of the 4 types of sensitive information from the full set
of 7537 sentences. This constitutes the positive (e.g. sensitive) labeled sen-
tences. From documents with different labels, we uniformly at random select
sentences for negative sampling for each class. This resulted in the distribu-
tion of sentences across classes shown in table 10.4. The labeling approach
to obtain the silver datasets provides a large number of labeled sentence us-
ing fewer resources. Clearly they may contain more noise than the golden
datasets, however we demonstrate in our evaluation Subsection Silver Labels
(page 126) that silver datasets carry intrinsic information on the sensitive in-
formation type. In particular we show that in Subsection Golden Labels (page
127) that models which transfer learning from silver to golden datasets are
stronger than models relying on golden datasets alone.
Labeling - Golden labels. The silver labels discussed above are especially
useful when sentence labels are missing or where only limited resources for la-
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beling are available. In particular for larger documents, though, a document
which contains sensitive information may also contain non-sensitive informa-
tion. E.g. an email may contain greetings or best wishes which is generally
not sensitive.
Labeling - Golden labels - Manual annotation. For silver labels such
documents may introduce noise. To study the impact of such noise in the
Monsanto dataset we carry out an evaluation study where human annotators
label sensitive vs non-sensitive sentences from the Monsanto dataset. These
new labels are provided as an additional resource with the larger datasets
containing the silver, document-based sentence labels.
We employ an iterative approach to developing annotation guidelines, with
discussion with annotators when they encountered corner cases initially.
In our new golden dataset we have labels from 3 annotators. The annota-
tors were given an introduction to the Monsanto case and the different types of
sensitive information. This included an initial meeting where we presented the
Monsanto Trial and discussed the various types of information which might be
deemed sensitive. We discussed the 4 definitions of sensitive information (see
Table 5.2). E.g. for the types of sensitive information the annotators used the
descriptive text in Table 5.2 to guide the definition of sensitive information
for the annotation process. For GHOST labels the lawyers were looking for
papers where there was discussion on who to remove as authors in order to
make an article appear as not being influenced by Monsanto. Also under the
GHOST label was communication where Monsanto made effort to discredit
experiments and scientists where the findings was deemed problematic by the
Monsanto team. For TOXIC and CHEMI there was some discussion with
the annotators how to distinguish between the two. Our response was that
TOXIC included when Roundup is toxic. This includes when or in which
circumstances Roundup could cause cellular change (e.g. cancer) and also
how to treat or store Roundup to prevent (or cause) toxicity. The documents
labeled CHEMI by Baum, Hedlund, Aristei & Goldman are focused on the
chemical properties of Roundup. E.g. which components are active and how
can they react with materials in the environment and which new reactive ma-
terials (molecules) might be generated under such reactions. Thus T OXIC is
on the toxicity and CHEMI is on the chemistry of Roundup (and the envi-
ronment in which Roundup is applied). The final type of sensitive information
is REGUL is on the tracking and influencing of government investigations and
regulation on the use of Roundup. Note that all types of sensitive information
(GHOST , TOXIC, CHEMI and REGUL) has special interest if studies
(controlled experiments) where properties of Roundup is under investigation,
the four types differ on the aspect or property of studies with which they are
concerned:
GHOST is concerned with ensuring support from scientist (to be signed au-
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thors) by funding or releasing studies.
TOXIC is concerned with the toxicity claims and consequences in studies
CHEMI is concerned with the chemical analysis and claims in studies
REGUL is concerned with the effect results or wordings in studies may have
on governmental regulating organizations
All 4 types of sensitive information discuss whether to fund or continue stud-
ies. GHOST and REGUL are also concerned with trying to halt studies
by outside researchers where the possible results are deemed problematic for
Monsanto. Specifically this can happen if the outside researchers are using a
different experimental protocol than Monsanto does internally. For GHOST
trying to stop publication of a paper led Monsanto to gather support for dis-
crediting the study in question and getting the study retracted11.
Before the annotation process itself we also had a workshop session where
we again presented the Monsanto trials and the documents from the trial.
During the workshop we also presented the annotation tool (see next para-
graph) developed to be used for the annotation process. Then the annotators
tried out the tool and we provided feedback on expected workflow and also
discussions when there was questions to the actual sentences. After this initial
close collaboration the annotators left and annotated the remaining sentences
offline and emailed results when done.
Golden labels - Using the tool. We developed a annotation tool which
allow the annotator to see the description of why the current document is
considered sensitive together with the current sentence and some sentences
before and after. A screenshot of the tool can be found in Figure 5.1. We
instructed the annotators using the tool as follows12:
1) Load the description file: click button "Labeling
Guide" (lower left corner) and select the file:
monsantoDataEntries.json
2) Load the data file: click the button "Load Data" (3rd
button from the top, left side)
3) Select a user: Select dropdown "Select User" (2nd
button from the bottom, left side)
You can click the arrow buttons left, right to move
between sentences.
11https://retractionwatch.com/2017/08/10/unearthed-docs-monsanto-connected-
campaign-retract-gmo-paper/
12See also
https://github.com/neerbek/taboo-mon/blob/master/doc/AnnotationDescription.
txt
58 CHAPTER 5. EVALUATION, DATA AND RESULT ANALYSIS
Figure 5.1: Screenshot of the annotation tool used for the golden labels.
See text for a description of functionality.
A few previous sentences are shown before the current
sentence to provide context together with the next few
sentences. In the application there is a context bar to
the right. This shows the current type of sensitive
information which is contained in the full document and
which we want to find sentences which contain. Below
the label there is provided a small descriptive text
which is written by the lawyer who labeled the document
and describe why the document is labeled as it is.
To label sensitive:
You can highlight parts of the sentence and click the
button "Annotate Sensitive" (or use shortcut key ’s’).
You can highlight complete sentences or multiple places
in a sentence where sensitive information is revealed.
To save annotations. Click "Save Session" (middle of
left side) and select a filename to save to.
In addition, we instructed the annotators as follows:
For a given sentence to be annotated, the annotator is instructed to consider
the type of sensitive information we are investigating, as defined in Table 5.2.
The annotator should then consult the guide text (in the context bar in the
right side of the application UI, see Figure 5.1). The annotator then has
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to decide whether this sentence contains expose any information about the
sensitive information type given.
The annotators were allowed to use the internet/Google to provide further
context. This was mainly used initially by some of the annotators to further
build a background understanding of the Monsanto case and for recall the
details of the case as introduced at the initial workshop.
Each annotator was given the same 1073 sentences taken at random from
documents labeled by the lawyers at Baum, Hedlund, Aristei & Goldman.
These 1073 sentences were distributed uniformly at random across each sen-
sitive information type.
Each annotator then labels the sentence sensitive or not, based on the
given sensitive information type.
Labeling - Golden labels - Annotation Results. We use majority of
inter-annotator agreement i.e., assign sensitivity to sentences which at least 2
annotators have labeled sensitive.
We found that on 65.88% of all sentences, all 3 labeled the same (sensitive
or not-sensitive). I.e., we applied the majority rule on the remaining 34.12%
of sentences.
To judge the inter-annotator agreement a number of metrics can be used.
There are the family of correlation coefficients metrics such as the Spearman
rho [70], which given 2 random variables with rank values (samples of 2 anno-
tator labels for our usecase) is calculated as the ratio between the covariance
of the two variables as numerator and the product of the standard deviations
of the variables as the denominator. Another family is the kappa family of
metrics [6]. We use the well-known Fleiss Kappa [29] which works for more
than two annotators and which tends to avoid over- or underestimation which
can occur with correlation coefficients such as Spearman’s rho [70].
Fleiss Kappa compares the sample probability with the probability of ob-
taining agreement from pure chance. The Fleiss Kappa metric takes values
from negative to 1, where below zero indicates agreement no stronger than
agreement by chance and 1 indicates perfect agreement. For our full set of
golden labels with 3 annotators we obtain a Fleiss Kappa:
Golden labels, Fleiss Kappa: 0.33
A rule of thumb interpretation of the Fleiss Kappa score given in [62] maps
our score of 0.33 to “fair agreement”. While this indicates fair inter-annotator
agreement, a higher score would be preferred. We note that our labels are
skewed towards non-sensitive and the Fleiss Kappa score is generally lower
on skewed data [6]. Calculating the Spearman rho to further characterize the
inter-annotator agreement, we obtain the mean Spearman rho over all pairs
of annotators to be 0.42. For Spearman rho a value of 1 indicates perfect
correlation. The value for Spearman rho on our data is in line with the value
for Fleiss Kappa.
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Outlook
We observe that out of the 274 released documents in the trial so-far13 only
118 have until now been labeled by human annotators. E.g. so-far less than
half of the Monsanto documents has been labeled, thus there is room for grow-
ing the Monsanto sensitive information dataset by obtaining labels for the rest
of the documents. A particular interesting future research direction could be
to generate an automatically labeled dataset by using the models developed in
Chapter 10 and trained on the already labeled data to generate automatic la-
bels on the unlabeled documents. These new auto-generated labeled sentences
could constitute a secondary dataset with automatic inferred labels and while
not of as high quality as the human labeled dataset this new proposed dataset
could be helpful in generalizing and help prevent overfitting by providing addi-
tional data to train on. See also Section 6.1 for further discussion on potential
future work.
5.3 Results Analysis
To motivate further the distinction between context-less and context-based
approaches we provide here an overview of performance of the different ap-
proaches. We compare the approaches discussed in this chapter and the deep
neural network approaches discussed in Chapter 4. In particular as an exam-
ple of a recurrent neural network (RNN) we use a Long short-term memory
(LSTM) networks and as an example of recursive neural network we use the
RecNN approach. See Chapter 4 for details.
We provide a performance overview in two ways. One where we compare
accuracy (fraction of correctly identified sentences) between the approaches
and a second overview where we compare each approach to the RecNN ap-
proach. Here we consider the fraction of sentences only found by RecNN but
not by other approaches. This metric tell us something about the effectiveness
and overlap between RecNN and other approaches. Specifically we compare
RecNN and the context-less approaches, as well as RecNN and LSTM ap-
proaches.
In Tables 5.4, 5.5, we show the accuracy percentage point increase when
using context-based approaches vs context-less approaches. We compare per-
formance on the datasets from Enron and Monsanto corpora. For an overview
of these datasets see Chapter 4.2. For the Enron corpus we show performance
on datasets PPAY, FAS, FCAST and EDENCE. In the row labeled “Enron
(mean)” we calculate average performance over the different datasets. For
the Monsanto corpus we show accuracy percentage point increases on both
our silver and golden labels (see discussion Chapter 4.2). The rows GHOST
(s), TOXIC (s), CHEMI (s) and REGUL (s) show results on the silver labels
13http://baumhedlundlaw.com/pdf/monsanto-documents
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on datasets GHOST, TOXIC, CHEMI and REGUL, respectively. The row
Monsanto (s, mean) is the mean performance gain (accuracy percentage point
increase) over all silver labeled datasets. In a similar fashion, rows GHOST
(g), TOXIC (g), CHEMI (g) and REGUL (g) show results on the golden labels
on datasets GHOST, TOXIC, CHEMI and REGUL, respectively, and the row
Monsanto (g, mean) is the mean accuracy percentage point increase over all
golden labeled datasets.
In the first table, Table 5.4, we show the different context-less approaches
considered in this work. These are InfRule, C-san;α = 1, C-san;α = 1.5 and C-
san;α = 2. See Chapter 3 for further description of these approaches. Our per-
formance measure is accuracy, i.e., the fraction of correctly identified instances
by an approach. For each approach a development data subset was used to
determine the ratio of sensitive to non-sensitive content which is used for set-
ting hyper-parameters. We have followed the setting of hyper-parameters as
done in [16, 84], see also Chapter 3. We have used a different development set
than in Chapter 10 which yields slightly different values from Table 10.6 and
Table 10.10.
Accuracy is given as usual (see also Table 1.1), for each dataset D and
approach the accuracy is
Acc =
tp + tn
|D|
where tp are the true-positive identified sentences, i.e., the sentences which
have ground-truth sensitive and which the approach identified correctly as
sensitive. Likewise, tn, are the true-negative sentences, i.e., the sentences
which have ground-truth non-sensitive and which the approach identified cor-
rectly as non-sensitive. The size of the dataset is denoted |D|.
In Table 5.4, the column Best is, for each dataset, the best performing
context-less approach among those considered here. We use the Best column
to compare against our context-based approaches in Chapter 5.5.
In Table 5.5, the column RecNN contains the accuracy obtained by our
best published RecNN model (Part II). The LSTM column contains the ac-
curacies obtained with the best LSTM model. Note that these LSTM results
for Enron are not found in Part II, but are added here to provide additional
information on alternative machine learning models. Hyper-parameters from
Monsanto silver datasets are reused. Both LSTM and RecNN (on both Enron
and Monsanto) use early stopping to complete training. Here, we stop training
when no increase in validation set accuracy is detected over 3 consecutive runs
over the training set. The models obtained are close in performance to the
more extensively trained models on the Monsanto datasets, reported in Chap-
ter 10. The LSTM and Monsanto performance in Table 5.5 has been obtained
using fixed hyper-parameters and stopping criteria to compare models given
approximately the same training effort.
In Table 5.5, the column CL contains the best context-less approach (see
Chapter 3) as obtained in Table 5.4.
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The column ∆1 is the percentage point improvement between the RecNN
model and the best CL model. The difference is measured as the num-
ber of correctly classified sensitive sentences on the test sets of the differ-
ent datasets. The percentage point improvement by adopting RecNN over
CL approaches, are 12.71% on Enron corpus, 9.77% on Monsanto, silver la-
bels corpus and −0.10% on Monsanto, golden labels corpus. This indicates
that RecNN performs well on complex sensitive information, in particular
on our larger datasets Enron and Monsanto (silver). As discussed in Chap-
ter 10, the RecNN and LSTM models seem to require more labeled data in
order to learn more than the context-less approaches considered here. We
also demonstrated in Chapter 10 that one way to obtain better accuracy for
RecNN when only little labeled data is available is to consider sources of sil-
ver, semi-automated labels and using transfer learning to further increase the
performance of RecNN.
The column ∆2 is a comparison of performance of RecNN vs LSTM. We
compare the percentage point improvement between the best RecNN model
and the best LSTM model in a similar fashion as for comparing RecNN and CL
approaches. In both columns a positive number indicates that the RecNN ap-
proach correctly classifies more instances than the approach compared against.
A negative number indicates that RecNN classifies fewer instances correctly.
The mean percentage point improvement in accuracy on Enron datasets is
−0.76%, on Monsanto silver datasets it is 1.77%, and on Monsanto golden
datasets the mean is 0.85%. We observe that where there was a large gain
when moving from context-less approaches to RecNN on the larger datasets,
the performance between RecNN and LSTM seems more at par, with RecNN
having a small increase in accuracy on PPAY, GHOST (s), T OXIC (s) and
REGUL (s). Both RecNN and LSTM approaches are context-based and en-
code the sentence context as a vector of artificial network neurons outputs.
The RecNN does this after a recursive structure (here constituent parse tree)
whereas the LSTM does this following a recurrent pattern, see the discussion of
artificial neural networks and recursive vs recurrent approaches in Section 4.1.
The second performance overview which we consider here is that of the
fraction of sentences which the RecNN approach correctly identifies compared
to other approaches. Take two approaches, denoted M1 and M2, and a partic-
ular dataset, denoted D. For example M1 can be the RecNN approach and M2
can be the InfRule approach and the dataset can be D = FCAST. Then for
sentences in the dataset, s ∈ D we are interested in comparing the number of
sentences where M1 identifies the label correctly and where M2 identifies the
label correctly. I.e., the sentences on which M1 (or M2) predicts the correct
label. We denote the sets of such sentences as follows
C1 = {s | s ∈ D and M1 identifies the label of s correctly}
and
C2 = {s | s ∈ D and M2 identifies the label of s correctly}
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The sentences identified correctly by M1 but not by M2 are then given
by subtracting set C2 from C1, i.e., C1 \ C2. To express this as a fraction we
divide by the number of sentences identified correctly by approach M1, e.g.
we divide by the size of C1
|C1 \ C2|
|C1|
(5.1)
which we refer to as the fraction of sentences only identified correctly by M1.
We start with the comparison between RecNN and the individual context-
less approach in Table 5.6. Here we calculate the fraction against the context-
less approaches InfRule and C-san (with various parameterizations, see Sec-
tion 3.3) and RecNN compared with the intersection of correctly identified
sentence over all context-less approaches (column Intersect). The fractions
(given as percentages) are calculated using Equation (5.1). A high percentage
means that a large fraction of the sentences identified by the RecNN approach
are not identified correctly by the compared approach and thus is an indica-
tion that the RecNN approach performs well on sentences where the compared
approach does not perform well. The higher the percentage the more the set
of correctly identified sentences by the RecNN differs from the set of correctly
identified sentences by the compared approach.
On the Enron dataset we observe that the context-less approaches seem
to have similar performance. We see a mean fraction in the range 18.55% (C-
san(α = 1)) to 26.47% (C-san(α = 2)). For the intersection of all approaches
the fraction of sentences only identified correctly by RecNN reaches 32.05%,
which indicates that the different context-less approaches correctly identify
different sets of sentences. To put this in another way, the context-less ap-
proach which comes closest to identifying correctly all sentences which RecNN
identifies correctly is C-san(α = 1) which identifies 100% − 18.55 = 81.45%
(as a mean) of all sentences which RecNN identifies correctly, however we
know that on 32.05%− 18.55% = 13.50% of the set of correctly identified sen-
tences (by C-san(α = 1)) at least one other context-less approach disagrees
with the identification of the sentence. A similar observation can be made
for Monsanto (silver), with the fraction of sentences only identified correctly
by RecNN compared to the intersection of context-less approaches is 51.53%,
and for Monsanto (golden) this fraction is 24.89%.
Two observations can be made based on these fairly large fractions; one, the
RecNN approach finds a significant fraction of sentences which is not found by
the intersection of context-less approaches, and two, we observe a high spread
in the fractions over single datasets by various context-less approaches and
parameterizations, which indicates that the set of sentences correctly identified
by the context-less approaches is highly influenced by choice of approach and
parameterizations. Furthermore, there does not seem to be a clear winner
in terms of which context-less approach to use, for Enron C-san(α = 1) and
InfRule are the two best, while for Monsanto (silver) the best are C-san(α = 2)
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and C-san(α = 1.5) and for Monsanto (golden) the best are C-san(α = 1) and
C-san(α = 1.5). It appears that the best context-less approach for a given
dataset needs to be determine using exhaustive search.
In Table 5.7 we list fractions of sentences only identified by RecNN when
compared to LSTM and the intersection of context-less approaches (the col-
umn Intersect, copied from Table 5.6 for easy comparison). First, we ob-
serve that LSTM generally has much lower fractions than the context-less
approaches. This is in line with in Table 5.5 where the two context-based
approaches RecNN and LSTM both obtain high accuracies. However, we ob-
serve up to 20.08% of sentences only identified correctly by RecNN for dataset
TOXIC (s), and in general for Monsanto (silver) we observe higher fractions
than for the other datasets (but still less than for the context-less based ap-
proaches). Comparing to Table 5.5 we observe that the mean difference in
accuracy for RecNN and LSTM (column ∆2) is 1.77%. Thus, the (mean)
fraction of sentences only identified by RecNN on Monsanto (silver) is 13.60%
which seems to indicate that the context-based approaches correctly identifies
different subsets of sentences.
In summary, we give an overview of the performance of InfRule, C-san
(with 3 different parameterizations), LSTM and RecNN approaches on our
12 datasets. We consider both accuracy as the fraction of correctly identified
sentences and, the fraction of sentences only correctly identified by RecNN as
performance metrics. While there is some variance in values, there is a clear
trend in that context-based approaches detect larger and different subsets of
sentences correctly than the context-less approaches. These findings are also
supported by the discussion in the coming chapters and the published works
in Part II.
Examples
Here we provide some examples to complement the analysis in the previous
section. We begin with PPAY, which is a dataset with sensitive information
type concerning financial so-call “prepay” transactions, see also Section 5.1
and Table 5.1. Here is an true positive example with sensitive content which
both RecNN and LSTM identify correctly
Subject: Re: Expedited DASH Process for Prepaid and
other Embedded Financings in Commodity Transactions.
Note that this example contains the word “prepaid” which seems likely to be
indicative of the PPAY sensitive information type.
A true negative example on PPAY without sensitive content and which
both RecNN and LSTM identify correctly is the following:
The bulk of actual bid mitigation, since market
operations began, has taken place with respect to bids
from generators in transmission congested areas.
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Dataset InfRule C-san C-san C-san Best
α = 1 α = 1.5 α = 2
Enron
PPAY 90.37% 90.30% 90.18% 88.65% 90.37%
FAS 59.75% 59.75% 59.59% 59.59% 59.75%
FCAST 75.00% 79.10% 63.49% 63.49% 79.10%
EDENCE 82.22% 83.71% 80.99% 73.42% 83.71%
Enron (mean) 76.84% 78.22% 73.56% 71.29% 78.23%
Monsanto (silver)
GHOST (s) 61.09% 52.26% 65.60% 71.99% 71.99%
TOXIC (s) 53.69% 50.00% 61.08% 62.78% 62.78%
CHEMI (s) 59.93% 56.95% 68.54% 72.52% 72.52%
REGUL (s) 60.74% 61.07% 69.46% 72.82% 72.82%
Monsanto
(s, mean) 58.86% 55.07% 66.17% 70.03% 70.03%
Monsanto (gold)
GHOST (g) 63.33% 77.78% 75.56% 75.56% 77.78%
TOXIC (g) 64.18% 73.58% 69.81% 69.81% 73.58%
CHEMI (g) 77.27% 83.33% 84.85% 84.85% 84.85%
REGUL (g) 80.60% 91.04% 91.04% 91.04% 91.04%
Monsanto
(g, mean) 71.34% 81.43% 80.32% 80.32% 81.81%
Table 5.4: Summary test accuracies of the context-less approaches.
While this sentence appears to be about financial transactions and terms such
as “bid mitigation” are associated with financial markets, the context seems
to suffice to determine the sentence as non-sensitive.
By contrast we here give an example from PPAY without sensitive content
which RecNN identifies correctly,but which LSTM does not
(4) Other Charges for US Service and Canadian Service:
Buyer shall be liable for the payment of invoices from
the railroad for demurrage and hazardous materials
storage charges incurred by ECFC as the prepaid shipper
due to Buyers inability to receive a rail car and/or have
a rail car placed on Buyers siding.
This constitutes an interesting case because it contains the term “prepaid” as
in the first example. Still, RecNN successfully determines from the context
that this is not sensitive. Similar worded sentences are likely to be found in
Enron contracts. It appears for this example having access to additional struc-
ture such as constituency parse trees, as the RecNN has, provides additional
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Dataset RecNN LSTM CL ∆1 ∆2
Enron
PPAY 96.30% 95.94% 90.37% 5.93% 0.36%
FAS 95.89% 96.61% 59.75% 36.14% −0.72%
FCAST 83.01% 84.96% 79.10% 3.91% −1.95%
EDENCE 88.56% 89.30% 83.71% 4.85% −0.74%
Enron (mean) 90.94% 91.70% 78.23% 12.71% −0.76%
Monsanto (silver)
GHOST (s) 83.27% 82.14% 71.99% 11.28% 1.13%
TOXIC (s) 73.58% 73.01% 62.78% 10.80% 0.57%
CHEMI (s) 80.46% 80.46% 72.52% 7.94% 0.00%
REGUL (s) 81.88% 76.51% 72.82% 9.06% 5.37%
Monsanto
(s, mean) 79.80% 78.03% 70.03% 9.77% 1.77%
Monsanto (gold)
GHOST (g) 77.78% 77.78% 77.78% 0.00% 0.00%
TOXIC (g) 71.70% 69.81% 73.58% −1.88% 1.89%
CHEMI (g) 84.85% 84.85% 84.85% 0.00% 0.00%
REGUL (g) 91.04% 91.04% 91.04% 1.50% 1.50%
Monsanto
(g, mean) 81.34% 80.87% 81.81% −0.10% 0.85%
Table 5.5: Summary test accuracies of the best context-less (CL) vs the
context-based approaches. Each column contains the best model obtained
with that approach. RecNN on Monsanto golden datasets includes the
transfer model RecNN-tf which was demonstrated to work well when we
have combinations of silver and golden labels (see Subsection Results -
4. Case: Overview on Golden (page 131)). Column ∆1 is the difference
in accuracy between RecNN and the best context-less (CL) approach.
Column ∆2 is the difference in accuracy between RecNN and LSTM
approach. In both columns a positive value indicates that RecNN has
higher accuracy.
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Dataset InfRule C-san C-san C-san Intersect
α = 1 α = 1.5 α = 2
Enron
PPAY 7.93% 7.93% 8.14% 9.73% 13.44%
FAS 40.18% 40.18% 40.35% 40.35% 40.35%
FCAST 19.24% 13.53% 33.70% 33.70% 41.15%
EDENCE 12.71% 12.54% 13.43% 22.10% 33.25%
Enron (mean) 20.02% 18.55% 23.91% 26.47% 32.05%
Monsanto (silver)
GHOST (s) 35.67% 46.28% 29.12% 22.35% 50.79%
TOXIC (s) 44.79% 50.19% 35.91% 32.82% 62.93%
CHEMI (s) 37.45% 38.68% 25.93% 20.99% 48.56%
REGUL (s) 34.84% 33.61% 22.95% 20.08% 43.85%
Monsanto (s, mean) 38.18% 42.19% 28.48% 24.06% 51.53%
Monsanto (gold)
GHOST (g) 34.29% 4.29% 18.57% 18.57% 41.43%
TOXIC (g) 26.32% 5.26% 2.63% 18.42% 28.95%
CHEMI (g) 16.07% 1.79% 0.00% 0.00% 16.07%
REGUL (g) 13.11% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 13.11%
Monsanto (g, mean) 22.45% 2.83% 5.30% 9.25% 24.89%
Table 5.6: The fraction of sentences only identified by RecNN, as given
by Equation (5.1). Last column Intersect is the fraction of correctly iden-
tified sentences by RecNN when compared to the intersection of correctly
identified sentences by all context-less approaches.
prediction power over the more linear structure considered by the LSTM.
From PPAY, an example with sensitive content which the intersection of
context-less approaches Intersect all identify correctly is:
NN at Macleod Dixon sent us a fax requesing copies of the
documents on the prepay.
This sentence contains the word “prepay” and is identified correctly by RecNN
and also the context-less approaches. Note the spelling error is from the
original text.
From PPAY an example with sensitive content, identified by RecNN but
not by Intersect is:
We intend to fit an actuarial model to predict option
exercises, and build some useful rules of thumb when
thinking about the future.
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Dataset LSTM Intersect
Enron
PPAY 2.42% 13.44%
FAS 1.44% 40.35%
FCAST 7.87% 41.15%
EDENCE 5.51% 33.25%
Enron (mean) 4.31% 32.05%
Monsanto (silver)
GHOST (s) 9.71% 50.79%
TOXIC (s) 20.08% 62.93%
CHEMI (s) 11.11% 48.56%
REGUL (s) 13.52% 43.85%
Monsanto (s, mean) 13.60% 51.53%
Monsanto (gold)
GHOST (g) 10.00% 41.43%
TOXIC (g) 2.63% 28.95%
CHEMI (g) 0.00% 16.07%
REGUL (g) 0.00% 13.11%
Monsanto (g, mean) 3.16% 24.89%
Table 5.7: The fraction of sentences only identified by RecNN, as given
by Equation (5.1). Here we compare against the LSTM approach (LSTM
column) and by the intersection of the context-less approaches from Ta-
ble 5.6 (Intersect column).
This sentence is about valuation (predicting value of something in the future),
which makes it plausible as a discussion of prepay transactions. The Inter-
sect approach identifies (incorrectly) this as non-sensitive which implies that
n-grams in the sentence are assigned low sensitivity scores. This is an exam-
ple of a paraphrasing that avoids “typical” keywords that would allow easy
identification.
From the CHEMI dataset from the Monsanto corpus (see Section 5.2),
with silver labels, an example is:
Ideally, he would be willing to discuss EPA assessment
of glyphosate and conclusion it is not carcinogenic b.
Minimally, he would participate and point out elements of
the IARC process that fall short of more in depth reviews
by regulators
Note that this text has been captured as a single sentence by the NLTK
sentence splitter in our tool-chain (see Chapter 4.2). It appears to be an
itemlist on the form “a. Ideally... b. Minimally...” where the first “a.” has been
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split away by the sentence splitter. The sentence is not sensitive in terms of the
CHEMI type of sensitive information, since it discusses EPA assessments and
not the chemistry of glyphosate itself. Both context-based approaches RecNN
and LSTM correctly identify this example as non-sensitive, however Intersect
identifies this example as sensitive. By considering the context of the use of the
term glyphosate, the RecNN and LSTM approaches can identify this sentence
as being non-sensitive, whereas the n-grams in sentence are associated with
the sensitive label.
From GHOST dataset with golden labels, where the use of ghost-writers
and controlling publications is labeled sensitive, see Section 5.2, an example of
a non-sensitive sentence identified as sensitive by both LSTM and Intersect,
but where RecNN correctly identifies the sentence as non-sensitive:
I wanted to ’tee up ’ an idea for a near term
communication, potentially via Forbes or another
appropriate media channel.
The sentence is about a meeting for discussing a publication, but it is not
about assigning authorship or ghost-writing. So the domain is correct (writing
publications) but this is not sensitive with regards to the GHOST (g) sensitive
information type.
5.4 Our Contributions
A key challenge in evaluating and developing new approaches for sensitive
information detection is the lack of good, public datasets with real-world ex-
amples of both sensitive and non-sensitive information. As discussed, while
some datasets has been previously released, none of these datasets fulfill the
criteria as a true evaluation dataset for sensitive information detection. Due
to the inherent sensitive nature of the data publicly available real-world data
including sensitive information is not easy to obtain.
To address this need we release publicly datasets with labels over the
Enron and Monsanto document sets. These two datasets with total 8 different
definitions of sensitive information types provide a novel and strong set of
data for sensitive information detection. We highlight the following strong
properties of our released datasets which form part of our contributions
• More than 750, 000 labeled texts.
• Both data and labels are humanly generated. I.e this is real-world data.
• Parse trees for all texts.
• 8 different types of sensitive information. The types represent very dif-
ferent kinds of information ranging from chemical texts to financial fore-
casts.
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• Sensitive and non-sensitive texts come from same data and are very
similar in structure
• Large datasets of unlabeled data is available which can be used for train-
ing unsupervised approaches and which potentially can be labeled in the
future in order to grow the datasets even more.
All 8 different types of sensitive information are presented as binary labels:
sensitive vs. non-sensitive. In the case of Enron, the original TREC labels are
per type of information such that the same sentence can be labeled as sensitive
(or non-sensitive) with respect to 2 different types of sensitive information. For
Monsanto papers the original labels provided by lawyers are disjunctive and
thus a sentence is only labeled sensitive with respect to one type of sensitive
information. This should make it easier to evaluate and compare different
sensitive information detection approaches. Our experiments show that the
sensitive information types in both datasets contain at least some context-
based sensitive information and the datasets may therefore serve as basis for
future investigations into the differences of keyword-based and context-based
approaches for sensitive information detection.
Furthermore we provide ready-to-use parse-trees for all sentences in the
datasets. We found in our approaches that structure in the sentences helps in
detecting sensitive information and the parse-trees makes it easy for others to
evaluate structured approaches over the datasets.
It is our hope that these processed datasets and the provided labels will
allow fellow researchers to advance the domain of sensitive information detec-
tion even further.
Resources available:
• General code including the parse tree parser: https://github.com/
neerbek/taboo-core
• Monsanto specific code: https://github.com/neerbek/taboo-mon
• Selective Training code (included for completeness): https://github.
com/neerbek/taboo-selective
• Enron labeled sentences with parse-trees: https://dataverse.harvard.
edu/dataverse/enron-w-trees
• Monsanto labeled sentences with parse-trees: https://dataverse.harvard.
edu/dataverse/monsanto-w-trees
Chapter 6
Outlook
The capabilities of computers to automatically extract information and con-
tent from unstructured text documents has increased rapidly in recent years.
This is also true in the sensitive information detection domain. In this work
we introduce new deep learning approaches such as recurrent and recursive
neural networks to the problem of detecting sensitive information in natural
language sentences. Experimentally we show in Part II there is an immediate
jump in detection accuracy from the adaption of deep learning methods to
the sensitive information detection problem. The new approaches allow us
to detect new types of sensitive information, beyond the capabilities of the
previous state-of-the-art keyword-based approaches.
We argue that considering the context of textual information is the key to
detecting the more general and complex forms of sensitive information. We
demonstrate that recursive and to some extend recurrent models do in fact
capture some of the important context. However, there are still many future
directions that might be fruitful to consider and which may lead to novel
and competing approaches for detecting sensitive information. Directions and
approaches which we just haven’t discovered yet.
In this final chapter of Part I we consider the possible directions of future
work in Section 6.1 and discuss the contributions in this work in Section 6.2.
6.1 Future work
Building on the work in this dissertation there are many possible areas and
directions which present interesting research directions in themselves and also,
potentially, completely new approaches with novel properties and potential for
detection of new, advanced types of sensitive information. Better approaches
for understanding context and informational content would of course benefit
the sensitive information detection domain, but also the general domain of
broad natural language processing as these are also important problems to
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tackle for the general field. Here we list some of the areas and directions
which we find to be of particular interest and potential.
• We demonstrate good results by including structure in the form of a
constituency tree rather than just viewing documents as sequences. An
interesting direction to consider is if we can stack several structures on
top of each other, i.e. similar to stacking LSTM to obtain a bi-directional
LSTM. Stacked sequential and convolutional models has shown promis-
ing results for other problems such as universal sentence representations
[21].
• Another interesting question would be to consider further and simpler
models that require less training data or computation resources. While
the focus in this work has been the creation of state-of-the-art perfor-
mance for complex sensitive information detection using advanced ma-
chine learning models, another direction could be to conduct a broad
comparative study into the differences among simpler models. Such a
study could be used to characterize the differences between simple and
complex sensitive information detection further.
• The selective algorithm for selective training presented in Chapter 9 is
a good start but we might be able to create better selective algorithms.
In particular it might be possible to create novel variants of the measure
∆MFO, which might be able to take into account other cluster measures
than the K-means one developed in Chapter 9. This in turn might lead
to even faster training and better accuracies. One direction here could
be to consider the spread or variance of a cluster as part of the improved
measure. Intuitively a cluster with high spread of members from centroid
contain at least some interesting information and should not be pruned
away even if they have high ∆MFO.
• The inverse shortcuts counter the vanishing gradient problem in our ex-
periments [74–76], see also Part II. The inverse shortcuts does so by
strengthening the error signal during the backpropagation step and thus
helps our approaches learn on large structures. An interesting future
direction could be to compare with the regular forward shortcuts ap-
proach and evaluate on several different types of problems, e.g. topic
classification, sentiment classification and sensitive information detec-
tion. This could lead to insights of which approach is better on which
problems. Combining the two approaches for stronger signals on very
large structures would very interesting. This could lead to new general
models which allow for longer sequences of neural layers before vanishing
gradients become a problem.
• In a similar vein it might be possible to view recursive neural networks
as a form of shortcuts themselves when the recursive structure is rele-
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vant to problem. Let the input be d = (w1, . . . , wnd) and a recursive
structure over the input be T . Assume the input has two words (wi and
wj) which are far apart i ≪ j in the document, while the words wi and
wj are relevant together. Let the length of the shortest path between
wi and wj in T be ℓ. Then the structure T provides a shortcut between
wi and wj if ℓ ≪ |j − i|. If a structure T (or maybe a set of struc-
tures) provides shortcuts for all relevant pairs of words then we might
obtain an easier problem-encoding than the original input document.
Whereas regular shortcuts or inverse shortcuts provides 1 shortcut per
step, the structure T could be viewed as providing a distance-based set
of shortcuts. Interesting topics to investigate could be; 1) Can we learn
such a structure unsupervised?, 2) Does the multi-dimensional short-
cuts stack with regular and inverse shortcuts, i.e. does it lead to better
performance?
Some interesting directions to work on with respect to the datasets we publish
• Our released Monsanto datasets contain both silver and golden sensitive
information definitions. This allows for extended empirically evaluations
as in Chapter 10. It could be interesting to conduct a similar study for
the Enron datasets also. Furthermore it would be interesting to com-
pare with the performance of our current approaches on finely labeled
datasets. Obtaining such a finely labeled dataset would require substan-
tial domain expert manual labeling effort and it is not clear if it is always
meaningful to carry domain specific definitions of sensitive information
all the way to sub-phrase level. In such case we may require a set of hu-
man annotators and then the label may become a distribution of labels
instead.
• Another interesting direction could be to consider large-scale additional
data labeled semi-automatically over the Enron and Monsanto datasets.
While we in this work presented innovative labeled versions of these
datasets with gold labels provided by human annotators, an interesting
future work would be to consider a set of silver labels based on current
best models for sensitive information detection. These models are set
to label all unlabeled data and the generated labels are then applied as
(silver) ground-truth labels for this additional set of documents. This
would increase publicly available datasets with labeled sensitive infor-
mation by an order of magnitude, similarly what authors did in [61] for
paraphrase detection on Twitter data. For sensitive information detec-
tion our models’ performance on hold-out labeled tests data can be used
to predict performance on unlabeled data and thus the quality of the
silver labels generated. Interesting followup questions to consider are
whether models trained on silver labeled data improves and how much
the added noise from the silver labels impact performance.
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6.2 Contributions
In this work we focus on the problem of sensitive information detection in un-
structured data. That is, the challenge of finding sentences containing sensitive
information. We discuss various challenges within this domain and capture
the problem of sensitive information finding in a number of definitions. Be-
low we list our contributions and we note the main research questions which
contribution addresses. The research questions, [RQ1],. . ., [RQ3], were posed
in Section 1.1. Our main contributions includes:
• The insight that paraphrase detection and sensitive information detec-
tion are related in terms of the types of informational or textual entail-
ment that they consider. This new connection enable us to:
• Adapt state-of-the-art approaches for paraphrase detection to the do-
main of sensitive information detection. This was directly aligned with
[RQ1] because this contribution motivated the use of constituency parse
trees to encapsulate context for complex sensitive information detection
• Specifically we adapted recursive neural networks for paraphrase detec-
tion to sensitive information detection. This was directly aligned with
[RQ1] because this contribution provided state-of-the-art ML (RecNN)
methods for complex sensitive information detection
• We introduce the concept of inverse shortcuts where we use early pre-
diction of label at each node in recursive structures. We demonstrate
that these inverse shortcuts can be used for training recursive neural
models in a meaningful and effective way. We demonstrate that we can
train complex RecNN models using only sentence, rather than phrase
based labels, thus this contributes to [RQ2] as it provided more efficient
training methods.
• A novel approach to more effective training through selective training
only on interesting examples. We show that our ∆MFO measure can
be used to achieve several times faster model convergence without sacri-
ficing predictive performance. This contributes to [RQ2] as this allow us
to train deep neural networks using efficiently using fewer computational
resources.
• Publication of 12, human labeled sensitive information detection prob-
lems over two distinct large document datasets In total we publish more
than 750, 000 labeled sentences together with constituency parse trees.
This contribute to [RQ3] as this is large set of available sensitive infor-
mation types which can be used for benchmarking.
• Our published datasets are the first ever large scale, public sensitive in-
formation datasets. Our datasets are all text from real-world settings.
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Furthermore our datasets contain both sensitive and non-sensitive in-
formation, whereas other previously published datasets have been ar-
tificially combined using very different types of documents in order to
obtain a sensitive information dataset. See the discussion in Chapter 4.2.
While our documents and the labels were previously available separately
on the web, they had never been put together in this way before and
the labeled sentences and parse trees had not been published before.
Furthermore we provide 4 human annotated golden datasets with sen-
tence level sensitive information annotation. We therefore provide the
sensitive information detection community with access to much needed,
new, readily available, real-world training and testing data to bench-
mark and further the algorithmic development and understanding for
sensitive information detection. This contributed directly to [RQ3] as
this provides the research community with publicly available benchmark
data as required to be able to benchmark different sensitive information
detection approaches.

Part II
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Abstract: State-of-the-art sensitive information detection in unstructured
data relies on the frequency of co-occurrence of keywords with sensitive seed
words. In practice, however, this may fail to detect more complex patterns of
sensitive information. In this work, we propose learning phrase structures that
separate sensitive from non-sensitive documents in recursive neural networks.
Our evaluation on real data with human labeled sensitive content shows that
our new approach outperforms existing keyword based strategies.1
Appeared as: Jan Neerbek, Ira Assent, and Peter Dolog. “Detecting com-
plex sensitive information via phrase structure in recursive neural networks”.
In Advances in Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, PAKDD ’18 [74].
1Minor changes to the published version. In particular, an error in the formula for F 1
score has been fixed. Non-pretrained embeddings of size 10 have been removed. All reported
trends and conclusions remain the same.
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7.1 Introduction
Detecting sensitive information in unstructured data is crucial for data leak
prevention. State-of-the-art approaches are based on defining keywords [10,
16, 38, 42, 84], i.e., assume that the sensitive topic is described in full by a small
set of keywords. While effective for simple sensitive topics as in named entity
recognition [16] and personal identifiable information [84], they ignore context,
i.e., the way in which people describe sensitive topics in natural language
phrases. As a result, they may fail to report complex sensitive information or
report false positives.
Concretely, complex sensitive information is characterized by the fact that
words are sensitive or not sensitive depending on their context. For example,
describing sensitive financial transactions might use the same vocabulary as
in the non-sensitive case, but using different expressions in natural language.
In this work, we therefore propose to extract the phrase structure from
sensitive information to learn these expressions, and create a recursive neu-
ral network model (RNN) [46, 88] that uses phrases to predict the sensitivity
of documents. We suggest a training approach for the RNN that requires
only document level sensitivity information and thereby does not require la-
beling individual sentences, phrases, or even words. Such fine-grained labels
are required for existing backpropagation-through-structure training, but are
generally not available in practice. Our evaluation on real sensitive content
with humanly curated labels demonstrates superior detection accuracy com-
pared to state-of-the-art keyword-based approaches. We furthermore show
that by boosting relative importance of incorrectly predicted samples we can
increase sensitive detection accuracy - in the extreme at the expense of an
increase in false prediction rate. This adds flexibility to our model and al-
lows for domain-based adjustment between prediction accuracy and end-user
confidence in detected samples.
Our contributions include:
• Introducing and analyzing complex sensitive information detection
• A new RNN model based on representations of multiword structured
phrases
• Training of our RNN model on document labels alone
7.2 Complex Sensitive Information Detection
We assume a corpus of documents D = {d1, d2, . . . , dm}, where each document
is a sequence of words d = (w1, w2, . . . , wnd) such that wi ∈ V and d ∈ D,
and training labels L : D → {0, 1}, where 0 means non-sensitive, and 1 means
there is (some) sensitive information.
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Note that the problem is asymmetric in that non-sensitive documents are
known to be completely non-sensitive, whereas sensitive documents may only
contain very little sensitive information. Thus, the problem is recall-oriented,
focusing on finding the pieces of sensitive information [10].
In existing work, each word w is assigned a sensitivity score sen(w), with-
out considering its context of use. In this paper, however, we differentiate
based on how the word is used, i.e., the sensitivity of a word is conditional on
its context d, the sequence of words in which it occurs: sen(w|d).
Definition 4 If for all words w and pairs of documents d, d′, we have
sen(w|d) = sen(w|d′)
then sensitivity is context-less.
Conversely, if there exists a word w′ and a pair of documents d, d′ such
that sen(w′|d) = sen(w′|d′), then sensitivity is context-based.
Please note that the definition reflects the asymmetry in sensitive information
detection as discussed above.
7.3 SPR - Sensitive Phrase based RNN model
Existing sensitive information detection approaches count co-occurrence of a
keyword, or small set of keywords, with other words in the text. Co-occurrence
is then taken as an indication of sensitivity. This works well e.g. for topics
like HIV where co-occurrence with terms such as AIDS is easily detected.
However, as we argue here, more complex topics, as in intricate financial
transactions, require models that can capture context. Sentences can have
arbitrary length and structure, which our model should be able to process.
We therefore encode the context of phrase structures, which are semantic
substructures in the text extracted through constituency parse-trees. Con-
stituency parse-trees structure a text into constituents, i.e., compositionality
through sub-phrases [90]. Creating phrase structure embeddings in a recur-
sive manner, we generate an encoding of the entire context. Varying sizes
of context are encoded by iterating in a large structure. Our SPR (Sensitive
Phrase RNN) model thereby captures the complexity in sensitive information
detection in natural language.
Phrase Structure
While sentences obviously can be interpreted as sequences, this does not re-
flect the way in which humans understand them. Consider the sentence
We may have to move to cash margining if necessary.
82 CHAPTER 7. DETECTING COMPLEX SENSITIVE INFORMATION
Figure 7.1: Constituency parse-tree (left). Node labels are syntactic tags,
e.g., NP Noun Phrase, VP Verb Phrase; cf. Penn Treebank [95]; note
SPR relies on phrase structure alone, not the particular label; corre-
sponding RNN (right).
It begins with a sequence of common words, “We may have to move to”,
that could appear in many different contexts. The particular context for this
sentence becomes clearer from the words “cash margining”. In sequence order,
the state after processing “We may have to move to” would be a general state,
whereas given “cash margining” first, we expect a more specific hidden state.
The latter order also reflects the grammatical structure in natural language.
We therefore propose to learn from sentences following their grammatical
structure instead. In Natural Language Processing, this structure is captured
in constituency parse-trees. Their leaves correspond to words, and nodes to
sub-phrases, as illustrated in Fig. 7.1. A depth-first descent from the root
node visits the words of the sentence in order. Constituency parse-trees can
be automatically generated in high quality for most languages [87]. Using
phrase structures as features we can successfully capture the context of words
in the way they are used in natural language. On the other hand, however,
phrase trees provide features which can be of arbitrary size and structure.
We therefore propose to build a model that can handle this variable input
by recursively taking in parts of the input. Concretely, we build a recursive
neural network structure.
Recursive Neural Networks with Phrase Structure
Our approach is to create embeddings of the complex structure in phrase trees
using neural networks. To handle input of arbitrary size we propose building
a recursive neural network (RNN) [89]. In a nutshell, a RNN recursively takes
in a new part of the input from the input structure. It includes output from
the previous step in the current step by applying the same architecture re-
peatedly. In this manner, recursive neural networks are capable of transferring
knowledge between the steps, and of taking in complex input structures.
Given a constituency parse-tree we process sentences in grammatical order
using the RNN recursively in a bottom-up fashion, where in each step we pro-
cess a new node in the parse-tree, ending at the root node. Processing phrase
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Figure 7.2: RNN; on the right unfolded in structure. A node has 4
possible inputs of which 2 are active at a time. For readability, not all
output edges are labeled V
trees through RNNs, we automatically learn what the relevant structures in
language are for the complex sensitive information detection problem. We do
not need to define the size or structure of the context a-priori, which makes
this a flexible and easily applicable model.
As illustrated in Fig. 7.2 (left), the recursive neural network is a function
that for each node in the constituency parse-tree is evaluated with the rep-
resentations of its children as input to generate its output representation (as
shown in the unfolded in structure illustration in Fig. 7.2 (right)). For a node
n with child nodes nℓ (left) and nr (right)
repn = RNN(repℓ; repr) = σ[Wℓrepℓ + Wrrepr + b] (7.1)
where σ is some non-linear activation function and repx is the generated rep-
resentation of node nx (for x ∈ {n, ℓ, r}). Matrices Wℓ, Wr weigh the different
inputs, b is an additive bias vector.
Representations for words are usually word embeddings [46], however, (7.1)
assumes that word representations (leaves) have same number of dimensions
as structure representations (nodes). Thus, it might be beneficial to consider
words and structure as two different learning problems. Fortunately, this
can be done with a minor adjustment to the equation above. We define a
transformation function t for child nodes nx as
t(repx) =
{
Uxrepx + bU nx is node
Wxrepx + bW nx is leaf
(7.2)
with nx ∈ {nℓ, nr}. We can then rewrite (7.1) as
repn = RNN(repℓ; repr) = σ[(t(repℓ) + t(repr)]
The decoupling in (7.2) gives us freedom to select optimal word embedding
size and hidden representation size [46].
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The output of a node in the tree is
on = σ(V repn + bp),
a prediction (sensitive/non-sensitive) based on the current node representa-
tion. Thus for internal nodes in the constituency parse-tree, we obtain our
prediction having only seen part of the structure so far.
Training SPR
For training, we use the unfolded network, i.e., copies of the RNN for each
node in the constituency parse-tree as illustrated to the right in Fig. 7.2. We
may backpropagate errors through the tree in a top-down order and aggregate
the errors across all copies of the neural network. This can be viewed as a
backpropagation-through-structure (BPTS) [35] approach.
Our SPR makes use of the well established softmax activation function
σ(x)[i] = ex[i]/(
∑
j e
x[j]) which provides a differentiable soft max of the output.
We expect only one answer to be true and therefore maximize (softly) the best
probability as the output. Using the softmax function allows us to interpret
the outcome as probabilities.
The prediction yn of SPR is given as yn = argmaxx∈{0,1} on[x] where on[x]
can be seen as probability that the input is x, with x ∈ {0, 1}.
Different sensitive domains require different focus on the model’s ability to
correctly predict sensitive vs. non-sensitive information. We model this using
relative weighing of the two types of information in the loss function (Different
weights are studied in the experiments). Adding everything together and using
cross-entropy for error function, we obtain our loss function
L = −
N∑
n=1
[
wtn log(pn) + (1− tn) log(1− pn)
]
(7.3)
where w is the weighting hyper-parameter. If w > 1 then we weigh sensitive
loss higher than non-sensitive loss.
Using the ground truth labels and BPTS we can learn our parameters θ
for maximal likelihood given our data. However, supervised BPTS as defined
in [35], requires a label for each node in the tree, which is not available and
would be difficult to obtain, as this would require assigning sensitivity scores
to phrases of increasing complexity. Still we can solve this challenge by prop-
agating labels from the root to the internal nodes of the tree. We can then
view SPR as learning to assign probabilities to each node wrt. being sensitive
or not. That is, if we have the same sentence s occurring in, say, 3 different
documents with label assignment l1=0, l2=1, l3=0, SPR will minimize the
loss function by assigning probability SPR(s) = 1/3. A similar argument can
be made for internal nodes in the constituency parse-trees. Thus sentences n
that contain actual sensitive information have MLE of SPR(n) = 1 because
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they never occur in a non-sensitive document. On the other hand, if there are
sentences that never occur in a sensitive document, their nodes have MLE of
0. We find that this approach tends to provide a self-regularizing effect and
we found no improvement of the accuracy of the models when adding further
L1 or L2 regularizing terms to the loss function, i.e. (7.3).
7.4 Evaluation Methodology based on public
available data
Working towards our goal of an representative empirical evaluation of sensitive
information detection approaches a key requirement is the availability of a
publicly available dataset. This data should contain representative examples of
sensitive information from “private” document collections. Once a dataset has
been modified or redacted it will in most cases no longer contain representative
examples of private sensitive information. Thus detection methods trained and
evaluated only on public datasets tend to target specifics and structure found
in the public data rather than tuned to the sensitive information directly.
These methods will often not accurately capture the specific characteristics of
sensitive information and therefore the evaluation will not be representative of
actual accuracy/performance. It is a further challenge that on one hand even
with access to a private dataset containing sensitive information these data
collections are obviously not available for publication as this would entail
publicizing information which for one reason or another has been deemed
sensitive. But on the other hand, public collections (such as public available
corporate web pages) has, as discussed above, no inherent sensitive content to
be detected and public data collections are therefore not suited for evaluation
of sensitive detection approaches.
For general or complex sensitive information detection, i.e. where the
definition of sensitive is complex and domain dependent, no public benchmark
data exists. In this work we provide access to a public real-world dataset. The
dataset contains much of the same types of structure as internal corporate
communications and we use this dataset to obtain a sensitive labeling which
contains different kinds of semantic sensitive relationships.
The dataset that we use is the Enron dataset [58]. The Enron data com-
prises of real-world complex interactions and where we can benchmark our
sensitive information detection approach. The Enron dataset was not orig-
inally intended to be published, but is now available in the public domain.
Therefore, we find that the dataset is uniquely suited as a benchmark of
real-world actual complex communication with possible sensitive information
embedded. The Enron data is a rare example of private data out in the public
domain.
There have been previous attempts at utilizing the Enron dataset as a
public dataset for sensitive information detection, e.g. [16]. However for real-
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istic evaluation we also need access to representative labeled data. I.e. relying
on automatically labeled data works well for examples with low inherent com-
plexity [16] and does not in general capture complex sensitive information
well.
So, to move beyond clear cut simple sensitive information captured with
automatic label generation from seed words and similar constructions, we in-
stead rely human expert labels given to the Enron corpus as part of a compe-
tition of the TREC conference. The labels were generated by human experts.
Specifically we take the annotations for documents containing information on
prepay transaction which were developed as part of the 2010 TREC conference,
legal track [22] [96].
7.5 Evaluation
Evaluation Methodology and Data
Complex sensitive information detection is not only a challenging task, but
also challenging to evaluate. Existing work has created evaluation ground
truth for sensitivity using three main strategies. The first strategy uses word
co-occurrence with seed words to semi-automatically label sensitive informa-
tion as ground truth [16, 38]. This ground truth uses the same assumption
as keyword-based detection that sensitive information co-occurs with other
sensitive terms, but does not reveal performance on more complex sensitive
information. Another strategy use sources of actual sensitive information,
such as WikiLeaks, and insensitive information from other sources. The ma-
jor disadvantage of this strategy is that insensitive and sensitive information
exhibit major differences in structure and content [42]. Thus, evaluation may
actually measure how well the differences in structure and content are learned
and not necessarily how well sensitive content is detected. The final strategy
uses human labeled data. However, the sensitive information in these ap-
proaches is typically simple like named entities (e.g. names of cities) [10], or
in general Personal Identifiable Information detection, such as person names,
sicknesses [84].
In this work we propose evaluation on the Enron dataset [58], an actual pri-
vate dataset which contains both sensitive and non-sensitive data, and which
is labeled by human experts. Our dataset contains examples of complex sen-
sitive information that cannot be characterized by a few keywords. It shows
the varied structure as seen in internal corporate communications and there
are different sensitive issues.
While this dataset has been used before for sensitive information detection,
e.g. [16], there were no complex sensitive information labels in the ground
truth. We here propose to exploit the human expert labels given to the Enron
corpus as part of a competition of the 2010 TREC conference, legal track [22]
[96]. Specifically, we study the case of prepay transactions.
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Table 7.1: Overview over our labeled extract of the ENRON/TREC data:
number of sentences and constituency parse-trees for each split of the
dataset.
set sensitive non-sen total non-sen/total
train 2985 6015 9000 0.6683
validation 462 968 1430 0.6769
test 322 638 960 0.6646
total 3769 7621 11390 0.6691
The Enron dataset has 1.2M+ documents [58], and there are 2720 docu-
ments labeled by human experts.
For each sentence in any document, we obtain constituency parse-trees,
11390 in total, which we split into training, validation and test sets, see Ta-
ble 7.1. All performance measures use the same test set, with no hyperparame-
ter tuning beyond what is reported in these tables. All word vectors come from
the Stanford Glove word vector set[79]. To evaluate performance, we study
accuracy of detection of complex sensitive information, with a particular focus
on finding sensitive data. Formally, if ground truth label ls = 1 on sentence
s and prediction of our model SPR(s) = 1 then s is true positive, if ls = 0
and SPR(s) = 1 it is false positive. Similarly for negatives. Ctp, Cfp, Ctn, Cfn
denote the counts of true positives, false positives, true negatives and false
negatives respectively. Accuracy of a data set D is then accD =
Ctp+Ctn
|D| .
Performance evaluation for complex sensitive information
We begin by studying the impact of input dimension of the word embeddings,
varying from 50 to 300. The hidden state internally is fixed at size 200. The
results are shown in Table 7.2, and as we can see, there is a clear increase in
accuracy as the dimension of the word embeddings is increased, but this trend
diminishes. Going from 100 to 200 the increase in accuracy score is 0.028,
whereas going from 200 to 300 the increase is negligible at only tiny 0.007.
Next, we investigate the impact of the size of the hidden state, here we
fixed word embedding size to 300. Similarly, to input word embedding size
which positively affects performance up to a certain point, we observe similar
performance increase when increasing internal hidden representation size, as
shown Table 7.3. There is a drop between using 200 neurons with another
increase for 300 neurons, after which the performance decreases again at 500
neurons. This suggests that we reach a level which provides a good size for the
internal hidden representation after which we most likely see effects of worse
performance due to overfitting as the model complexity exceeds what is useful
for a well generalizing model. We also evaluate the use of several layers at
each node (Table 7.4). In all experiments the sum of all neurons in the models
is fixed to allow for the same potential expressive power, and the number of
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Table 7.2: SPR-input; Perfor-
mance for varying size of input
word embeddings
vector size Accval
50 0.7531
100 0.7580
200 0.7608
300 0.7615
Table 7.3: SPR-hidden; Vary-
ing the size of the hidden state
hidden state Accval
50 0.7497
100 0.7650
200 0.7615
300 0.7678
500 0.7643
Table 7.4: Comparison of SPR-layer models as the number of layers is
varied, keeping the total number of neurons fixed
Hidden state layers Accval
300 1 0.7678
150 2 0.7554
100 3 0.7594
layers varies between 1 and 3. Here we find that the best hidden representa-
tion is a single, wide layer rather than stacked thinner layers. In [46], the best
performance for sentiment analysis is observed for a stacked architecture with
3 layers. While a throughout examination of these differences falls outside the
scope of this work, we make the following observation; Sentiment analysis has
a more Boolean behavior than sensitive information detection. In sentiment
a single “not” in the sentence can flip the expected label as in “good” vs.
“not good”. This Boolean property means that the model can make localized
decisions which suggest thin and high models, whereas complex sensitive in-
formation can be viewed as a measure on the complete context. I.e., sensitive
information is a property of what is communicated and is not as easily flipped
by a single word, which then suggests that a wide layered model will perform
better.
We compare our final model with state-of-the-art in the field of sensitive
information detection both in terms of overall accuracy, and in terms of the
performance when focusing mostly on the sensitive information, as opposed
to correctly predicting non-sensitive documents. As discussed in more detail
in Related Work in Sect. 7.6, state-of-the-art is based on word counting, i.e.,
word co-occurrences (n-gram), inference rules and mutual information models
are all keyword-based. In Table 7.5, Assoc Rules denotes [16] with default
parameters for “Email” corpus, C-sanitized [84] with α values as reported in
their experiments. Keyword-Based denotes a generic keyword based approach,
given optimal keyword set and is an upper bound for Assoc Rules and C-
sanitized. SPR-input: best model of experiments in Table 7.2, SPR-hidden:
best model of experiments in Table 7.3, SPR-layer: best model of experiments
in Table 7.4.
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Table 7.5: Overall accuracy comparison; Assoc Rules [16], C-sanitized
[84], Keyword-Based generic keyword based, given optimal keyword set,
SPR-input best of Table 7.2, SPR-hidden best of Table 7.3, SPR-layer
best of Table 7.4
Approach parameter Acc
baseline 0.6646
Assoc Rules supp= 2, conf= 0.6 0.7104
C-sanitized psen = 0.3354, α = 2.0 0.6479
C-sanitized psen = 0.3354, α = 1.5 0.6479
C-sanitized psen = 0.3354, α = 1.0 0.7240
Keyword-Based 0.7476
SPR-input 300 0.7615
SPR-hidden 300 0.7678
SPR-layer 1 0.7678
Table 7.6: Weighing sensitive examples in loss function; accuracy for
sensitive information; F1 measure
Approach AccSen F1
baseline 0 N/A
keyword-based 0.2795 0.4009
SPRw=1 0.3540 0.4720
SPRw=2 0.3540 0.4800
SPRw=3 0.7236 0.5143
SPRw=4 0.9224 0.5073
As we can see in Table 7.5, all approaches improve upon the base line accu-
racy value of 0.6646. Our models, as studied in the experiments above, outper-
form this baseline, and also existing keyword based approaches with respect to
overall accuracy. However, as discussed before, in sensitive information detec-
tion, we are typically much more interested in successfully identifying sensitive
information than we are in correctly predicting non-sensitive information. We
therefore conduct an experiment that investigates this case in depth. Over-
all, SPR successfully identifies complex sensitive information and outperforms
state-of-the-art particularly when focusing on documents containing sensitive
information as opposed to identifying non-sensitive information. SPR shows
value in capturing the phrase structure used to describe complex sensitive
information that might go unnoticed when relying on keywords alone.
In Table 7.6 we weigh errors on false negatives (unidentified sensitive ex-
amples) higher in the loss function. We report class-based accuracy AccSen
and also the F1 score which weights false negatives and false positives in a
single score according to F1 =
2Ctp
2Ctp+Cfn+Cfp
. We obtain close to 100% accu-
racy on sensitive example detection by increasing this weight, but for weights
90 CHAPTER 7. DETECTING COMPLEX SENSITIVE INFORMATION
Table 7.7: SPR semantics in related single words (top) and sentences
(bottom)
Label Close SPR embeddings
Dates May-02, Feb-02, Oct-03, Apr-01, Jun-99
Names Stacy Dickson, Martha Braddy, James Westgate, GEA
Rainey, Citibank ISDA
Good-byes “Yours sincerely, EnronEntityName”
“Signature of Company Officer”
Prepay “However, he did not attempt to calculate a VaR statistic
for the daily cash requirements for the exchange traded
positions”
“Li identified several of these and they are given on the
flowchart (gas settlements, merchant assets, etc.)”
Oil & Gas “The oil flows through the orifice and into the bearings
and forms a film that cools and lubricates the journal”
“In accordance with NFPA, the fire and gas detection con-
trols will be powered by a dedicated 24V DC battery sys-
tem”
greater than 3 the F1 score starts decreasing, reflecting that the number of
false positives now is so high that overall performance across both sensitive
and non-sensitive information degrades unreasonably. We observe that all of
the SPR models in Table 7.6 have higher performance than the best result we
can obtain using previous state-of-the-art algorithms. The weight parameter
allows our SPR model to be adjusted to the domain in a natural manner; for
some domains false negatives may be associated with high cost in which case
a corresponding high weight can be used to ensure a relatively low number of
false negatives. In other domains, on the other hand, too many false positives
may be undesirable and thus here it would intuitively make sense to have a
lower weight for false negatives.
Qualitative Analysis
For our qualitative analysis (see Table 7.7) we investigate the semantics that
SPR learns, i.e., how close selected groups of phrases are in terms of Eu-
clidean distance in SPR embedding space. Table 7.7 lists single words such
as “May-02” as being close to similar other dates. Please note that we did
not do any preprocessing for dates and “May-02” is not in our input vocabu-
lary. We can see that all our phrases in Fig. 7.3 seem far away from unknown
input words, which suggests that our model learns semantic meaning for all
phrases. The SPR model extracts these semantics automatically, as exem-
plified also for Names and Goodbyes. We observe that the space in Fig. 7.3
also contains structure where dates seem almost localized to a distinct point,
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dates
names
goodbyes
prepay
oil&gas
unknown
Figure 7.3: 2-dimensional view of SPR phrase model with colors high-
lighting 200 closest phrases of label groups listed in Table 7.7
where-as Prepay sentences form a curly line-like structure. The final listing in
Table 7.7, which we termed Oil & Gas due to its apparent semantics, is from
a region of the space completely devoid of sensitive phrases. Prepay on the
other hand, has 99.2% sensitive sentences, and is thereby a strong indicator
of how sensitive information is captured by SPR.
Our qualitative analysis shows that the SPR model indeed learns semantic
meaning from the documents. This suggests that the successful identification
of sensitive information in SPR is based on its ability to identify distinct
compositional semantic information.
7.6 Related Work
Early work in sensitive information detection is inspired by inference rule
discovery [16]. Here, sensitive information is defined from an initial seed set of
words and new inferred sensitive words are found using inference rules. The
inference rules are created based on word co-occurrence counting such that
words with high confidence are used as predictors. A word has high confidence
if the probability of the document containing sensitive information is high
given that the document contains the word. The authors argue that in contrast
to other domains, such as market basket recommendations, high support (the
word occurs often) is not required for interesting sensitive information rules
as we are interested in any word with high confidence, regardless of support.
In their qualitative evaluation, [16] use confidence for words as a sensitivity
score and detect sensitive information where any word in a paragraph has high
sensitivity score.
In [38], the inference rule approach is applied to detect sensitive infor-
mation that is to be redacted in software code-bases. The paper presents
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examples where a company has released software to third parties or to the
public, but where comments or function names have leaked internal sensitive
information such as insights into internal business processes or names of cus-
tomers. The goal of the work is to detect and redact sensitive information
in a way that allows new programmers to the code-base to retain the “source
code” understanding, i.e. the utility of the code-base, and at the same time
minimize the inferred sensitive information. The approach of [16] is used with
seed words and inferred rules to define what the sensitive information is in
this particular application case. An external ontology data such as WordNet
is used to count word co-occurrences for the inference rules and to obtain
synonyms for actually redacting the sensitive information.
In [42], direct word-to-word (bi-grams) co-occurrence counts are used to
determine which words are sensitive. Rather than considering precision or
recall, the false-discovery-rate (FDR), i.e., the inverse of the precision, is
used to ensure low number of false positives. The authors argue that too
many false positives lead to users ignoring potential leaks of sensitive infor-
mation. The word sensitivity scores obtained from bi-grams are evaluated as
well as a number of other black box methods. Two models are developed,
one which is good at removing non-sensitive information SApublic and another
one, SAsecret, which targets detection of sensitive information. By applying
the models in sequence, the number of false positives is reduced.
In [10], an assistive approach is chosen to semi-automatically rank doc-
uments in order to best detect documents containing sensitive information.
The documents are ranked by maximizing total utility, which is a measure
of the model’s probability that the word is sensitive together with the gain
associated with the word. The gain is a measure of the expected increased
accuracy from learning the true label of the word, i.e., the weighted increase in
F1 score as more false-positives or false-negatives are corrected. Experiments
are performed investigating the average increase in accuracy when top 5%,
10% and 20% of the data is probabilistically given correct labels.
[84] develops a pointwise mutual information (PMI) approach. PMI is
in this context the co-occurrence count of bi-grams, where one word from a
seed set of sensitive words is divided by the occurrence count of the candidate
word together with the count of the sensitive word. PMI is compared to a
threshold of the information theoretic Information Content (IC). IC is the
logarithmic value of the ratio of the occurrence count of the sensitive seed
word and the size of the corpus. An additional hyper-parameter α can be
used to control how strict the sensitive information detection should be, i.e.,
varying the α parameter allows for an increase of recall of sensitive information
at the expense of higher number of false positives.
All approaches above uses single word definitions for sensitive content.
While they differ in the precise sensitive information definition, they all rely on
seed-word and word pair co-occurrence counting. Such co-occurrence count-
ing of pairs ignores context as discussed above. In this work, our proposed
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SPR model uses the structure extracted from natural language, namely the
phrase trees, which feed into a recursive neural network that can handle ar-
bitrary length structures, and thereby learn automaticlaly what characterizes
the sensitive examples.
7.7 Conclusion
We introduce the complex sensitive information detection problem where con-
text and structure in language has to be taken into account. Our SPR model
extracts phrase structure to learn a recursive neural network model. Our
experimental evaluation, which is the first to use a real document corpus con-
taining both sensitive and non-sensitive documents with human expert labels,
shows that we outperform state-of-the-art keyword based models.
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Abstract: Leak of sensitive information from unstructured text documents
is a costly problem both for government and for industrial institutions. Tradi-
tional approaches for data leak prevention are commonly based on the hypoth-
esis that sensitive information is reflected in the presence of distinct sensitive
words. However, for complex sensitive information, this hypothesis may not
hold.
Our TABOO system detects complex sensitive information in text doc-
uments by learning the semantic and syntactic structure of text documents.
Our approach is based on natural language processing methods for paraphrase
detection, and uses recursive neural networks to assign sensitivity scores to
the semantic components of the sentence structure.
The demonstration of TABOO focuses on interactive detection of sensitive
information with the TABOO system. Users may work with real documents,
alter documents or prepare free text, and subject it to information detection.
TABOO allows users to work with our TABOO engine or with traditional
approaches, and to compare results. Users may verify that single words can
change sensitivity according to context, thereby giving hands-on experience
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with complex cases of sensitive information.
Video: https://youtu.be/tqQ4BP0wqs8
Appeared as: Jan Neerbek, Peter Dolog, and Ira Assent. “Taboo: Detect-
ing unstructured sensitive information using recursive neural networks”. In
Proceedings of the 33rd International Conference on Data Engineering, ICDE
’17 [73].
8.1 Detecting Complex Sensitive Information
Detecting and redacting sensitive information in documents prior to publica-
tion, Data Leak Prevention (DLP), is increasingly important in industry and
government, as more and more documents are made available publicly [16, 42].
Traditional approaches for DLP such as n-grams [42] or inference rules
[16], assign sensitivity scores to words directly without considering context.
These traditional approaches, including NLP inspired sentiment analysis, topic
modeling (e.g. Latent Dirichlet Allocation) or Named Entity analysis [47],
generally perform well for private information; usually entities such as location
or personally identifiable information [47].
However, a core challenge in DLP is that the definition of sensitive infor-
mation is often human specified and complex in nature. An entity, such as a
company name, may be sensitive in one context and non-sensitive in another
context, or sensitive information may not even be captured by a single name
or term alone.
Consider the real case that we use in our demo, namely the internal and
external communication of Enron, that was published when the company was
prosecuted for fraud [57]. The documents contain both sensitive and non-
sensitive content (manually labeled by experts with respect to complex issues
such as “prepay transactions” [96]).
An example for such complex sensitive information are so-called “prepay
transactions”, where “letters of credit” may be sensitive, but not if discussed
in the context of e.g. possible loan of money. We observe that sensitive
information may be embedded in the semantic meaning of the text, even
when the text contains only “non-sensitive” words.
Our TABOO system extracts compositional sub-structures of the sentences
to learn sensitivity scores. It builds on successful NLP methods including para-
phrasing, sentiment analysis and image-sentence ranking [54, 88]. TABOO is
motivated by the observation that complex sensitive information bears some
similarity to paraphrasing. Consider the (real) examples “We need letters of
credit, with approved collateral in order to approve the prepay transaction”
containing the sensitive keyword “prepay transaction”. It is a paraphrase of
“we have proposed letters of credit for the approved form of collateral pending
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further discussion” (shortened in the interest of space). Also this example is
sensitive even in the absence of the keyword.
In TABOO, a Recursive Neural Network (RNN) processes the sentences in
a structured way. The same neural network is applied recursively according to
the structure given by the syntax tree of the text. At each node in the syntax
tree the RNN generates a representation of the particular compositional sub-
structure captured by that node. These representations have been shown to
successfully predict whether one sentence paraphrases another [88].
8.2 The TABOO Engine
The TABOO system takes a set of documents containing sensitive information
as training input. Using the trained model the system then detects sensitive
content in new documents. TABOO consist of a number of steps to process
the input. As a learning system TABOO has two different modes of operation;
training mode and predicting mode. Training mode is used when training the
RNN model for improved predictions. When TABOO is introduced to a new
domain a training set must be provided and a RNN model must be trained.
The user can also choose to retrain an existing model, if, say, the definition of
sensitive changes over time. Once a model is obtained the system can be used
in predicting mode. Here, TABOO takes a document and detects sensitive
information in the document according to the model.
TABOO input documents are either loaded by scanning an input directory
or through the TABOO graphical user interface where the user can load or
write a document directly. Each document is then subjected to 1) Sentence
splitting, 2) Syntax Parsing and 3) RNN. 1) Splits the document into sen-
tences for further processing, using NLTK [11], the natural language toolkit
for Python. 2) Extracts substructures of sentences in the form of a parse tree
reflecting the structure of the sentence using the Stanford NLP parser [66].
3) Trains a model (or detects using an existing model) on the syntax trees
using Deep Recursive Neural Networks as developed by İrsoy and Cardie [46].
Training employs backpropagation-through-structure with dropout, evaluat-
ing recursively in feed-forward manner [46] and persists the model for future
use. Detection outputs the highest scoring prediction per sentence under the
model.
8.3 The TABOO System and Demo
Our interactive demo allows the user to load any document or devise any text,
and subject them to a number of sensitive information detection approaches
using different selectable definitions of sensitivity. The TABOO system also
allows the user to load a set of documents for training a new model under a
new definition of sensitivity.
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Figure 8.1: Main screen of the TABOO system. The user can load a
document or edit the text directly. Clicking “Run” subjects the document
to sensitive information detection under the selected model and definition
of sensitive information (“Dataset”). On the right, the user has access to
samples of sensitive and non-sensitive content.
For the demo, we additionally prepare real case text samples from the
Enron case that users can embed in documents for testing purposes or may
alter them freely to test the detection capabilities.
The TABOO demo comes with 3 different prediction engines, The RNN
model (our approach), n-gram model [42] and inference rules model [16].
In Figure 8.1 the TABOO system interface is shown. The left frame is the
main frame that holds the document for detection which is either loaded from
file, created or edited directly. The right side of the screen contains samples
of real sensitive and non-sensitive text for validation purposes. These samples
are not used in training to avoid any bias, and are color-coded red and green
to indicate sensitive and non-sensitive text snippets, respectively. Clicking
allows copying them to the document in the main frame. These samples can
be used as-is (in particular when working with a new domain or new definition
of sensitivity) or altered to challenge the detection capabilities of the different
models.
The underlying corpus (Dataset), as well as the sensitive definition given
through labeled training documents (Sensitive Definition Labels), can be se-
lected. The system comes with pre-generated models for 8 different definitions
of sensitive information. The user can also choose which particular approach
to use for detecting sensitive content; “RNN model”, “2-gram” or “inference
rules”. The latter two are traditional approaches. Clicking the Run button
executes the model on the document in the main window and highlights sen-
tences with sensitive content (in red).
In interacting with the demo, conference attendees will gain hands-on ex-
perience with the differences in detection power of different engines, and in-
sights into different complexities of sensitive information and the challenges
associated with them. The Enron case contains accessible sensitive informa-
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tion that is difficult to characterize, allowing users to develop an intuition of
when keyword-based approaches suffice and when the definition of sensitive
information is so complex that it requires a structure-based model such as the
RNN model we propose in our TABOO engine.
TABOO is designed as an analysis tool for determining the best approach
for a given application and for validating documents used for training. I.e., in
interacting with the system, the analyst can verify whether particular types
of sensitive information are successfully captured or whether more or different
training data is required. Different detection models can be persisted and
used for comparison and deployment in practice, making TABOO a tool to
manage different redaction requirements prior to document publication.
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Abstract: Distributed word embeddings and related models have been sho-
wn to successfully learn natural language representations. However, for com-
plex models on large datasets training time can be extensive, approaching
weeks, which is often infeasible in practice.
In this work, we present a novel method to reduce training time sub-
stantially by selecting training instances that provide relevant information for
training. Selection is based on the similarity of the learned representations
over input instances, thus allowing for learning a non-trivial weighting scheme
from multi-dimensional representations.
We demonstrate the efficiency and effectivity of our approach in several
text classification tasks using recursive neural networks. Our empirical evalu-
ation shows that the objective function converges up to 6 times faster without
sacrificing accuracy.
Appeared as: Jan Neerbek, Peter Dolog and Ira Assent. “Selective Train-
ing: A Strategy for Fast Backpropagation on Sentence Embeddings.”. In Ad-
vances in Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, PAKDD ’19 [75].
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9.1 Introduction
In computational linguistics, distributed word embeddings and related models
have been shown to learn successfully natural language representations [9, 20,
50]. However, their training time can be prohibitive, in particular for large
training corpora and complex models.
As a consequence, training time may be a critical factor in the deployment
and advancement of more powerful, expressive machine learning models. This
is certainly true for deep neural network models where training times of weeks
are reported [19] and where the quest for stronger and better neural models
drives doubling of models sizes (number of neurons) approximately every 2.4
years [37].
In this work, we present a novel highly effective training approach to train
Artificial Neural Network models much more efficiently. The core idea is
a selection strategy that focuses training to cluster-based structures in the
space of representations. In a nutshell, by focusing on instances with relevant
information for training, our approach requires fewer training iterations to
converge to a stable and effective model.
While in this paper we focus on the deep recursive training approach called
backpropagation-through-structure (BPTS) [35, 46] for text classification tasks,
our results are applicable to most classifier models which generate distributed
instance representations, e.g. all deep neural network models.
We demonstrate in our empirical study on several document corpora that
the gains in training time do not come at the cost of accuracy, but may even
bring a slight improved accuracy score1.
Unlike existing work on adaptive training, such as boosting (e.g. AdaBoost
[32]), where training methodology is modified, our focus is on modifying the
data samples used for training in order to speed up training times. Also, as
opposed to strategies that change the actual training methodology (e.g. [93]),
for example by updating the model in parallel using several mini-batches, or
by automatically adjusting the learning rate depending on the loss ([51]), our
work selects training samples that are then subjected to the original training
methodology. In this manner, our proposed method can be used in a large
variety of existing training approaches, speeding up training while showing
high model accuracy.
Our contributions include a novel selection strategy for training with sub-
stantial speed up while maintaining accuracy, an empirical study on four real
world datasets that demonstrates the effectiveness and efficiency of our ap-
proach as well as robustness of our approach with respect to parametrization,
and a detailed error analysis.
1Please note that the source code and the data used in our empirical study will be made
available online at publication time of this article
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9.2 Background
Distributed word embeddings [9] have been immensely successful in NLP for
a wide range of task including sentiment analysis [90], POS-tagging [20] and
text classification [50]. Many approaches learn unsupervised word embeddings
on large corpora such as word2vec [71] and GloVe [79].
Research in generating sentence embeddings from word embeddings in-
cludes VecAvg [63] which defines them as the average of all word embeddings
in the sentence. VecAvg has since been superseded by stronger models such as
recurrent neural networks (RNN) using gated memory cells such as the LSTM
[44].
A generalization of the recurrent model has been proposed in [87] as re-
cursive neural networks (TreeNN)2. In TreeNN models we may incorporate
semantic knowledge about the sentence in a tree or graph like structure. To
evaluate a TreeNN a walk is required from node to node through the entire
tree. This may negatively impact performance, and the walk may be hard to
parallelize, therefore various restricted version of the TreeNN have been pro-
posed such as Hierarchical ConvNet [21] and Graph Convolutional Networks
(GCN) [52] where the number of steps in the graph is restricted to a fixed
constant number. In our experimental study we consider embeddings gener-
ated by the full TreeNN model over the constituency parse trees as proposed
in [88], but our approach is more general and only assumes embeddings and
thus can be applied to any text/sentence embedding generating approach as
well.
9.3 Problem Definition
Given a dataset D of n texts D = {d1, d2, . . . , dn}, a ground-truth labeling
L : D → {1, 2, . . . C} with C classes, and label L(x) for x ∈ D, train a given
model m using as few training cycles as possible. Model m is parametrized by a
set of parameters θ ∈ Θ, where Θ denotes all possible model parametrizations.
The approach used to find a good model is referred to as the learning approach,
which we denote Tm, e.g. Tm could be the application of backpropagation on
model m.
Given (mini-)batches of b texts per cycle the learning approach updates
the set of parameters Tm : (Θ, D
b) → Θ, i.e., given a parametrized model mθ
and a subset D′ ⊆ D of b texts the training function returns a new set of
parameters θ′: θ′ = Tm(θ, D
′).
Efficiency of the training approach is then the expected number of ran-
dom batches of training texts that needs to be processed by Tm before the
performance of the model mθ converges, i.e., further batches do not bring
2In this work we refer to recursive neural networks as TreeNN to avoid name clash with
RNNs.
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mθ closer to L, as indicated by an error measure, such as the squared er-
ror (L(x) −mθ(x))2. We wish to minimize the objective function obj(mθ) =
1
|D|
∑
x∈D(L(x) − mθ(x))2, . Given a threshold ǫ, model mθ′ as the model
after training mθ on additional δ batches, then we say that the model m has
converged iff obj(mθ) − obj(mθ′) < ǫ , i.e., further batches do not bring mθ
closer to L.
In this paper, the expected number of batches to produce a good model is
used as a measure of the training time needed, denoted t(Tm) or just tm for
short. We define the training time optimization problem for a dataset D with
labeling function L, a model architecture m and training method Tm as the
minimization of t(Tm) under the constraint that model accuracy be preserved.
We consider the hard constraint that given a model trained on the full
training data mf
θ
and the model trained using our selection strategy ms
θ
, then
selection must perform at least as well as the full model, i.e. obj(ms
θ
) <
obj(mf
θ
). It would also be possible to consider soft, approximate versions, sac-
rificing some accuracy in the interest of training time, by demanding obj(ms
θ
)−
obj(mf
θ
) < ∆ for some small ∆.
For embedding based approaches we use a distributed representation of
the input to predict the correct label. Thus, our model mθ can be split
into a predictive part mp
θ
and an embedding generating part me
θ
as follows:
mθ = m
p
θ
me
θ
. In complex models the embedding layer may in fact consist
of several layers me
θ
= mL
θ
. . . m2
θ
m1
θ
. For our method, we only use the most
informative embedding which is the final embedding produced just before a
prediction is made.
Evaluating model mθ on training instance x yields mθ(x) = m
p
θ
me
θ
(x). We
refer to the output of the embedding layer as a representation of x: repr(x) =
me
θ
(x).
The key idea in this work is to exploit this representation as a means to
identify a subset of the training instances that does not contain information
for training. Excluding it from further training reduces training time t(Tm)
while not hurting accuracy.
9.4 Our Approach
To minimize the number of training cycles t(Tm) our goal is to select the most
informative training examples to be provided in training batches. Intuitively,
we want to choose the batches which increase performance of our model the
most.
Given a model mθ and input x we consider the generated representations
repr(x). If our model is strong then two inputs, x and x′, with different labels
L(x) = L(x′) should have different representations - because if the representa-
tions were very similar then it would be challenging for the model prediction
layer to distinguish between the two representations. Thus, we expect the two
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representations to be far apart. Furthermore, for a successful (strong) model
this behaviour can be expected across all instances. We informally refer to
this as the structure of the representation space.
We observe that the structure of the representation space allows us to
select training instances of interest, namely groups of instances with different
labels in close vicinity in representation space. Clearly, training on instances
with similar representations and identical label provides less information for
distinguishing between classes.
We therefore pose the problem of finding subsets of interesting training
instances as a clustering problem. While in general any hard clustering method
can be used, we use the well established K-means [17, 30, 64] as a simple and
efficient choice. In brief, K-means assigns representations into k clusters such
that the total sum (TS) of L2 distances between cluster centroid and cluster
members is minimized: TS =
∑
xi∈D
‖repr(xi)− cj(xi)‖2, where cj(xi) is the
centroid of the cluster that input xi is assigned to.
Let C = {C1, C2, . . . , Ck} be the resulting clusters, grouped exclusively
based on the similarity in representation space. We now analyze them with
respect to label purity to identify areas in the representation embedding that
have already been learned and can be omitted from further training. We
formalize this analysis as the ratio of the most frequently occurring (MFO)
class label ratio in a cluster, MFOi, as MFOi = maxℓ∈L
∑
x∈Ci:L(x)=ℓ
1
|Ci|
i.e.,
the ratio of the most frequently occurring class label in a cluster Ci is the
maximum (over possible labels) of the ratio between the number of instances
with that label and the cardinality of the cluster. Clusters with low MFOi are
valuable for training, whereas those where MFOi is close to 1 are uninteresting
as little more can be learned. A strong model has MFOi for all clusters close
to 1 (otherwise accuracy is low, see above). If there are only two classes {0, 1},
we simplify using the ratio for only one class fi =
∑
x∈Ci:L(x)=1
1
|Ci|
and obtain
MFOi = max(fi, 1− fi).
Our goal is to separate interesting from uninteresting clusters by finding a
suitable threshold for the MFO ratio to filter uninteresting training instances
away and focus training on interesting ones only. More formally we wish to
choose the lowest possible MFO threshold such that models trained with our
approach ms
θ
satisfies the hard optimization constraint, i.e. that the objective
function value over the data on our obtained model is at least as low as the
objective value obtained with standard training approach.
This can be seen as a balance between two forces: First, we want as high
a MFO threshold as possible. Higher MF O means we are filtering only data
where we are very sure of the label, and do not mistakenly dismiss information
from training. Setting the MFO threshold too low might lead to loss of
information that decreases the overall model accuracy. Second, we want to
remove as much training data as possible. Removing more data, i.e., setting
the MFO threshold lower means we have reduced training to fewer instances,
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i.e., we expect to use fewer minibatches for learning.
Obviously, the maximum MFO threshold is 1, but removes nothing and
obtains no training time improvement. If, on the other hand, we set the
threshold very low to remove as much training data as possible, clusters with
low MFO are dismissed from which we could potentially learn more. Clearly,
the best filtering cutoff is a trade-off. We propose to study the decrease in
MFO in the log-scale, and define ∆MFO = − log10(1−MFO). Intuitively,
we want remove as much training data as possible while keeping ∆MFO
as high as possible. Our empirical study suggests values in the range 2 ≥
∆MFO ≥ 1.5.
Algorithm 1 Proposed fast training approach
1: procedure
2: D ← corpus of labeled documents
3: k ← Number of clusters to generate
4: MFOcut ← cutoff for filtering
5: while pretraining do
6: ∆Acc ← rate of acc. improv.
7: if ∆Acc starts dropping then
8: break pretraining
9: Cluster using K-means
10: MFOi ← MFO for cluster i
11: D′ ← clusters with MFOi ≤ MFOcut
12: while main-training do
13: train on reduced dataset D′
14: if convergence is achieved then
15: break main-training
Algorithm 1 outlines our training approach. At prediction time we match
new data to clusters. For data in removed clusters we use its dominating class
label. For other clusters use the model trained on the reduced set. In the
experiments, we demonstrate that our approach indeed converges faster, i.e.,
uses fewer training epochs and converges to an accuracy that is as high as the
one for full time training on all data.
9.5 Evaluation
Data and experimental setup
We use the raw text document corpus Enron [58], comprised of actual email
and company documents that vary greatly in style, language and length and
thus provide excellent insights into performance on different types of text.
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Figure 9.1: Training time (in mini-batches) on 4 datasets
All documents are split into sentences and then constituency parse trees
(i.e., splitting sentences into phrases). Each phrase is to be placed in the
embedding space.
We use labels from ongoing efforts of the TREC conference [22, 96], where
different topics were labeled by at least 3 human annotators: FCAST :
267366 sentences regarding Enron’s financial state. We use 40000 sentences for
validation, 40000 for testing, and the rest for training. The ratio of sentences
in class 1 is approximately 31%.
FAS: 178266 sentences where Enron claims compliance with Financial
Accounting Standards3. We use 27000 sentences for validation, 27000 for
training. The ratio of sentences in class 1 is approximately 59%.
PPAY : 134256 sentences about financial prepay transactions. We use
15000 sentences for validation, 15000 for testing. Approximately 13% labeled
class 1.
EDENCE: 167913 sentences discussing tampering with evidence. We
use 25000 sentences for validation, 25000 for testing. Approximately 23% in
class 1. For further details see [22, 96]. Our processed datasets will be made
available online for the research community.
Empirical study and discussion
Fig. 9.1 on 4 different datasets of varying complexities shows that standard
backpropagation converges on the EDENCE dataset in 758, 000 minibatches,
and on the PPAY dataset, 3, 674, 000 minibatches are needed for convergence
even though the datasets are of comparable sizes. Our approach reduces the
training time by a factor of approximately 2 to 6. The actual reduction factor
seems to depend on intrinsic properties of the dataset. Consider FCAST and
FAS which have approximately the same runtime on the full dataset. Our
approach reduces this for FCAST by factor 2.42, while for FAS we obtain an
impressive factor of 6.1. It seems that FAS can be learned from fewer training
3http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/
DocumentPage?cid=1218220124871
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Pretraining Training Total
0 3, 674, 000 3, 674, 000
50, 000 2, 128, 000 2, 178, 000
100, 000 2, 365, 000 2, 465, 000
150, 000 913, 000 1, 063, 000
200, 000 830, 000 1, 030, 000
250, 000 1, 036, 000 1, 286, 000
500, 000 1, 818, 000 2, 318, 000
Table 9.1: Pretraining cutoff on PPAY
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Figure 9.2: Pre-train cutoffs, PPAY training curve
instances, which our method picks up on. Our approach can also be used to
improve model accuracy by training using more minibatches than the minimal
required (not shown due to space constraints; small accuracy improvements
of 0.1%− 0.4%).
Stopping pre-training, i.e., when to cluster and remove instances, can be
determined from the graph over accuracy as a function of training time (see
Fig. 9.2 for accuracy on PPAY using backpropagation; other datasets show
similar behaviour; omitted here).
Vertical cuts on the training graph show pretraining stopping points and
the number of additional mini-batch visits required after filtering.The mini-
mum (Total column) is at 200, 000 mini-batches. Comparing with cut-lines in
Figure 9.2 we note that the best stopping point for pretraining is where the
curve “bends”, i.e., where the rate of improvement starts to plateau. At this
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MFO ∆MFO Cluster count Percentage Total Training
- (0) - - 3, 674, 000
0.9970 2.52 1 3.6% 3, 362, 000
0.9945 2.26 3 11.9% 2, 574, 000
0.9940 2.22 4 19.3% 1, 194, 000
0.9867 1.88 5 23.0% 1, 030, 000
0.9863 1.85 6 26.9% 891, 000
0.9858 1.85 8 34.3% 1, 480, 000
0.9800 1.70 12 50.6% 1, 739, 000
0.9720 1.55 15 59.9% > 5, 000, 000
Table 9.2: Filter percentage, PPAY , 200K minibatches
.
point we have gained most (further gains are more expensive) and thus have
the best potential for out-performing full training. Further, our approach relies
on meaningful sentence embeddings and the “bend” occurs when large-scale
statistical properties of the data are encoded.
To determine how many clusters should be filtered out, we take the model
after 200, 000 minibatches and generate sentence representations. These rep-
resentations are clustered using K-means and we filter out all clusters with
a higher MFO ratio than a filter cutoff. Figure 9.3 shows clusters sorted by
the ratio of sentences with class 1 (using the simplified approach for 2-class
problems as described above). Clusters to be filtered (i.e., high MFO ratios)
are at the far left and right and clusters to keep are at the center. Note that
the MFO ratio for the far left clusters is much higher than the MFO ratio for
the far right clusters. For dataset PPAY it seems easier finding pure clusters
of label 0, whereas clusters with a high ratio of label 1 tend to be mixed with
many examples of label 0 occurrences. Thus, here we only filter clusters on
the far left.
We test different filtering cutoffs from 1 cluster (3.6% of data filtered) to
15 clusters (59.9%) and show converge times in Table 9.2. We observe marked
improvements for filter cutoffs in the range 19.3% to 26.9%. Cutoffs are shown
as vertical lines against class 1 ratio in Fig. 9.3.
Table 9.2 shows a large drop in ∆MFO from 2.22 to 1.88, where we thus
should place our cut to obtain a runtime of 1, 194, 000, which is significantly
less than the standard runtime of 3, 674, 000.
Table 9.3 shows the effect of different values of k is small on runtime. We
test different k values between 15 and 70 and compare runtime of 3 different
filtering cuts for each. Each cut is a row in Table 9.3 (“Small (S)”, “Medium
(M)”, “Large (L)”). “Medium (M)” corresponds to the optimal size cut and
the others are smaller and larger, respectively. We set the MFO cutoff such
that we filter approximately the same amount of examples across k values
(ratio of filtered examples given in column “Size”). Ratio of examples filtered
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Figure 9.3: Filter cutoffs (Table 9.2) over class 1 ratio.
k = 15 k = 35 k = 70
Size Time Size Time Size Time Avg. Diff
S 11.92% 1, 486K 11.91% 1, 683K 11.87% 1, 756K 6.32%
M 27.84% 924K 26.92% 891K 26.92% 1, 040K 6.19%
L 33.66% 1, 551K 34.32% 1, 480K 33.07% 1, 933K 11.21%
Table 9.3: Runtimes over k and filtering cutoffs (Small (S), Medium (M)
and Large (L)). Size is filtered data ratio. Time is measured as runtime of
1000s of minibatches, i.e., 1, 486K means that the training took 1, 486, 000
minibatches
varies only slightly due to filtering an integral number of clusters, but still
allowing a comparison of runtimes across different values of k.
Across k values we experiment with filtering a “Small (S)” amount (≈
12%) of data, a “Medium (M)” amount (≈ 27%) and a “Large (L)” amount
(≈ 33%). Table 9.3 shows that runtimes only vary slightly, i.e., an average
difference from mean of 6.32%, 6.19%, 11.21% for Small, Medium and Large,
respectively. Thus, k does not impact reduction in training time significantly.
9.6 Detailed Error Analysis
We study whether removing training samples leads to models that general-
ize as well as full training. We start by comparing prediction accuracy for
data used by our approach and full training in PPAY (76067 sentences with
embeddings from both).
Table 9.4 shows the standard approach misclassifies 1926 instances, where-
as our approach only misclassifies 1565. A more detailed inspection reveals
that out of these 1565, 869 are made by the full training approach as well, i.e.,
our approach makes 18.74% fewer errors and out of the remaining errors 55%
are identical to those of full training. We conclude that our speed up does not
jeopardize accuracy, but even leads to slightly improved results.
We analyze errors using K-means clustering on the embeddings (Table 9.5)
and observe that except for group 7 with 310 elements, all other clusters have
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Total number of shared embeddings 76067
Errors of the standard training 1926
Accuracy of the standard training 97.47%
Errors of our training method 1565
Accuracy of our training method 97.94%
Table 9.4: Shared embeddings in PPAY
Group id Cardinality Perc. of class label 1
1 97 100.0%
2 113 100.0%
3 112 99.1071%
4 188 98.9362%
5 134 89.5522%
6 202 78.7229%
7 310 74.8387%
8 78 71.0526%
9 185 48.6486%
10 148 41.8919%
Table 9.5: Error group statistics
size around 100− 200. This uniform size distribution (especially compared to
Fig. 9.3) suggests that the errors are not concentrated in any particular part
of the embedding space. Our approach thus is expected to generalize well, at
least there is no particular part of the embedding space where our approach
is weak.
Before studying actual examples, we note that the first four groups in
Table 9.5 contain 510 out of 1565 of our errors (32.59%) with high MFO, all for
label 1, which makes these groups interesting for future work on improving our
approach. Groups 6, 7, 8 have a medium MFO score, with group 5 showing a
slightly higher score. Finally, groups {9, 10} show lower MFO. From Table 9.6
with error examples from each group, we observe the following types of errors:
Soft errors. Clusters 2, 3, 4 contain examples of prepay transactions (la-
bel 1) where wording and structure seem to be good indicators of the class.
These clusters are candidates for future improvements. Cluster 7 seems simi-
lar, but shows greater diversity in label distribution, which is more challenging
to resolve.
Poor filtering. Cluster 8 contains examples of sentences which should
have been filtered out in pre-processing, and can therefore be used to inform
the pre-processing step.
Short emails and headers. Clusters 6, 9 contain examples of short
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Group
Id
1 Type of error: Document headlines
Example: Section 12.1 Duration
2 Type of error: Generic sentence
Example: I spoke to Tim today regarding the prepayment trans-
actions with terminated counterparties
3 Type of error: Stating facts
Example: Let me know, but as I understand it, the Chase agree-
ment should be a good format for this master agreement
4 Type of error: Prepay technicalities
Example: A similar swap was entered into between the American
Public Energy Agency and Chase on the same date
5 Type of error: Specific location
Example: New York, New York 10043
6 Type of error: Short standard email
Example: If there is anything else you need please feel free to call
me on 0207 783 5404
7 Type of error: General question wrt. entity
Example: Please let me know the nature of the transaction with
National Steel
8 Type of error: Bad text/filtering
Example: [. . .] – – – – – - Enron-6.11.00.ppt
9 Type of error: Preambles, email header
Example: RE: Swap Transaction; Deal No M180816
10 Type of error: Abbreviation and numbers
Example: The PSCO Project will be sold into TurboPark on
1/19/01
Table 9.6: Samples from each of the 10 error groups with description of
type of error. The Id column is over error Group Id and the second column
contains a description/headline of the type of error and an example from
the dataset of each type of error.
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email sentences. Again, this can be used to inform pre-processing e.g. com-
bining them with email subject, to/from or the like.
Hard errors. Clusters 1, 5, 10 contains headlines, locations and sentences
with little information, which we consider unlikely targets for improvement
based on sentences alone.
In summary, some groups can be used directly to improve performance
further in pre-processing, others offer potential for future work, and few con-
tain too little information to be correctly predicted. Models trained using
our faster selection strategy seem to generalize just as well as full training,
providing even slightly better accuracy.
9.7 Related Work
There is a large body of research on different training strategies, often with
the aim of improving the accuracy or stability of a classifier. The classi-
cal approach is AdaBoost [32] which adapts training depending on the error
observed by weighing “difficult” examples higher. At a very abstract level,
boosting also refocuses training.
However, there are two core differences between our approach and boost-
ing: first, we aim to reduce training time (i.e., speeding up convergence of
the model parameters) by removing samples that are not expected to bene-
fit. And secondly, we base the selection of samples on their multi-dimensional
representation rather than on the one-dimensional difference in ground truth
label and predicted label.
For an extensive survey of bagging and boosting in classification we refer
the interested reader to [59].
Adaptive learning methods, such as the one presented in [51] automatically
adjust the learning rate based on adaptive estimates of lower-order moments
in the loss function. [51] observe faster convergence of the model during train-
ing to a particular accuracy (cost) value compared to other popular learning
optimizers (AdaGrad, RMSProp, SGDNesterov, AdaDelta). Adaptive learn-
ing methods thus essentially adjust the learning rate, whereas our approach
takes a fundamentally different approach that adapts the training data being
used to learn accurate models much more efficiently.
A slightly different angle to the problem is taken in [93], which presents
a demonstration from COLING 2016 along with an analytical discussion that
model parameters can be updated in parallel during training of several mini-
batches. [93] observe parallel updates lead to read-write conflicts and following
potential errors in model parameters, but demonstrate one can still obtain con-
sistent results. Please note that our work again does not change the training
methodology as such, but instead the data to improve runtimes.
[99] combine local word context (neighboring words) with global context
(which texts or clusters does the word appear in) for learning text embeddings.
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They use K-means to identify different cluster centroids as global contexts.
Please note that while we also use K-means clusters in our approach, our
goals is not to distinguish between local and global context nor to improve
the embeddings, but instead to identify those clusters that should be removed
from training. The clusters that we are interested in actually contain little
(relevant) information such that dismissing them from further training speeds
up learning without hurting accuracy.
9.8 Conclusion
We present a novel approach for reducing training time on large text corpora.
We propose studying groups in representation space to identify where learning
from training data seems to be complete, and where more training is expected
to improve model accuracy. Discarding clusters with pure label distribution,
we refocus training to those samples that lead to high accuracy models with
less training time.
We show how to easily infer the parameters for selecting clusters using
rate of improvement on training graphs and our proposed ∆MFO measures.
In thorough experiments, we demonstrate up to 6 times faster training
without loss of accuracy on a number of datasets based on human labels.
Overall, our method allows training complex models on large data volumes by
identifying those samples that are most important to learning, while achieving
even slight improvements in training accuracy.
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Abstract: In this work we present a corpus for the evaluation of sensitive
information detection approaches that addresses the need for real world sensi-
tive information for empirical studies. Our sentence corpus contains different
notions of complex sensitive information that correspond to different aspects
of concern in a current trial of the Monsanto company.
This paper describes the annotations process, where we both employ human
annotators and furthermore create automatically inferred labels regarding
technical, legal and informal communication within and with employees of
Monsanto, drawing on a classification of documents by lawyers involved in
the Monsanto court case. We release corpus of high quality sentences and
parse trees with these two types of labels on sentence level.
We characterize the sensitive information via several representative sensitive
information detection models, in particular both keyword-based (n-gram) ap-
proaches and recent deep learning models, namely, recurrent neural networks
(LSTM) and recursive neural networks (RecNN).
Data and code are made publicly available.
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“A real-world data resource of complex sensitive sentences based on documents
from the Monsanto trial”. In Proceedings of The 12th Language Resources and
Evaluation Conference, LREC ’20 [76].
10.1 Introduction
Sensitive information detection addresses the problem of identifying (parts
of) text documents that are considered sensitive in a particular application
context. Sensitive information detection is of great importance in a number of
applications, where unintended leak of sensitive information may incur severe
negative consequences for individuals, businesses or authorities. In a study
from 2017 Poneman Institute and IBM find that the average cost of a breach
of sensitive information is $3.6 million in total, for detection, escalation, noti-
fication, and after-the-fact response [81, 82].
Sensitive information detection has been studied in the Natural Language
Processing and Machine Learning research communities [10, 16, 36, 38, 42, 74,
84, 85]. In this work we focus on sensitive information detection considered as
a form of text classification, where the goal is to predict whether a sentence
contains sensitive information. Here we consider sensitive information to be
domain specific and the definition in 4 different datasets in this work is given
by labels from domain experts.
A distinguishing feature of sensitive information detection with respect to
traditional text classification is that we are interested not only in the content
(topics and entities) but also in context [36]. In this work we follow [36] and
focus on context within a sentence.
A limiting factor in research and evaluation of sensitive information de-
tection methods is the lack of high quality corpora, which at least in part can
be attributed to the very nature of sensitive data. Given the lack of publicly
available real-world data, existing work has resorted to the creation of ad hoc
evaluation data by defining particular seed keywords as sensitive [16, 38, 84],
or by using two distinct data sources for sensitive and non-sensitive data [42].
Evaluations using these data sources are thus limited to comparatively sim-
ple sensitive information that is captured by keyword co-occurrence alone, or
may account for structural differences in data sources rather than for actual
accuracy of sensitive information detection.
As an example of the types of sentences we encounter in the Monsanto
corpus we provide here an example of a sentence from the GHOST sensitive
information type:
But I suspect that is wishful thinking Are you interested
in writing a column on this topic?
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This sentence has been labeled sensitive by the annotators, and indeed the
sentence discusses writing for Monsanto. Note that the sentence does not
explicitly talk about ghost writing or even authorship of the written material.
This is an example of where context influences sensitivity.
So far, a single corpus provides a language resource with real sensitive
information, namely, the Enron corpus [22, 58]. It contains corporate docu-
ments with a variety of information content and structure, and has been used
extensively to evaluate sensitive information detection [16, 42, 84]. However,
the corpus is unlabeled and more than 15 years old. Thus, the need for an
up-to-date labeled corpus for state-of-the-art empirical evaluation.
We here present a new real-world sentence resource with complex sensi-
tive information. We process, label, analyze, and characterize recently released
documents that are part of the Monsanto trial [7] as a source of great value
to the research community. We provide two sets; the first contains inferred
sentence level datasets based on expert labels at document level by lawyers
involved in the trial (“silver” labels); the second contains labels directly anno-
tated manually at the sentence level (“golden” labels). Following the 4 differ-
ent sensitive information definitions extracted from the trial documents, we
in total provide 8 classification datasets and 15, 000 labeled sentences. We re-
lease this language resource into the ELRA Catalogue of Language Resources1
together with source code for loading of corpus and building of new models2.
Furthermore, we characterize the complexity of the datasets in terms of
the sensitive information content in the sentences. In particular, we study
traditional sensitive detection methods such as n-gram or inference rule based
approaches and more recent deep LSTM models and recursive neural net-
works. We find that all datasets present complex sensitive information which
is not fully captured by traditional models. Complex models that consider
phrase-like context capture more of the complexity of the sensitive informa-
tion. Still, some sensitive information is not detected using existing methods,
which provides interesting open problems for research and evaluation of future
methods.
10.2 Related Sensitive Information Corpora and
Related Work
Sensitive information corpora are scarce due to the inherently private nature of
the data. This poses a challenge to research in sensitive information detection.
We here review document collections used for evaluation purposes.
Open datasets such as Wikipedia has been used for detecting well-defined
types of sensitive information, e.g. Personal Identifiable Information (PII);
HIV (Health) [85] or Catholicism (Religion) [84]. As discussed e.g. in [74],
1http://catalogue.elra.info
2https://github.com/neerbek/taboo-mon
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such forms of PII are often defined as a seed set of named entities which
are comparatively easy to detect, and such resources are thus not sufficiently
challenging for realistic sensitive information detection benchmarking.
WikiLeaks is used as a sensitive information source in [42], where other
webpages are considered non-sensitive. That is two very different sources for
content (internal secret documents versus public webpages) and successful
distinction may be due to differences in data source rather than sensitivity of
content. See also discussion in [74].
[10] uses a corpus of 1111 historical records from UK government on Per-
sonal Information and International Relations. The corpus is not publicly
available due to its sensitive nature. [67] shows that both types of informa-
tion can be modeled using features such as entity (person or country) and
sentiment towards this entity, and thus does not capture aspects of sensitivity
beyond such entity (sentiments).
The Enron corpus [16, 42] has been partially labeled by law students as
part of the TREC legal track NLP tasks [22].
The corpus we present in this work contains real documents with complex
sensitive and recent content. It complements the Enron corpus which concerns
mostly finances with further complex sensitivity notions as discussed below.
10.3 Curation of the Monsanto Datasets
The Monsanto papers and the series of trials from which they originate are
still ongoing. The trial(s) was begun in 2017 where a group sued Monsanto for
claiming Roundup3 to be safe, while Monsanto allegedly knew that Roundup
could cause cancer. The Monsanto papers are internal papers from Monsanto,
relevant to the trials and released due to effort by Baum, Hedlund, Aristei &
Goldman law firm during the trials4 [7, 69].
As part of this trial [7], law firm Baum, Hedlund, Aristei & Goldman cat-
egorizes Monsanto corporate documents into four categories (see below). No
formal definition is provided, but a headline and description of the (sensitive)
content in each document. Below we list the headlines and our informally
derived descriptions of sensitivity notions (manually created based on content
of sampled documents):
• GHOST , Ghostwriting, Peer-Review & Retraction. Concerns article
writing and peer-reviewing by Monsanto salaried people as well as ef-
forts in pressuring journals to retract damning studies without revealing
Monsanto connection
• TOXIC, Surfactants, Carcinogenicity & Testing. Concerns chemical
glyphosate (part of Monsanto product Roundup), in particular toxic-
3Roundup is a herbicide which is developed by Monsanto
4https://www.baumhedlundlaw.com/toxic-tort-law/monsanto-roundup-lawsuit/
10.3. CURATION OF THE MONSANTO DATASETS 119
Number 21
Id MONGLY 03934897
Link http://baumhedlundlaw.com/pdf/monsanto-documents/
25-Invoice-Showing-Monsanto-Paid-$20000-to-
Expert-Panel-Member-Dr-John-Acquavella.pdf
Link text Invoice Showing Monsanto Paid $20, 000 to Expert Panel
Member Dr. John Acquavella
Description This document is an invoice dated August 31, 2015 from
Monsanto to Dr. John Acquavella in the sum of $20, 700 for
“consulting hours in August 2015 related to the glyphosate
expert epidemiology panel.” at ∗1.
Number 27
Id MONGLY 02085862
Link http://baumhedlundlaw.com/pdf/monsanto-documents/
4-Internal-Email-Further-Demonstrating-Heydens-
Involvement-Drafting-Expert-Panel-Manuscript.pdf
Link text Internal Email Further Demonstrating Heydens’ Involvement
in Drafting Expert Panel Manuscript
Description This document contains an email from Dr. Heydens to Ash-
ley Roberts regarding the introduction to the Expert Panel
Manuscript. Among other features, Dr. Heydens’ draft at-
tempts to convey “that glyphosate is really expansively used.”
at ∗1.
Table 10.1: Example metadata harvested in human readable form: for
each document number and id, a link to the source, a link text and a
brief description are provided.
ity; declining funding for further studies; declining requested studies or
declining data to regulators
• CHEMI, Absorption, Distribution, Metabolism & Excretion. Discus-
sion on studies and results with regards to how animals and human reac-
t/absorb ingredients found when using Monsanto products. Discussions
on starting studies deemed “risky”. (Note, while TOXIC is concerned
with when and if Monsanto’s products might cause cancer, CHEMI
is more concerned with the actual chemical reactions with ingredients
found in Monsanto products.)
• REGUL, Regulatory & Government. Concerns rewards for scientists
that protect Roundup business; efforts to monitor and influence regula-
tive bodies for possible negative rulings or ratings related to Roundup /
glyphosate.
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Length (characters) Count
[0; 4] 1175
[5; 19] 1122
[20; 74] 2428
[75; 124] 2062
[125; 299] 3165
[300; 499] 573
[500; 1000] 195
[1000; 3165] 54
[0; 3165] 10774
Table 10.2: Raw sentence length distribution (in characters)
We downloaded all 274 documents (emails, doc, excel, scans, etc) from lawfirm
Baum, Hedlund, Aristei & Goldman5 with human readable description of 120
links to documents6. We matched the documents with the human readable
description. We resolved minor issues with matching document ids, links and
descriptive texts. We use the four different types of sensitive information that
Baum, Hedlund, Aristei & Goldman identified at the document level to label
the documents (as discussed above).
Each document is annotated by with number, an id, a link, a link text
and a description. An example is shown in Table 10.1. All documents are
pdf documents. Some are exported from emails, word documents, and so on.
Some of the documents are or contain scanned images of their text without any
optical character recognition. We extracted all text encoded in the documents,
but have not used OCR to transform non-text content.
Before tokenizing sentences, we removed email headers, except for the
subject. We used the NLTK toolkit [12] and tokenized sentences using the
Punkt sentence boundary detection approach [55], yielding 10, 774 sentences.
The length distribution is shown in Table 10.2.
We cleaned the data further by removing very short sentences (4 words or
less) and very long sentences (200 words or more). By doing so, we removed
3160 short sentences and 35 long sentences. We used label majority as the
label for the dataset. We obtain a total of 7537 high quality sentences (see
also Table 10.3).
We employ two labeling approaches to curate two sets of labels for each
Monsanto datasets, to create silver datasets and golden datasets.
For the silver datasets, we assign the document label (sensitive or not
with respect to each of the 4 datasets) to all sentences of that document, as
5https://www.baumhedlundlaw.com/toxic-tort-law/monsanto-roundup-lawsuit/
monsanto-secret-documents/
6https://www.baumhedlundlaw.com/pdf/monsanto-documents/monsanto-papers-
chart-1009.pdf
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Length (words) Count
[5; 9] 705
[10; 19] 2339
[20; 29] 1881
[30; 39] 1076
[40; 49] 572
[50; 74] 605
[75; 99] 203
[100; 149] 114
[150; 200] 42
[5; 200] 7537
Table 10.3: Final sentence length distribution (in words)
Dataset Total Train Dev Test
GHOST 6932 5900 500 532
3466 2949 245 272
50.00% 49.98% 49.00% 51.13%
TOXIC 2892 2200 340 352
1446 1099 176 171
50.00% 49.95% 51.76% 48.58%
CHEMI 2702 2100 300 302
1351 1048 154 149
50.00% 49.90% 51.33% 49.34%
REGUL 2548 1950 300 298
1274 951 170 153
50.00% 48.77% 56.67% 51.34%
Total 15074 12150 1440 1484
7537 6047 745 745
50.00% 49.77% 51.74% 50.20%
Table 10.4: Silver data (row 1: sentence count; row 2: sensitive sentence
count; row 3: ratio of sensitive sentences)
provided by the lawyers at Baum, Hedlund, Aristei & Goldman. Such silver
datasets thus require little human annotation effort (if we were to add more
documents), as the legal experts only need to label at the document level.
We thus have sensitive labels for all 7537 sentences. From documents with
different labels, we uniformly at random select sentences for negative sampling
for each dataset, resulting in the distribution of sentences shown in Table 10.4.
The silver labels are representative of application scenarios where sentence
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labels are not available or (too) costly to obtain. In some applications, and in
particular for larger documents, though, a document which contains sensitive
information may also contain non-sensitive information. E.g. an email may
contain greetings or best wishes which is generally not sensitive. For silver
labels such documents may introduce noise. To study the impact of such
noise, we also create golden labels where assignment of sensitivity is manu-
ally conducted at the sentence level. In the evaluation, we compare models
constructed and tested on datasets following either labeling approach.
The golden labels are provided by 3 annotators for each sentence in a sub-
set of about 1000 sentences. For annotation guidelines the annotators were
given an introduction to the Monsanto case and the different types of sensi-
tive information (the list introduced in the beginning of this section above),
and participated in a kick-off workshop7. Each annotator was given the same
1073 sentences taken at random from documents labeled by the lawyers at
Baum, Hedlund, Aristei & Goldman. These 1073 sentences were distributed
uniformly at random across each sensitive information type. Each annotator
then labels the sentence sensitive or not according to any of the sensitive infor-
mation types given. We use majority of inter-annotator agreement i.e., assign
sensitivity to sentences which at least 2 annotators have labeled sensitive. In
our data all 3 annotators agreed on label for 65.88% of the sentences. The
inter-annotator agreement can be assessed with the Fleiss Kappa [29] which
takes values below or equal to 1, with 1 indicating perfect agreement and less
than 0 indicating agreement by chance. Our Fleiss Kappa is 0.33 which in the
rule of thumb by [62] can be considered a “fair agreement”.
Distribution of labels in this golden annotated dataset is shown in Ta-
ble 10.5.
We observe that GHOST and T OXIC have sensitive ratio around 25%,
where CHEMI and REGUL are more skewed with a sensitive ratio around
15%.
10.4 Empirical Characterization
We characterize the sensitivity of information in sentences in our data resource
by an empirical study of existing approaches in the field. We place particular
focus on comparing silver and golden labels.
Detection Models
Broadly speaking, the models for sensitive information detection can be di-
vided into keyword-based and context-based [74]. Keyword-based approaches
7See also
https://github.com/neerbek/taboo-mon/blob/master/doc/AnnotationDescription.
txt
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Dataset Total Train Dev Test
GHOST 296 144 62 90
77 41 14 22
26.01% 28.47% 22.58% 24.44%
TOXIC 252 134 65 53
57 26 15 16
22.62% 19.40% 23.08% 30.19%
CHEMI 250 123 61 66
32 17 5 10
12.80% 13.82% 8.20% 15.15%
REGUL 275 139 69 67
34 19 9 6
12.36% 13.67% 13.04% 8.96%
Total 1073 540 257 276
200 103 43 54
18.64% 19.07% 16.73% 19.57%
Table 10.5: Golden data (row 1: sentence count; row 2: sensitive sentence
count; row 3: ratio of sensitive sentences)
assign probabilities to words (or rather, n-grams) occurring in sensitive (or
non-sensitive) sentences. They differ in how they utilize these probabilities
[10, 16, 38, 42, 84]. Context-based approaches consider the context (beyond
n-grams) of a word occurrence for assigning probability of a sentence being
sensitive. Dense embedding approaches can be seen as a prototypical way of
encoding context for a word (e.g. [71, 79]). In a context-based approach, the
probability of a particular word or phrase being sensitive is allowed to vary
with the context (sentence, paragraph, document) in which the word appears,
allowing them to detect more complex types of sensitive information that are
not characterized by (co-)occurrence of keywords alone. In this evaluation we
focus on sentence level sensitive information.
We quantify the complexity of our corpus by making use of these character-
istic differences in keyword-based and context-based approaches, respectively.
Simply put, datasets where the performance gap between the two is large,
contain more complex sensitive information. We use recurrent memory cell
neural networks, LSTM[44] and recursive neural networks, RecNN[27, 35, 90]
as examples of context-based approaches. Both generate an embedding for
each context and predict based on this context embedding.
Keyword-based approaches used are InfRule [16], C-san (C-sanitized) [84]
and an empirical upper bound on keyword-based approaches we term Keyword-
Max.
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InfRule. One of the earliest works in the sensitive information detection
domain [16] is inspired by association rule mining [2]. It considers words in
a sentence as events in a probabilistic process and discovers rules which can
either be simple: w → s (word w implies sensitive information s) or complex
combinations using conjunction, disjunction and logical not (w1 ∧w2 ∧¬w3 ∧
(w4 ∨ w5)) → s. The confidence of a rule is the fraction of times it occurs
and predicts correctly in the training set. We follow the setup in [16] which
uses InfRule on the Enron corpus using simple rules and a constant confidence
cutoff.
C-san. [84] use point-wise mutual information (PMI) between a word w and
a type of sensitive information s (s can be a known sensitive word or inferred
some other way) PMI(s; w) = log P (s∧w)
P (s)P (w) , i.e., logarithm of the probability
of the joint occurrence of word w and sensitive information s, normalized
by the probability of occurrences of sensitive information s multiplied by the
probability of occurrences of the word w. A sentence is considered sensitive
if its PMI exceeds a sensitivity threshold. The threshold is determined using
the information content (IC) of the sensitive information s, defined as the
logarithm of the fraction of occurrences of sensitive information s: IC(s) =
− 1
α
log(P (s)), where α is a user defined constant which reflects the cost of false
negatives. A text is sensitive if for any word we have PMI(s; w) ≥ IC(s).
The intuition behind this definition is that (for α = 1) PMI is maximal if
PMI(s; w) = IC(s) and word w will predict/disclose the information s with
probability 1, thus w is a good predictor. By dividing IC by α > 1 we detect
keyword-based predictors with lower than 1 probability and thus will be able
to predict sensitive information even when perfect predictors do not exist.
Keyword-Max. To identify how much of the sensitive information poten-
tially could be captured by keyword-based approaches, we include a form of
(upper) empirical baseline. We allow it to set hyperparameters based on the
test set, which means it is given access to additional information that in reality
is not available. It is still interesting as it denotes the limit of keyword based
approaches, and thereby provides a further indication of the complexity of
sensitive information that cannot be captured by keyword-based approaches.
LSTM. The sequential LSTM approach builds a neural network model and
for each word in a sentence applies the neural network in sequence. For a
given text t = (w1, w2, . . . , wn) and for each step consider a new word wi
and apply the neural network to obtain both a new memory cell state and a
hidden state. Whereas the hidden state is mainly used to parse information
from one step to another, the memory cell is “protected” by several gated
states which allows the LSTM to carry information across longer step counts
than what is generally possible using vanilla recurrent neural networks. In our
10.4. EMPIRICAL CHARACTERIZATION 125
previous work [75] we built LSTM models for sensitive information detection.
Prediction is based on the state arrived at after sequentially processing every
word in the sentence by adding a fully connected layer. In our evaluation we
apply these models on the Monsanto datasets developed here.
Please note that the LSTM could be augmented with structural informa-
tion similar to the RecNN below. In our dataset characterization, we use the
LSTM as a representative of unstructured sequential deep methods, and the
RecNN as a structured one. Both approaches use GloVe word embeddings
[79].
RecNN. As discussed in [74, 75] the recursive neural network, RecNN, ap-
proach has been used successfully for sensitive information detection. The use
of RecNN for context dependent tasks is motivated by the previous RecNN
models for e.g. sentiment analysis [90] and paraphrase detection [88]. In a
RecNN we are given both the text t and a structure over the text S. As
structure here we generate probabilistic context-free grammars (pcfg) based
constituent trees [56], where the pcfg was trained over the Penn Treebank [95].
Let Y be the set of all nodes in the structure and all words in t, then the struc-
ture S is a mapping from each element in Y to a list of parents also in Y .
The structure can be a directed acyclic graph (DAG). In this study we follow
[88, 90] and restrict the approach to only tree-like structures. In this case the
length of the list of parents is at most 1, and the list of parents is empty for
the root node in the structure. As described in Section 10.3, our data resource
contains constituency parse trees for each sentence (text) t. We follow [74]
where given a sentence, the root state is the last state of the evaluation of
the neural network on that sentence which may carry most information about
the sentence. As for the LSTM, we add a fully connected layer for predicting
sensitivity. Compared to our previous work we develop transfer learning for
the RecNN model between our silver and golden dataset and show improved
performance of the RecNN model.
Experimental setup. Both InfRule and C-san use a cutoff of minimum
confidence that a keyword must have. These cutoffs are set using the dev
dataset. In contrast, Keyword-Max is allowed to set that cutoff based on the
data in the test set, even though that is not available in a real application.
As we observe in our study, there is a limit to the sensitive information that
keyword-based approaches can successfully detect, which makes it possible for
us to reliably characterize complex sensitivity in our datasets. InfRule uses
default parameters on Enron data as in [16], C-san α values used in [84],
namely, α ∈ {1, 1.5, 2}. LSTM and RecNN approaches use GloVe embeddings
[79], with embedding size 100 given the relatively low number of labeled sen-
tences. Dropout rate 0.5 was found to work well for LSTM, while lowering
dropout rate for RecNN to 0.1 yielded the best results. For LSTM we obtain
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Approach GHOST TOXIC CHEMI REGUL
InfRule 57.80% 59.71% 60.33% 67.33%
C-san; α = 1 49.60% 52.94% 54.00% 61.33%
C-san; α = 1.5 62.40% 65.29% 67.67% 71.33%
C-san; α = 2 72.60% 70.29% 71.33% 74.33%
LSTM 83.60% 77.33% 86.67% 82.33%
RecNN 86.60% 75.00% 83.67% 87.00%
Table 10.6: Characterizing complexity of silver label data using accu-
racy of keyword-based (top) and context-based approaches (bottom):
keyword-based approaches can successfully capture the majority of sen-
sitive content; more complex sensitive information is captured by deep
learning methods; no existing method can fully recover all sensitive con-
tent
the best results using AdaDelta optimizer for learning rate optimization. For
RecNN the best results were found using stochastic gradient decent (SGD)
with learning rate determined through line search. Please note that we are
mainly interested in obtaining optimal performance for each approach such
that the complexity of the datasets is accurately characterized.
Silver Labels
In the following, we characterize our data resource with the above models
using silver labels for training and evaluation. For each sensitive information
type we train a specific model for each of the approaches.
In Table 10.6, we characterize sensitive information complexity using sil-
ver sentence labels on reported accuracy scores8. We observe that InfRule
generally finds more complex sensitive information than C-san when α is set
to 1, but if this parameter is optimized, C-san captures additional sensitive
information beyond InfRule results. We observe that InfRule and C-san gen-
erally perform better on REGUL, where differences between all models are
smaller. This indicates less complex sensitive information compared to the
other datasets. Additionally, we find that by giving keyword-based approaches
access to test set information, in the Keyword-Max model as described above,
we obtain an empirical upper limit on the less complex sensitive information
as follows:
GHOST TOXIC CHEMI REGUL
78.60% 73.24% 80.67% 75.00%
8More details on experiments parameters can be found in https://github.com/
neerbek/taboo-mon/blob/master/doc/ExperimentParameters.txt
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The context-based approaches LSTM and RecNN are capable of captur-
ing more complex sensitive information beyond the keyword-based approaches.
We observe that on silver labels LSTM has best performance on TOXIC and
CHEMI. These datasets both deal with discussions on cause and effect of
chemical compounds and experimental design. Likely, this follows a more se-
quential buildup, presentation-wise, which the LSTM is particularly designed
for capturing. Conversely, we observe that the structured approach RecNN
which has access to the constituency parse tree for each text shows best per-
formance for datasets GHOST and REGUL. Both datasets contain many
emails and are thus more conversational in nature. Accordingly, we observe
that the RecNN outperforms LSTM here. This shows that complex sensitive
information may show different structures in these datasets.
Overall, we conclude that all datasets contain sensitive information that
can be captured by keyword-based approaches, but also more complex types
that require advanced methods that exploit the context. We also note that
none of the approaches achieves close to perfect accuracy, i.e., these datasets
still provide potential for research on methods that can capture aspects of
sensitivity that are not currently detected.
Golden Labels
We now turn to the characterization of the data with respect to the golden la-
bels. We subdivide this study into four cases and due to space considerations
we restrict our characterization experiments to our most expressive model fam-
ily, the RecNN. While small differences occur, the overall conclusions remain
the same.
Furthermore in our 3. case we motivate the use of transfer learning between
our larger silver dataset and the smaller golden dataset as a way to character-
ize the level of sensitive information learnable from the silver dataset. Such
characterization is based on the concept of transfer learning discussed in [98]
for embedding based model families and thus not as such applicable to the
keyword-based approaches.
In our 4. case we return to characterization using all models, including
the transfer learning models and summaries the characterizations learned over
the datasets.
1. Case: Silver-to-Golden In this evaluation, we build silver label based
models and study how well they predict golden labels. This allows an un-
derstanding of how valuable the relatively easily obtainable document-based
silver labels are when compared to human labels on sentence level. Note that
in the silver dataset all the labels of the golden subset are sensitive. If the
models have learned to distinguish sentences containing sensitive information
from noisy, falsely labeled non-sensitive sentences then the model should pre-
dict some of the sentences correctly as non-sensitive in the golden dataset
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simply because the model has learned the sensitive information type. Put
differently, noisy sentences which are incorrectly labeled sensitive in the silver
dataset may be similar to non-sensitive sentences in the silver dataset. Con-
sider our previous example with sensitive emails. The initial greeting may
be very similar to other greetings from non-sensitive emails. Thus a model
may still learn to correctly label greetings as non-sensitive even though they
appear in a sensitive email. When this is the case, we say that the model has
successfully learned the sensitive information type, and it is an indication of
the usefulness of sensitive labels for training of sensitive information detection
models.
2. Case: Golden-to-Golden Here, models trained on golden labels are
evaluated against golden label test sets. This provides insight into accuracy
using sentence level human labels. A major challenge with the golden dataset
is its smaller size as it is based on manual effort, which may make the models
prone to overfitting. We train with different types of regularization to combat
overfitting.
3. Case: Silver-Transfer-to-Golden The third case outlines how transfer
learning models may combine both silver and golden labels to counter both
issues with noise in silver labels and issues with limited training data in golden
labels. It further provides an indication about the relationship between the
silver and golden labels beyond Case 1. Our study is based on transfer learning
for deep neural models as discussed in [98] for convolutional models (CNNs).
They train a layered model on one task and then transfer the weights to a
second task that benefits if sufficiently similar. In our study, we transfer all
layers except 1 from silver models and train the final layer using the golden
training set.
4. case: Overview on Golden We provide an overall comparison of all
models to characterize the golden dataset as we did with the silver dataset in
Subsection Silver Labels (page 126)
Results - 1. Case: Silver-to-Golden
In Table 10.7 we show precision for each class (sensitive vs non-sensitive) as
well as accuracy against the golden labels. Consider a correctly predicted
sensitive label as true-positive (tp), a sensitive label predicted incorrectly as
non-sensitive as false-negative (fn), a correctly predicted non-sensitive label as
true-negative (tn) and a non-sensitive label predicted incorrectly as sensitive as
false-positive (fp), then precision sensitive is Prec-sen = tp
tp+fn , and precision
non-sensitive is Prec-Non-sen = tn
tn+fp .
Due to space limitations, we here show results only for RecNN models that
capture most sensitive information in our previous evaluation. The focus in
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Dataset Prec-Sen Prec-Non-sen Acc
GHOST 31.82% 61.76% 54.44%
TOXIC 37.50% 83.78% 69.81%
CHEMI 70.00% 51.79% 54.55%
REGUL 16.67% 73.77% 68.66%
Table 10.7: Dive in on performance of RecNN model; Precision and ac-
curacy on golden label test set for models using silver labels for training.
this characterization is on the relationship between silver and golden labels; a
final overview also on the golden labels is provided in the final characterization.
From the results in Table 10.7 we observe that models trained on silver la-
bels do learn to correctly predict sensitive sentences vs non-sensitive sentence,
even though all non-sensitive sentences in the golden test sets are labeled sen-
sitive in the silver datasets. This demonstrates that datasets with silver noisy
labels indeed provide useful training data for sensitive information detection
models.
Results - 2. Case: Golden-to-Golden
In the interest of space, we only present RecNN characterization as before
(results for all models are summarized in the final overview). We train models
on the training data with golden labels and evaluate on the golden test sets.
As the golden datasets are relatively small due to the efforts in manually
labeling on sentence level, we particularly study overfitting. For this, we
show performance results on training, development (validation) and test sets,
separately (Table 10.8). As expected, the models that perform well on the
training data fail to generalize well to the development and test set, i.e.,
experience overfitting. Concretely, the models reach almost 100% accuracy
on the training set, but much lower accuracy on the development and tests
sets. Model hyperparameters was found through a line search on development
set9.
Except on TOXIC where we observe higher test score than just always
predicting “non-sensitive”, we observe that the overfitting results in worse
generalization (i.e., test scores being lower than major class fraction). TOXIC
seems to have a high ratio of sensitive information in the test set. The data
was sampled uniformly and thus the distribution is expected to be uniform,
but for small size datasets small variance in actual numbers can lead to a
biases which can contribute to the score on T OXIC.
The overfitting is a sign that the sensitive information types are difficult
to detect and require larger samples of labeled data to detect properly. If the
9https://github.com/neerbek/taboo-mon/blob/master/doc/
ExperimentParameters.txt
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Dataset Train Dev Test
GHOST 71.53% 77.42% 75.56%
100.00% 79.03% 75.56%
TOXIC 80.60% 76.92% 69.81%
100.00% 76.92% 71.70%
CHEMI 86.18% 91.80% 84.85%
100.00% 83.61% 80.30%
REGUL 86.33% 86.96% 91.04%
100.00% 82.61% 88.06%
Table 10.8: Accuracies on golden test set by training using golden label
training set only. For each dataset, row 1 is accuracy if always predicting
“non-sensitive”, row 2 RecNN accuracy. Note: 100% accuracy on training
set and poor test results mean overfitting due to small training sets.
Dataset Acc Non-sen
GHOST 77.78% 75.56%
TOXIC 71.70% 69.81%
CHEMI 84.85% 84.85%
REGUL 92.54% 91.04%
Table 10.9: Accuracy obtained on golden label test set using transfer
learning, i.e., trained first on silver label training set, then all but one
layers fixed and finetuning the final layer using the golden label training
sets.
Approach GHOST TOXIC CHEMI REGUL
InfRule 76.67% 73.58% 84.85% 92.04%
C-san; α = 1 77.78% 73.58% 83.33% 91.04%
C-san; α = 1.5 75.56% 69.81% 84.85% 91.04%
C-san; α = 2 75.56% 69.81% 84.85% 91.04%
LSTM 77.78% 69.81% 84.85% 91.04%
RecNN 75.56% 71.70% 80.30% 88.06%
RecNN-tf 77.78% 71.70% 84.85% 92.54%
Table 10.10: Characterizing complexity of sensitive information on golden
test sets using keyword-based approaches (top) and context-based ap-
proaches (bottom): keyword-based approaches capture more sensitive
content on less noisy golden data as compared to silver data; across al-
most all models and datasets performance increases slightly; in particular,
REGUL golden labels seem easiest to recover; transfer learning captures
most sensitive content as it makes use of both silver and golden labels;
no existing method can fully recover all sensitive content
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information types could be characterized using a simple set of keywords, then
we would expect our RecNN model to be able to obtain better performance.
Our results in Table 10.8 implies that our sensitive information types extend
beyond simple keyword based definitions and in fact contain some complex
information.
In the next section we address the need for additional data (using transfer
learning) and show increased performance for our models when we can com-
bine golden datasets with transferred learning from the silver datasets. This
indicate a key characteristics of our sensitive information datasets, namely
that they do indeed carry complex sensitive information which cannot be cap-
tured by simple keyword-based approaches alone.
Results - 3. Case: Silver-Transfer-to-Golden
We now turn to the combination of silver labels and golden labels using trans-
fer learning. As discussed above, transfer learning allows making use of both
silver and golden labels, thereby potentially counteracting noise and limited
training data. We used the same models trained on the silver datasets as above
for transfer learning with golden labels. We then trained a single layer model
on top of these (fixed) representations. We fine-tuned hyper-parameters using
line search and found adding data augmentation in the form of small amounts
of random noise to the input embeddings worked well as regularization. We
obtained the test accuracies shown in Table 10.9.
With transfer learning we are able to extract the most learning from the
datasets, i.e., obtain the highest accuracies across the datasets. Following [98]
we know that transfer learning performs well if the two tasks share similarities,
which means that silver and golden labels are sufficiently related, and can thus
be used for training and evaluation sensitive information detection models.
We have successfully transferred learning from the original models (the
silver labels) to the golden labels. This furthermore implies that our document
based silver labels actually provide knowledge which with relatively little effort
can be utilized for sensitive information detection, even at the sentence level.
Noise in the silver labels can thus be successfully ignored by the models used
in our characterization.
Similar performance even in the face of noise in the silver labels further-
more implies that, all things being equal, a larger dataset with silver labels
may be more valuable than a smaller golden label dataset. If available, the
combination of the two labels in learning seems a promising approach indeed,
both with respect to training and with respect to evaluation of approaches.
Results - 4. Case: Overview on Golden
We conclude the characterization by comparing all models on the golden
datasets. In Table 10.10, we provide a complete overview over results of all
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the models used to characterize the golden datasets. RecNN-tf here denotes
the transfer model discussed in the previous section.
We note that the golden dataset, as seen before, provides limited training
data, which means that RecNN does not perform well. The performance of the
different keyword-based methods is similar in trend as we saw in Table 10.6, C-
san performing better than InfRule when the α parameter is chosen to match
the dataset. On REGUL InfRule is slightly better than C-san, both worse
than RecNN-tf. The RecNN-tf model performs better than the keyword based
models, except for T OXIC where the small dataset sizes makes the keyword
based methods better.
Overall, the transfer model RecNN-tf provides the best performance and
thereby indicates how much of the sensitive information can be successfully
captured by the models in our study using both silver and golden labels. It
thus also provides an indication of the potential for further improvement of
sensitive information detection models using this data resource.
10.5 Conclusion
In this work, we present new, real-world datasets based on the Monsanto
documents labeled by lawyers involved in the court case. We provide labels
following two different labeling approaches, golden and silver, with the data -
in total 8 datasets for the sensitive information detection research community.
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